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The verdict on the Compact 
with Africa (CwA) in its third 
year is that private cross-border 
equity flows have not material­
ised and neither have domestic 
resources been mobilised. The 
African countries are not to 
blame, as their governance 
scores have improved.
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Currently, it seems that the
CwA is primarily owned by 
civil servants from the World 
Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. Moreover, 
neither the private corporate 
sector nor institutional inves­
tors seem to have fully bought 
into the CwA.
The CwA fails to stimulate 
inclusive growth. The weak­
nesses of the CwA approach
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
While there has been a long history of G7 initiatives relat­
ing to Africa, the Compact with Africa (CwA) is the first 
comprehensive initiative between the G20 and Africa.
The CwA's primary objective is to increase the attractive­
ness of private investment in Africa through substantial im­
provements to the macro, business and financing frame­
works. It aims to leverage private financing for infrastruc­
ture projects via blended finance to mobilise subsequent 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The Compact brings 
together selected African countries, international organisa­
tions — primarily the IMF, World Bank Group (WBG) and 
African Development Bank (AfDB) — and bilateral partners 
from the G20 to coordinate country-specific reform agen­
das, support respective policy measures and advertise in­
vestment opportunities to private investors. Through the 
Africa Advisory Group (AAG), the G20 tracks the progress 
of governance and cross-border flows.
In principle, any African country can join the Compact. The 
current group of African CwA partner countries, however, 
evokes the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative
of the 1990s, suggesting that political >like-mindedness< 
may have been a factor in the selection of the African CwA 
partners. The nine low-income countries (LICs) of the 12 
CwA partner countries were part of the HIPC initiative and 
were granted debt relief by bilateral Paris Club creditors 
from 1996. Further, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) adopted in 2005 allowed for the cancellation of the 
claims of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), WBG and 
the AfDB on HIPC completion point countries. It is precise­
ly these multilaterals who are managing the Compact Initi­
ative today. In this sense, the CwA initiative is a deja vu ex­
perience for Africa's HIPC countries.
The African CwA partners are, therefore, countries with a 
history of low >debt tolerance<. It is surprising, considering 
the limited capacity of these countries to mobilise tax reve­
nues, that the Compact favours financial instruments that 
tend to raise infrastructure debt and implicit fiscal liabili­
ties, such as blending and public-private partnerships 
(PPPs).
To monitor CwA partners in Africa, the G20 relies heavily 
on internationally recognised indices such as the World 
Bank's Ease of Doing Business (EoDB) index. However,
these indicators reflect the perceptions of narrow groups 
of individuals, mostly educated in advanced countries, and 
implicitly refer to levels of development instead of the pace 
of sustainable transformation. The governance indicators 
promoted by the CwA do not necessarily touch on the driv­
ing forces behind institutional, economic, political and so­
cial change. As well as the governance indicators, the qual­
ity of institutions — as measured by the World Bank's 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) —  is a 
key component of the monitoring mechanism integrated in 
the CwA design. CPIA scores determine the investability of 
CwA countries as they form the backbone of IMF/WB debt 
sustainability assessments. The IMF assessment of debt 
sustainability provides an important signal to private port­
folio investors and creditors, both domestic and foreign, 
and can act as a barrier to new private capital flows.
The strong negative correlation between per capita in­
come (PCI) and the relative importance of private finance in 
cross-border financial flows may have been part of the im­
petus for the CwA, notably via instruments of risk mitiga­
tion. It would be undeniably impressive if the CwA man­
aged to meet the challenge of stimulating private capital 
flows into African compact partner countries. It would also 
be reasonable to expect the same, ex ante, for African in­
frastructure funding. Traditionally, the private response to 
funding African infrastructure has been negligible. None­
theless, the Compact seeks to address the trend that offi­
cial development assistance (ODA) is declining and that f i­
nancing for development will increasingly have to come 
from the private sector.
Two years is perhaps not long enough to allow for an ap­
praisal of how effective the CwA has been in achieving its 
aims. Thus, the dominant approach in the official docu­
ments has been input orientation rather than output mon­
itoring. By contrast, this study is data driven. It assembles 
the most recent data on governance, debt, capital flows 
and savings in the 12 current CwA partner countries. Gov­
ernance scores have improved since 2016. However, FDI 
and national savings have not yet responded accordingly. 
In fact, both fell for the majority of CwA partners during 
the 2017-18 period. Thus, it often proved impossible to 
tame public debt dynamics. In view of the macroeconomic 
data discussed here, the positive tone of the CwA Monitor­
ing Reports to date appears hollow.
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In the 2019 Monitoring Report, the African Center for Eco­
nomic Transformation (ACET) concluded that the recipro­
cal commitment of investors was not guaranteed within
the CwA, resulting in an ill-defined >value propositions 
Consequently, the Compact is neither fully understood nor 
fully owned by the governments of CwA countries, even 
two years after it was launched. Our interviews have re­
vealed doubts, even in Berlin, about the sequence envis­
aged by the CwA architecture: first African CwA partners 
implement reforms, then private capital flows will arrive.
It certainly isn't a given that the CwA countries will form a 
club of middle-income countries (MICs). Some of the CwA 
countries might have the opportunity to create a club of 
MICs, provided they are able to tap into their economic po­
tential. This, in turn, could occur if the economic policies of 
African countries, and also the CwA, help to bring about 
structural change. At present, structural change is slow, the 
modernisation of agriculture is sluggish, and informality 
and thus poverty are prevalent. But, in the 2010s, before 
the Compact was launched, rising inflows of FDI, high 
growth rates, partly thanks to numerous reforms (industrial 
policy, better governance indicators and Human Develop­
ment Indices or HDI) gave cause for optimism. Through 
their cooperation with the G20 countries, the CwA mem­
bers can hope to further reduce both poverty and under­
employment.
In this study, we take a more detailed look at three quite 
different CwA countries, with which Germany has estab­
lished a special partnership: Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal. 
In all three countries, the presence of China and other 
emerging partners has helped boost growth in the last 
decade by stimulating raw material prices, providing lend­
ing from non-Paris Club countries and removing some in­
frastructure bottlenecks to improve trade logistics. Further, 
all three countries are characterised by an important agri­
cultural sector and high informality.
The contribution of manufacturing to the creation of bet­
ter jobs is inadequate in all three countries, particularly giv­
en the importance of young entrants into the respective la­
bour markets. Economic growth has, therefore, been 
largely >jobless<, failing to generate enough employment 
for the large number of young people. The imbalance be­
tween the increase in the supply of and demand for work­
ers has resulted in higher and persistent unemployment. 
Manufacturing firms rely heavily on imported raw materi­
als, which is generally not to their advantage given the lim­
ited availability of foreign exchange and lack of access to 
adequate credit —  particularly for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).
The CwA is a comprehensive blueprint for the development 
of selected African countries that aims to draw in the private 
sector rather than the country relying on official aid support. 
However, major shortcomings of the CwA architecture hin­
der its effectiveness. As already stated in our 2017 report, 
we feel that the Compact is not fit for purpose — namely to 
support resource mobilisation in low-income Africa.
-  The verdict on the CwA in its third year is that the an­
ticipated private cross-border equity flows have not
materialised and neither have domestic resources been 
mobilised. Thus, it has often proven impossible to tame 
public debt dynamics. The African countries involved in 
the Compact are not to blame, as their governance 
scores have mostly improved. While they have fulfilled 
their part of the deal, there has been no strengthening 
of private cross-border equity flows or domestic re­
source mobilisation.
-  For the majority of CwA countries, there has also been 
no tangible upswing in private cross-border flows. To 
revive the Compact initiative we would need to raise 
expectations and improve ownership, clarify the func­
tion of Compact Teams and provide better capacity 
support. As stressed by the ACET, the CwA model is 
neither fully understood nor owned by the govern­
ments of CwA countries. The value proposition of the 
initiative is not clear. Moreover, it is highly uneven as 
the CwA Country Matrices are full of stipulated govern­
ment actions and quantitative monitorable targets tar­
geting the African partner countries.
-  Currently, it seems that the CwA is primarily owned 
(and scripted) by civil servants from the WBG and the 
IMF. Moreover, neither the private corporate sector nor 
institutional investors seem to have fully bought into 
the CwA. Despite occasional announcements at semi­
nars and conferences, the proliferation of German sup­
port measures provided by the various government 
ministries and of policy actions required of the 12 CwA 
partners outlined in each of the country Policy Matrices 
can be blamed for the fact that CwA country govern­
ments have become confused and thus failed to active­
ly guide the Compact initiative.
-  The weaknesses of the CwA approach illustrate the 
need for a new agenda for development cooperation. 
The CwA fails to address the issues of how to achieve 
inclusive growth and how to eradicate poverty. The 
CwA currently being implemented represents a depar­
ture from the objectives set out in the Millennium De­
velopment Goals and Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).
-  I t is important to recognise that FDI alone will not be 
able to correct jobless growth. FDI in African countries 
is capital- and technology-intensive, i. e., the number of 
jobs created is low. Since the CwA mainly focuses on 
large-scale investment, there are certainly labour mar­
ket effects, but these are essentially rather small. On the 
other hand, FDI in the production of simple consumer 
goods — such as textiles and food — mainly aims to 
address the low wages. Here the number of jobs creat­
ed is greater, but the labour market effects in capital-in­
tensive production are comparatively limited. This is 
mainly due to the fact that proactive industrial policy 
would be necessary to achieve employment gains 
through linkages between foreign investors and local
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companies. However, the CwA does not envisage any 
labour market measures of this type.
-  Policies that enhance the complementarities between 
FDI and domestic investment should be promoted to 
ensure inclusive and sustainable growth. This should be 
a task for the country teams. The CwA strategy assumes 
that a high level of infrastructure investment and FDI 
will automatically result in linkages. However, the devel­
opment of backward linkages and local supply chains 
depends on (a) a favourable investment climate and (b) 
proactive measures to support local businesses generat­
ing growth and employment. If the backward and for­
ward linkages increase, this can lead to a greater dis­
semination of knowledge, technology and know-how, 
and also create employment. Government efforts to 
promote access to credit through financial sector re­
form remain important for strengthening local enter­
prises. But governments also need to encourage foreign 
firms to create linkages with the domestic suppliers. 
This could be achieved by introducing incentive systems 
and/or local content requirements. Or by promoting a 
change in industrial policy direction, i. e., no longer fo­
cusing on developing a national industry as a whole, 
but rather concentrating on sector-specific measures. If 
these measures are introduced in sectors which already 
have a comparative advantage, the upgrading of local 
enterprises can be managed more easily. This requires 
moving up through the value chain of a particular com­
modity or set of commodities to higher value-added 
activities. African economies can benefit most by spe­
cialising in particular segments of a value chain. This 
more focused type of policy can already be identified in 
some African countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Sene­
gal, Rwanda and Ethiopia.
-  Many countries are investing in the development of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and industrial clusters to 
attract foreign investors. There are a few examples of 
success, such as in Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal, but 
some of these SEZs have had and continue to have ma­
jor problems. Many have not even been very fruitful in 
terms of job creation or technological development. 
Some of them remain isolated enclaves linked to the 
surrounding area only by labour force employment. 
Nevertheless, SEZs also have many potential advantag­
es, including better transport systems, qualified labour 
and reliable access to electricity. Industrial clusters can 
also generate external economies. Although many 
clusters accommodate micro-enterprises and are infor­
mal, some become dynamic hubs where start-up com­
panies also become active. Support programmes for 
start-up companies and medium-sized enterprises, 
funds for young entrepreneurs, easier access to fi­
nance, and business development services can drive 
innovation and job creation. This can, in turn, help to 
attract FDI and encourage subcontracting to local me­
dium-sized enterprises. Although the SEZ concept is 
not a panacea for unemployment and poverty, the 
measures mentioned above can support the develop-
ment of local companies in the service sector, in indus­
try and in agriculture.
The CwA should focus on activities promoting the de­
velopmental role of SMEs. Dismantling market entry 
barriers for SMEs can stimulate economic growth and, 
hence, boost employment and raise incomes. Al­
though the overall environment for enterprise devel­
opment has improved, the World Bank's EoDB indica­
tors show that the situation remains critical for SMEs in 
many CwA countries. The German measures within 
the framework of the Development Investment Fund 
(DIF) complement the CwA agenda. Conceptually, the 
DIF measures have a different approach to the CwA. 
They provide support for medium-sized enterprises 
and start-up companies, promote the integration of 
African companies into the supply chain, and focus on 
vocational training measures through the Special Initi­
ative on Training and Job Creation (SIT). The aim is to 
stimulate sustainable investments with a high employ­
ment impact. The DIF implements projects in the re­
form partner countries Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. Projects in Rwanda are
in the pipeline. The special initiative is thus intended to 
contribute to the implementation of the G20 CwA. 
How effective and successful the initiative will be still 
remains to be seen.
I nterventions at sector level, coordinated around a tar­
geted set of activities and embedded in a competitive 
framework, can be an important driver of economic 
transformation. This, in turn, is crucial for sustained job 
creation, inclusion and diversified economies. The key 
factor here is that sector-level interventions (and not 
just interventions at the company or country level) are 
important and have implications for actors looking to 
support economic transformation. Economic opportu­
nities were identified in all the countries where transfor­
mation had been successful. This included, for instance, 
the identification of opportunities in rising markets 
(Ethiopia, Rwanda), opportunities presented by global 
outsourcing, such as automobiles in Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt, the pivotal role of agriculture in some Afri­
can economies, such as cocoa in Ghana, Senegal and 
Cote d'Ivoire, and using SEZs and trade preferences in 
the garment sector as a first step into manufacturing in 
Ethiopia (which also created jobs for women).
Although many countries still regard manufacturing as 
especially important, it is necessary to focus activities 
on the sectors with comparative advantages, including 
industries without smokestacks< (ICT-based services, 
tourism and transport), which are outpacing the 
growth of the manufacturing sector). The challenge is 
to use the opportunities in these industries in a way 
that sets the virtuous circle of learning, diversification 
of capabilities and knowledge spillovers in motion.
The CwA agenda also seeks to improve countries' ex­
port performance. This requires the development of
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infrastructure and FDI inflows. However, in order to 
fundamentally improve export performance, more 
far-reaching measures must be implemented. Since Af­
rica's ability to compete with Asian manufacturers is 
limited, alternatives must be found. Reports by UNI­
DO, UNCTAD, FAO and the World Bank present some 
viable options. Agricultural exports share many of the 
features of manufacturing, both in terms of their po­
tential to spur growth and employment, and the insti­
tutional constraints they face in trying to achieve this 
potential. Agricultural products, such as cotton, cof­
fee, cocoa and groundnuts, still dominate the exports 
of many CwA countries and affect the livelihoods of 
very large numbers of rural residents and smallholder 
farmers. Exports of specialty coffees, e . g ., in Rwanda, 
illustrate the potential gains from exports of agricultur­
al commodities through technological transfer and 
product upgrading. The neglect of the agricultural sec­
tor, which employs the majority of people in the CwA 
countries, can be addressed through the targeted ag­
ricultural modernisation associated with the develop­
ment of agro-industries. This would require expanding 
the infrastructure not only in the urban centres but 
also the neglected rural areas.
-  Despite the opening of African markets to a large ex­
tent, foreign trade has not developed favourably. There 
are still strong asymmetries, diversification in foreign 
trade has only progressed slowly, integration in value 
chains is limited and, as a consequence, knowledge 
and technology diffusion currently play a marginal role 
at best, not least because the educational efforts and 
research activities of many African countries lag behind 
those in other regions. Africa's innovative efforts are 
limited to initial attempts to imitate the abilities of suc­
cessful countries and to use growth successes by im­
porting modern goods to generate innovations in local 
companies. The start-up scene in African countries is 
often in its infancy and only a few countries have had 
breakthroughs here (Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and 
Ghana). The implication could be to focus on the en­
dogenous development that can be promoted by a de­
velopmental state through reasonable protective meas­
ures and incentive systems. This is all the more urgent 
since the protectionism of the USA, China, the Europe­
an Union and other OECD countries, as well as the 
emerging economies, does not exactly offer good op­
portunities through integration, since the economic 
power constellations (large multinational corporations, 
subsidies in the OECD world) obviously lead to exclu­
sion rather than inclusion and convergence. Asym­
metries between the world's leading countries and Af­
rica are increasing and technological delinking 
processes are deepening. Consequently, the postulate 
of >endogenous development will have to be revived 
through selective dissociation policies.
Due to its special agenda focused on developing infra­
structure and promoting FDI, the CwA pursues a policy 
that does not trigger structural change towards the devel­
opment of local entrepreneurship, industrial clusters, the 
modernisation of agriculture and thus broad-based em­
ployment, but instead is a model oriented towards ex­
ports. Exports can help to enable loans to be repaid and 
thus help to prevent countries from falling into debt traps. 
This strategy makes sense, but has the disadvantage that 
endogenous growth generated by the activities of local 
farms and companies is counteracted to a certain extent. 
Thus, the CwA strategy can have unintended consequenc­
es. These include a) the danger of pure contract process­
ing; b) the risk that not enough new jobs will be created; 
c) concentration of FDI on enclaves that are poorly linked 
to local industry; d) FDI necessarily involving the import of 
intermediate products because local firms do not produce 
the necessary intermediaries; e) the creation of low-paid 
jobs; e) future profit repatriation of FDI burdening the 
country's balance of payments and lowering local pur­
chasing power (this is something clearly shown by invest­
ment in the Ethiopian textile industry); f) the danger of the
CwA promoting >jobless< growth by focusing on large­
scale projects that benefit foreign capital rather than Afri­
can entrepreneurship and farms and lastly; g) the danger 
that the CwA may aggravate the labour market situation 
by diverting resources into non-sustainable and non-inclu­
sive areas.
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1
INTRODUCTION: STUDY AIMS
The Compact with Africa (CwA) is a long-term initiative. 
Since it was launched in 2017, it is, however, not too early 
to investigate what the initiative has achieved so far. So,
firstly, what do we mean by >achieved<? On a general level, 
we would like to trace the extent to which the self-declared 
goals of the Compact have been reached: better govern­
ance, more private capital inflows and improved mobilisa­
tion of local resources to remove obstacles to African jobs 
and growth, particularly infrastructure bottlenecks. On a 
more detailed country level, we attempt to explore wheth­
er the CwA initiative is supporting sustainable structural 
transformation towards better jobs and lower poverty. We 
try to identify the policy measures that are particularly 
promising in this regard. Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal have 
been selected as case studies. These sub-Saharan countries 
have negotiated special reform partnerships with the Ger­
man Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel­
opment (BMZ).
After the introduction, in Chapter 2 we will provide an 
overview of the development trends in African countries 
with a special focus on the CwA countries. Chapter 3  is 
dedicated to the antecedents of the G20 Compact, and 
Chapter 4  goes on to present the architecture and original 
concept of the CwA. Chapter 5  highlights the governance 
indicators the German government used for CwA country 
selection and monitoring. Chapter 6  discusses the contro­
versial role of private foreign capital in sustainable transfor­
mation. In terms of quantified results, Chapter 7  reports 
how governance scores, private capital flows, debt and do­
mestic savings have developed in the 12 CwA countries 
over the past two years. Chapter 8 analyses the main com­
ponents of structural transformation on the African conti­
nent. Chapter 9  provides a more detailed description of 
three different countries Ghana, Senegal and Ethiopia. 
Chapter 10 sheds light on the German discussion on the is­
sue and addresses the question of the role of Germany in 
implementing the Compact. Policy recommendations are 
made in the final chapter.
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AFRICA IS CHANGING
For some African countries, many positive developments 
can be reported. The African continent with its 55 countries 
is undergoing fundamental change. The »great transforma­
tion« is taking place1 and it is bringing an increase in PCIs, 
improved access to education and health, the reduction of 
poverty, the rise of middle classes, urbanisation with grow­
ing inequality and informality, and employment crises in its 
wake. Some countries, such as the CwA partners Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Ghana and Senegal, have recorded relatively high 
economic growth for over a decade. Many countries have 
been able to increase school enrolment rates. And still oth­
ers have managed to increase investment. Another positive 
aspect is the increased commitment of the African commu­
nity of states, evidenced by initiatives such as the plan to 
create an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) or 
the many ideas for industrialising the continent. The fact 
that development aid no longer plays such a major role is a 
sign that Africa wants to make progress on its own.
Population growth in Africa is extremely high. In most 
countries it is above 2.7 per cent (for CwA countries, see 
Table 1). In 28 African countries, the population will double 
between 2010 and 2050. By 2050, the continent's popula­
tion could reach two billion. The working-age population is 
set to increase even more rapidly —  from about 480 mil­
lion in 2013 to 1.3 billion in 2050. In most African coun­
tries, population growth over the last 30 years has, on av­
erage, been only slightly lower than economic growth and 
growth in food production.
Most CwA societies have become caught in the Malthusi­
an trap. This particularly applies to the CwA countries Be­
nin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Rwanda and Sen­
egal, despite the fact that urbanisation has led to a decline
in growth rates in all countries.
The development of the population in select CwA countries, 
i. e., Ethiopia, Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana and Senegal shows 
the extent to which demographic transition has taken place.2
1 Robert Kappel (2020): Afrika -  Die große Transformation. Berlin
(forthcoming).
2  Lilli Sippel, Tanja Kiziak, Franziska W oellert and Reiner Klingholz 
(2019): Africa's Demographic Challenges. Berlin; available at: 
https://www.berlin-institut.org/publikationen/studien/afrikas-
demografische-herausforderung.html
As the first country on the African continent, the age struc­
ture of Tunisia's population is now economically favourable. 
To date, however the country has failed to fully exploit this 
potential due to the lack of jobs for the large number of 
people of working age.3 From a demographic point of view, 
Ethiopia's recent development can be described as a success 
story. Although the birth rate is still very high, the decline in 
fertility seems to be continuing. If this trend prevails, the 
population of Ethiopia could have a favourable age structure 
by 2035. From a demographic point of view, Ghana is ahead 
of the pack. No other country in West Africa has a lower av­
erage number of children per woman. The comparatively 
high degree of urbanisation in the country had an impact on
Table 1
Demographic Transition and Population G row th  Rate
2010 2018
Benin 2.8 2.7
Burkina Faso 3.0 2.9
Cöte d'Ivoire 2.3 2.6
Egypt 2.0 2.0
Ethiopia 2.8 2.6
Ghana 2.5 2.2
Guinea 2.3 2.8
Morocco 1.3 1.3
Rwanda 2.6 2.6
Senegal 2.7 2.8
Togo 2.7 2.4
Tunisia 1.0 1.1
SSA 2.8 2.7
Source: World Bank data.
3 Hans-Heinrich Bass, Robert Kappel and Karl W ohlmuth (2017): Start­
ing Points fo r a National Employment Strategy fo r Tunisia. Tunis: FES 
(April 2017); available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13336.pdf
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the national birth rate. Education is another major influenc­
ing factor in Ghana's positive demographic development. By 
2015, on average, more than half of Ghanaians between the 
ages of 20 and 64 had attended secondary education. Espe­
cially among women, the educational level in Ghana is sig­
nificantly better than in many other West African countries. 
In francophone West Africa, in international comparison, the 
average number of children per woman is highest in Sene­
gal, where each woman has an average of 4.7 children. 
However, the state has taken measures in two areas in par­
ticular that could contribute to declining birth rates in the fu­
ture: it has improved access to education for the young pop­
ulation and improved access to family planning services.
Africa's great transformation is having an impact on popula­
tions and countries across the continent, creating both op­
portunities and uncertainties. A  positive trend can be seen 
in the urbanisation and diversification of both FDI and do­
mestic investments.4 Large consumer markets are emerging 
in African cities, attracting both foreign and domestic inves­
tors. Some African cities are becoming urban hubs with 
modern industrial and service companies and growing mid­
dle classes. However, this only applies to a limited extent in 
a small number of hubs, as most people in the cities work in 
the informal economy. The gap between the rich and the 
poor, between urban and rural, between large cities and 
small towns, and between those with and those without 
jobs, is widening. Social conflicts are intensifying.
The low level of market integration (especially in rural areas) 
caused by inadequate infrastructure measures implemented 
over recent decades poses a major challenge, results in high 
transport and trade costs and contributes to limited partici­
pation of workers, farmers, women and enterprises in eco­
nomic life. African agriculture in particular is marginalised.5 
Only in the last decade have some African countries seen an 
increase in industrial value added, whether in the agro- or 
textile industry. Overall, the share of manufacturing industry 
in Africa is very low, averaging at just 10-15 per cent (see 
Figure 2). The technology gap between African and Asian 
countries is widening rather than narrowing, something 
which robotisation and digitalisation has had a particularly 
significant impact on recently. LICs, in particular, do not 
have the necessary financial resources, technological skills 
and adaptability and thus fall behind.
One indicator of positive change is the rising internal tax rev­
enues in African countries. These are significantly higher 
than FDI and remittances. Increasing investment in infra­
structure and the growing interest in Africa shown by inves­
tors from China, India, the Gulf States and Turkey over the 
past ten years indicate that changes are afoot. The growth of
4  African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-opera­
tion  and Development and United Nations Environment Programme 
(2016): African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable Cities and Struc­
tural Transformation. Paris.
5  Theo Rauch, Gabriele Beckmann, Susanne Neubert and Simone Rett­
berg (2016): Rural Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Berlin: SLE
Discussion Paper (01/2016).
a local entrepreneurial class that invests locally also makes it 
clear that change is taking place in some countries. Perhaps 
the most crucial thing is the new self-confidence of African 
elites and a strengthening of civil society. Africa has changed. 
The plethora of positive developments has led many an ob­
server to speak of the African continent as a place of hope.
So now the question arises: Is convergence taking place and 
will some African countries be able to bring about catch-up 
development? This is not a theoretical issue, but rather a 
question of whether and to what extent the CwA measures 
contribute to a process of catching up among the African 
CwA countries. If the CwA agenda boosts PCI and helps to 
reduce the gap between its partners and countries with 
higher incomes and lower poverty, then convergence effects 
will emerge. If CwA countries grow faster than other coun­
tries as a result of CwA measures, this will see them contrib­
uting to a more positive and sustainable development path, 
and to poverty reduction.
If we look at developments in Africa through the prism of 
certain economic findings, we come to realise that catch-up 
development appears to be more of an exception. Studies 
by Dani Rodrik6 *confirm this. Some countries, such as Korea 
or China, have caught up and become members of the club 
of the rich OECD countries. But African success stories are 
rare and most of these countries have become stuck in the 
lower-middle-income trap or have simply remained LICs.
To what extent do African countries converge, what kind of 
convergence exists and which countries are converging? To 
answer these questions, we need to reveal the convergence 
criteria: absolute beta convergence means that relatively poor 
countries with lower capital resources grow at a higher rate 
than relatively rich countries with higher capital resources. 
This is due to diminishing marginal returns on capital. Coun­
tries with low (high) capital resources achieve higher (lower) 
marginal returns on capital. In the long run, this approach will 
lead to a catch-up process in the poorer countries, so that all 
economies end up on the same growth path. Absolute beta 
convergence means that two countries with different gross 
domestic products (GDP) and PCI but with the same savings 
ratios, depreciation rates, population growth rates and tech­
nical progress rates converge to the same capital stock and 
PCI levels in the long run. The implication is that, of the coun­
tries with similar parameters, in theory, the countries that 
were initially poorer will achieve higher growth rates.
Conditional beta convergence means that countries grow 
faster, the further below their own long-term equilibrium 
growth (as determined by the national structural charac­
teristics) they are. The implication is that structural charac­
teristics, and not initial national income, determine the 
long-run GDP per worker. Thus, foreign assistance should
6 Dani Rodrik (2013): Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing, 
in: Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 128, 1: 165-204; Margaret Mc­
Millan, Dani Rodrik, D. and I. Verduzco-Gallo (2014): Globalization,
Structural Change, and Productivity Growth, w ith  an Update on A f­
rica, in: W orld Development, 63, 1: 11-32.
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focus on removing structural barriers (in infrastructure, ed­
ucation or the financial system), but there is no need for an 
income transfer from richer to poorer nations. Growth 
economists do not assume absolute convergence, in which 
all poor countries catch up equally, but instead argue that 
there is conditional beta convergence. This means that 
economies converge to different steady states,7 provided 
that these have differences in model parameters.
Some African countries have absolute beta convergence 
and have shown higher growth than other regions of the 
world over a long period of time. These include Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Lesotho and the Seychelles, all of which have 
achieved positive growth since the 1960s. Since 2000, only 
six countries have achieved average growth of more than 
three per cent (including CwA countries such as Ethiopia, 
Rwanda and Senegal).8 The others continue to lag behind.
A reduction in the dispersion of levels of income across econ­
omies is sometimes referred to as sigma convergence.  It
7  State o f an economy in which all economically relevant variables, 
such as consumption, investment and workload, are constant over 
tim e or grow  at the same rate (steady state).
8 Regarding poverty convergence, Ravallion (2012) documented a lack 
o f cross-country poverty convergence, whereby countries starting out 
w ith  higher poverty incidences did not subsequently experience faster 
poverty reduction than those starting ou t w ith  lower poverty inci­
dences. This view is contradicted in a new study by Yusi Ouyang et 
al., according to  which »[p]overty convergence remains absent across 
LDCs during 1981-2014«, but »[i]n SSA, in contrast, we find strong 
cross-country poverty convergence«; Yusi Ouyang, Abebe Shimeles, 
Erik Thorbecke (2018): Revisiting Cross-Country Poverty Convergence
in the Developing W orld w ith  a Special Focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.
Bonn: IZA DP No. 11388; available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp11388.pdf; 
cf. M artin Ravallion (2012): Why Don't We See Poverty Convergence?, 
in: American Economic Review, 102, 1: 504-23 .
comprises an increase in PCI and a reduction in income dif­
ferences relative to other regions of the world, e .g ., OECD 
countries. Sigma convergence measures changes in the dis­
tribution of PCI. For this purpose, the distribution of PCI be­
tween the individual states is recorded and the standard de­
viation at the beginning and at the end of the selected ob­
servation period is determined.
Depending on which reference countries are used, the re­
sults for Africa are sobering. The study by Ranjbar et al.9 
shows that out of 52 countries examined over the 1969­
2011 period, only five were able to initiate a catch-up process 
with the USA while 47 fell behind the USA. The IMF (2018) 
comes to a similar conclusion for the 2000-2017 period. 
While there are comparable countries in other regions that 
have been able to achieve higher growth and some conver­
gence with the USA, there are only a few African countries 
that are actually catching up. This picture still proves to be 
relatively positive compared with the 1985-2000 period, 
which illustrates a very clear income divergence with the 
USA. Nevertheless, most African countries achieve neither 
conditional beta or absolute beta convergence, or indeed 
even sigma convergence with the USA.10
9 Omid Ranjbar, Chien-Chiang Lee, Tsangyao Chang and Mei-Ping 
Chen (2014): Income Convergence in African Countries: Evidence 
from  a Stationary Test W ith M ultip le Structural Breaks, in: South 
African Journal o f Economics, 82, 3: 371-391; available at: https:// 
doi.org/10.1111/saje.12036
10 The convergence debate overemphasises grow th  compared to  SDGs 
or the development o f the Human Development Index (HDI). How­
ever, it  can be shown that most CwA countries also have a low , al­
beit improving, HDI. The HDI includes income, life expectancy and 
education. For example, life expectancy has increased in most CwA 
countries, which is mainly due to  improved healthcare systems.
Figure 1
CwA Countries GDP per capita, PPP (current in ternational $), 2018
Source: World Bank data.
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The best performing African countries were countries that 
were able to increase their PCI ($PPP)11 by between three and 
six, including the CwA countries Ethiopia (4.12), Ghana (3.46) 
and Rwanda (4.2). Although most countries have more than 
doubled their PCI within 25 years, they still mostly remain in 
the club of LICs (such as the CwA countries Togo, Burkina Fa­
so, Ethiopia and Rwanda). The >best performers< were able to 
narrow the gap with the already relatively highly developed 
African countries and were therefore able to converge with 
them. They were also able to converge to the African average.
The expectation that some African countries can achieve 
higher inflows of FDI because of low wages in the produc­
tion of simple consumer goods (T-shirts, shoes, refrigera­
tors, bicycles, motorcycles) has long been frustrated. Most 
African countries have comparatively high wage costs (see 
Table 2), which have kept some foreign investors away. 
However, this is only one of the many reasons for the low 
inflows of FDI in most CwA countries (with the exception 
of some countries of North Africa). Other important ex­
planatory factors for the absence or low inflow of FDI are 
the small markets, low purchasing power, high trade and 
transport costs and the comparably poor EoDB indicators. 
The extent to which low wage costs lead to a sustained in­
flow of FDI, such as in the Ethiopian textile industry (see 
Chapter 9.1), cannot be predicted at present.
There is evidence that Chinese and Indian companies are 
investing in African countries because of rising local wag- 
es.12 Wages are now rising comparatively fast in China, v i­
etnam and Bangladesh.13 Enterprises from China and India
11 PCI PPP =  GDP PPP (purchasing power parity) is GDP converted to  in­
ternational dollars using purchasing power parity rates. Purchasing 
power parities are the rates o f currency conversion that eliminate the 
differences in price levels between countries.
12 Low labour costs are only one reason fo r investment. Other im ­
portant factors include access to  markets and raw materials, high 
grow th  at the investment destination and securing competitive 
advantages compared w ith  other investors.
13 Helmut Reisen and Michael Stemmer (2018): Die drei Phasen des
China-Schocks, in: Blog Ökonomenstimme (30.4.2018); available 
a t: http://www.oekonomenstimme.org/artikel/2018/04/die-drei- 
phasen-des-china-schocks/
hope to be able to produce more cheaply due to wage dif­
ferences and the opening up of new markets; their aim is 
to gain a strategic advantage over their competitors. China 
also wants to exercise strategic power. The hope that, due 
to rising wage costs in China, investors will now develop 
some African countries into >industrial cores< is rather de­
ceptive, however. Apart from a few textile and leather 
companies in Ethiopia and individual industrial companies 
in more developed Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Ghana and 
Senegal, there is not much evidence of such a trend.14
HOW STRONGLY DO AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES INDUSTRIALISE?
In principle, late industrialisers — like most sub-Saharan 
countries — face the problem that industrialisation can no 
longer be regarded as a panacea for poor growth and unem­
ployment. Historically, sustained and high growth has been 
accompanied by industrialisation. This is the case in emerg­
ing economies but not on the African continent. While South 
Korea and Taiwan were already able to absorb about 30 per 
cent of the workforce in the manufacturing industry during 
the pre-globalisation phase from the 1960s to 1980s (35 per 
cent in Germany in 1970, 20 per cent in Mexico in 1990), v i­
etnam reached just 15 per cent (India, 13 per cent and China, 
16 per cent, to date). It would be very difficult for most Afri­
can countries to reach this level. Overall, the share of manu­
facturing industry in Africa is very low (see Figure 2), the 
same applies to most CwA countries (see Figure 3).
14 Jiajun x u , Stephen Gelb, Jiewei Li and Zuoxiang Zhao (2017): 
Adjusting to  Rising Costs in  Chinese Light M anufacturing: w hat 
Opportunities fo r Developing Countries?;  available a t: https:// 
www.odi.org/publications/10984-adjusting-rising-costs-chi- 
nese-light-manufacturing-what-opportunities-developing-coun- 
tries; x inshen Daio, M argaret M cM illan and Dani Rodrik (2017): 
The Recent G row th Boom in Developing Countries.  W ashington, 
D.C.: IFRI W orking Paper; available at: h ttps://w w w .ifp ri.o rg /pub- 
lication/recent-growth-boom-developing-economies-role-ser- 
vices; Noah Smith (2019): Africa Isn't Being Re-Colonized; avail­
able a t: https://www.bloom berg.com /opinion/articles/2019-07-15/ 
africa-s-economic-development-isn-t-a-new-form-of-coloni- 
alism?srnd=opinion&utm_content=africa&utm_medium=so- 
cial&utm _source=tw itter&cm pid% 3D=socialflow-tw itter-afri- 
ca&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic.
Table 2
Labour Costs and Capital Costs. Comparison o f Selected African Countries w ith  Bangladesh, 2017
Labour costs/workers in  US dollars Capital costs/workers in  US dollars PCI
Bangladesh 835 1,070 853
Kenya 2,118 9,775 1,117
Tanzania 1,777 5,741 1,095
Senegal 1,562 2,422 775
Ethiopia 909 6,138 471
PCI = per capita income.
Source: Karishma Banga and Dirk Willem te velde (2018): Digitalisation and the Future o f Manufacturing, London: Supporting Economic Transformation (SET) programme (March 2018); 
available at: https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SET_Digitalisation-and-future-of-African-manufacturing_Final.pdf
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Figure 2
Value-Added Share o f African Manufacturing Industry in GDP, per cent (most recent value available for 2014-2015)
Sources: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/04/27/figure-of-the-week-manufacturing-value-added-in-sub-saharan-africa/; W orld Bank data.
Figure 3
Value-Added Share o f CwA Countries' Manufacturing Industry in GDP, per cent (most recent value available for 2016-2017)
Source: W orld Bank data
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With the exception of Senegal and the North African CwA 
countries, the CwA partners are lagging behind industrially 
and, in view of global competition, rapid technological 
change and global shifts in demand towards services, they 
are struggling to successfully industrialise and thus achieve 
any kind of significant increase in industrial employment. 
This is predominantly caused by globalisation.
The CwA does not address the process of industrialisation 
directly, but it assumes that the improved infrastructure and 
good governance (e. g., EoDB) will lead to higher invest­
ments, which will flow into industrial sectors, the service 
sector and agriculture. The implication is that higher invest­
ments — whether foreign or domestic — can also boost in­
dustrial development.
While the CwA stresses that the EoDB index and adminis­
trative competence are key criteria for investment behav­
iour, other aspects are equally important. Among other 
things, this is linked with the lower productivity in almost all 
CwA countries. Of particular importance, however, is the 
fact that most CwA countries enter the product cycle too 
late. Exceptions are the production of automobiles in Egypt, 
Tunisia and Morocco, which are operated by multinational 
corporations.15 Product cycle theory describes the develop­
ment from product differentiation to product standardisa­
tion. The cycle theory assumes that a good has three life 
phases: »new product«, »maturation process of the prod­
uct« and »standardized product«.16 The question that aris­
es here is: Do CwA countries have comparative production 
advantages in a specific phase of the product cycle? This is 
theoretically possible. In the early phases of the cycle, the 
capital-rich industrialised countries have this advantage; in 
labour-intensive mass production, it is the low-wage coun­
tries that have the upper hand. Foreign companies them­
selves outsource standardised production or have local 
companies from developing countries that produce in the 
value chain. Most African countries have not been able to 
attract labour-intensive mass production even in countries 
with SEZs. Only in the past decade have we seen labour-in­
tensive mass production emerge, be it in the agricultural 
sector, in the textile industry or in food production. Starting 
at a very low level, Ethiopia is attempting to industrialise 
and has managed this relatively successfully in recent years 
(see Chapter 9.1 Ethiopia). This success is partly due to the 
fact that the wages in Ethiopia's textile industry are com­
paratively low.
Overall, there is a very large technological gap between Af­
rica's development process and that of the Asian countries, 
and the gap is widening rather than narrowing. Recently 
this has also been exacerbated by robotisation and digital-
15 W hether more recent investments or announcements o f investments
by corporations in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire or Ghana suggest 
a revival of industrial production remains to be seen.
16 Gary Hufbauer (1970): The Impact of National Characteristics and 
Technology on the Commodity Composition o f Trade in Manufac­
tured Goods, in: Raymond vernon (ed.): The Technological Factor in 
International Trade. New York.
isation, for example. The starting scenario of the »technol­
ogy gap theory« is a technological advantage in country A , 
which is used to produce new good x . After a certain time, 
a demand for this good x also emerges in country B, which, 
however, can only be covered by imports. However, this 
foreign trade, resulting from a technological gap in country 
B, does not last long: After a certain period of response 
and learning, companies in country B succeed in imitating 
products and consequently imports decline. The total 
amount of imports depends on the duration of the imita­
tion phase. In China, Taiwan, Malaysia, vietnam, Korea and 
other countries imitation has been successful, but this has 
not been the case in many African countries. LICs in par­
ticular, including some CwA countries with a lower PCI (Be­
nin, Togo and Guinea, for instance), do not have the nec­
essary technological skills and capabilities and thus fall be­
hind.
This is also demonstrated by an analysis of digitalisation. 
Although Africa has seen very high growth rates in Internet 
use over the past ten years, it still lags far behind other re­
gions. As Banga and te velde (2018)17 show, with the ex­
ception of Kenya, very few companies in the African coun­
tries surveyed use Internet at all. This is partly due to the 
high capital costs for digital development. Reducing the 
digital gap can encourage companies to invest more in Af­
rica and help local entrepreneurship to open up new fields 
of business through the digital revolution. This is not the 
case in the majority of CwA countries as the conditions for 
industrialisation are lacking or only weakly developed. 
These conditions include sufficient infrastructure, ade­
quate skill levels of companies and workers, and a compet­
itive African SME sector.18 Most African companies are 
small and informal and do not grow.
Currently, it is impossible to estimate the effects of roboti- 
sation in the OECD countries and China on Africa's devel­
17 Karishma Banga and Dirk W illem te velde (2018): Digitalisation and 
the Future o f Manufacturing. London: Supporting Economic Trans­
formation (SET) Programme (March 2018); available at: https://set. 
odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SET_Digitalisation-and-future- 
of-African-manufacturing_Final.pdf
18 The CwA does not address the dynamics of African companies. Only 
the business environment is factored into the discussion. The CwA's 
business framework primarily addresses regulatory uncertainties. Its 
agenda sets priorities regarding institutional and judicial bottlenecks, 
which include enactment of business rules, lack of access to informa­
tion and discretionary treatment by government officials. Although it 
is absolutely necessary to resolve these basic problems, the CwA falls 
short when it comes to proactive strategies to support African enter­
prises. Robert Kappel, Birte Pfeiffer and Helmut Reisen (2017): Com­
pact w ith  Africa. Bonn: DIE Discussion Paper 13 (2017); available at: 
https://www.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/compact-with-af- 
rica-fostering-private-long-term-investment-in-africa/;  Robert Kap­
pel (2016): von informellen Unternehmen zum African Mittelstand? 
Differenzierungen im afrikanischen Unternehmertum, in: Antje Dan­
iel, Sebastian Müller, Florian Stoll and Rainer Oehlschläger (eds.): Af­
rikanische Gesellschaften im  Wandel -  Mittelschichten, Mittelklassen 
oder Milieus?. Baden-Baden: 87-110; Oluyele Akinkugbe and Karl 
W ohlmuth (2016): Middle Class Growth and Entrepreneurship Devel­
opment in Africa -  Measurement, Causality, Interactions and Policy 
Implications, in: Materialien des Wissenschaftsschwerpunktes »Glo­
balisierung der W eltwirtschaft«, vol. 43. Bremen; available at: http:// 
www.karl-wohlmuth.de/files/dateien/122_final_number_43_white_ 
series___wohlmuth_akinkugbe_final_10_11_2016.pdf
12
AFRICA IS CHANGING
opment. The question arises as to whether the industriali­
sation of Africa will face further obstacles if robotisation 
results in labour-intensive industries no longer being relo­
cated to Asia or Africa, but rather remaining in Europe or 
even being relocated back to the EU.
To address this question, it would be helpful to first take a 
look at productivity. Dani Rodrik19 assumes that there will 
be an unconditional convergence of labour productivity in 
the manufacturing industry. This means that the countries
that are further away from the >frontier< can grow faster 
and start a process of catching up. This is linked to the fact 
that the manufacturing industry is dependent on those 
commodities that allow countries to join global networks 
in order to implement technology transfers.
The following formula for labour productivity growth shows 
whether there can be absolute convergence in labour pro­
ductivity
Gr LPt = a + ß  (Log (LP)t-1 + ui
where Gr = growth and LP = labour productivity. The de­
pendent variable is the growth of LP. The evaluations by
Gelb et al. (2014)20 show that a negative value of ß leads
to convergence of LP, i. e ., some African countries manage
to increase labour productivity. But whether this will be 
sufficient for them to grow industrially depends on a num­
ber of conditions. In addition, there is the fact that indus­
trial investment creates far fewer jobs today than in previ­
ous decades due to productivity growth. In other words, 
even with large-scale industrial investment, demand for 
jobs is lagging behind, as Joseph Stiglitz21 noted. Conver­
gence of labour productivity does not necessarily mean 
more jobs.
As capital costs rise, African countries will find it harder to 
invest in new technology because it is expensive. As a re­
sult, many African countries — especially LICs — will not be 
able to easily digitise and thus will be excluded from global 
value chains (GvCs) or even be unable to enter them in the 
first place. If, on the other hand, the relative costs of capital 
fall (in relation to labour costs), then the production of fin­
ished goods could also be relocated towards the OECD 
world thus impeding Africa's opportunities for industrialisa­
tion and hence convergence. But the industrialisation meas­
ures adopted by many countries in recent years, the estab­
lishment of SEZs, support of industrialisation, investment in 
industrial clusters, the improved EoDB index and the meas­
ures taken to raise human capital and enhance governance
19 Dani Rodrik (2013): Unconditional Convergence in Manufacturing, in:
Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 128, 1: 165-204.
20 Alan Gelb, Christian Meyer and vijaya Ramachandran (2014): Devel­
opment as Diffusion: Manufacturing Productivity and sub-Saharan Af­
rica's Missing M iddle (Working Paper 357). Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Global Development; available at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/de- 
fault/files/development-diffusion-market-productivity_final.pdf
21 https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/stiglitz-the-east-
asian-miracle-cant-be-repeated-in-sa/
are all bearing fruit.22 This is clearly evidenced by the African 
transition countries, a group that also includes some CwA 
countries, such as Ghana, Senegal and the North African 
countries Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.
GLOBALISATION REINFORCES 
ASYMMETRIES
Today, African companies compete with producers from all 
over the world. African firms no longer produce within the 
protective borders of their own country, but rather are ex­
posed to competition from producers all over the world. The 
use of new technologies, which could, in principle, trigger a 
surge in industrialisation, is limited by rising capital costs, a 
lack of research and development (R&D) and low levels of 
human capital.23 Investment in R&D could create technolog­
ical externalities, but, with the exception of a few CwA 
countries (Morocco and Egypt), private and government 
R&D spending is extremely low.
The consequences of lagging behind in global competition 
like this are manifold:
-  African countries require more FDI in their agriculture 
and industry and also higher local investment. This in­
flow of FDI could bring foreign technology and knowl­
edge. It could also create world market access, stimu­
late local entrepreneurship and lead to growth in 
medium-sized enterprises. FDI can stimulate industrial 
processes and promote the modernisation of agricul­
ture. It can also promote linkages between foreign and 
domestic enterprises if the appropriate economic policy 
measures are taken at the same time, e. g., through in­
centive systems to increase local content. FDI, however, 
still flows largely into the extractive sectors; these are 
large-scale investments that often have few linkages 
with local industries. The CwA focuses on these capi­
tal-intensive investments and thus contributes to the 
formation of enclaves and the development of SEZs, 
which also tend to have less of a positive impact on 
subcontracting to domestic companies. The data sug­
gest that these investments will not facilitate any real 
catching up.
-  Exports of manufactured goods are of marginal impor­
tance and their share in Africa has fallen rather than ris­
en. Reducing the high trade and transport costs (ports, 
land transport) and the high non-tariff trade barriers in 
Africa, the EU, the USA and China will encourage export 
opportunities for African countries. The CwA rightly un­
derlines the importance of expanding infrastructure.
22 Bright Simons: Africa's Unsung »Industrial Revolution«; available at: 
https://www.cgdev.org/blog/africas-unsung-industrial-revolution (21 
March 2019). »There is an industrial revolution underway in sub-Sa­
haran Africa's most entrepreneurial economies —  places such as
Ghana, Uganda, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire.«
23 Dani Rodrik (2018): New Technologies, Global Value Chains, and the 
Developing Economies. Oxford; available at: http://j.mp/2xYN1x5
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-  Intra-African trade24 remains limited. The AfCFTA could 
boost trade inside Africa. It is a huge opportunity and a 
big step in the right direction. If properly implemented, 
it will increase Africa's economic growth and reduce ex­
treme poverty more than any other single factor over 
the long term.
-  The conditions for expanding local industries are severe­
ly limited, companies are mostly small and medium-sized 
enterprises are only just beginning to gradually emerge. 
But there are many ways to promote rather than hamper 
African entrepreneurship. This can be achieved by re­
moving the numerous obstacles (for example, putting a 
stop to favouritism, providing unrestricted access to 
electricity, improving financing opportunities and elimi­
nating tax disadvantages for SMEs) and by supporting 
start-ups, improving the EoDB indicators, fostering Busi­
ness Development Services and promoting industrial 
clusters. Measures like this have been launched in many 
CwA countries, but they are far from sufficient, as all 
studies on the development of entrepreneurship in CwA 
countries show.25
-  African companies are poorly integrated into global or 
regional value chains.26 However, a slight trend reversal 
has been observed for some years now. African enter­
prises have managed to join GvCs in the apparel, food, 
car production and automotive industries as well as in 
some business services (see Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, 
Senegal and Ghana). Global value integration is still 
constrained by traditional trade policy barriers. The Af- 
CFTA should thus make eliminating these barriers a top 
priority. But African countries remain minor players in 
the global economy, accounting for just three per cent 
of global trade in intermediate goods. African coun­
tries' exports tend to feature at the very beginning of 
GvCs where a high share of their exports enter the 
value chain as inputs for other countries' exports, re­
flecting the still dominant role of agriculture and natu­
ral resources in their exports. If we examine countries' 
overall participation in agricultural GvCs between 
1990 and 2015, CwA countries such as Tunisia, Moroc­
co and Ghana stand out with increases in G vC  partici­
pation.
-  Industrialisation in SEZs is not really a panacea for most 
countries as the prerequisites for successful operations 
are usually lacking. But some countries, such as Ethio­
pia and Ghana, have shown that SEZs can be success­
ful.
24  Francisco Arizala, M atthieu Bellon and Margaux MacDonald (2019): 
Regional G row th Spillovers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D.C.: 
IMF W orking Paper WP WP/19/160; available at: https://w w w .im f. 
org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/07/24/Regional-Growth-Spillo- 
vers-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-47005
25 Haroon Bhorat and Finn Tarp (2016): Africa's Lions: G row th Traps 
and Opportunities fo r Six African Economies. Washington, D.C.
26 W orld Bank (2020): W orld Development Report 2020: Trading for
Development in  the Age o f Global Value Chains. Washington, D.C.; 
available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2020
-  It may be necessary to go beyond investment in the 
manufacturing industry with its low-skilled jobs and 
instead to invest in promoting qualified jobs in the ser­
vice sector and in what are referred to as industries 
without smokestacks< (ICT, tourism, transport and 
banking services).27
A breakthrough in Africa's industrial development is unlike­
ly to occur in the medium term. Many African countries 
have even deindustrialised, including some CwA countries. 
Most small countries, landlocked states, LICs and fragile 
states should not have high expectations of sufficient FDI or 
significant local industrial development, even if they pursue 
an industrial policy. Only a few larger CwA countries, such 
as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal 
may have the opportunity to develop industrial hubs. The 
stronger the local medium-sized enterprises, the better this 
will work. These companies will play a key role in econom­
ic growth and employment. FDI could play a complementa­
ry role in technology transfer through the integration of lo­
cal enterprises into value chains.
There continues to be significant differences between the 
countries in Africa. There are some emerging countries, such 
as Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and some MICs, which are con­
verging, or at least keeping up. The majority of countries, 
however, face low growth and high poverty. The LICs tend to 
stagnate, which is partly due to particularly high population 
growth in these countries. A convergence club of around 20 
African LICs and/or countries with high or even rising pover­
ty is emerging. It is also unlikely that many African countries 
will be able to create internationally competitive industries, 
which is linked to the fact that productivity growth lags be­
hind that of other regions and global competition is extreme­
ly high. When it comes to the digital revolution and robotisa- 
tion, Africa is failing to catch up. Whether the CwA countries 
end up forming a club of emerging MICs cannot yet be fore­
seen. They are characterised by high growth resulting from 
numerous reforms (reformed industrial policy, better EoDB 
indicators, DBI, rising HDIs). Nevertheless, the potential of 
most CwA countries is far from being fully exploited. The ex­
tent to which the high growth actually indicates a structural 
transformation is not certain. Structural change is slow, the 
modernisation of agriculture is sluggish, informality and thus 
the poverty economy prevails.
27 Richard S. Newfarmer, John M . Page and Finn Tarp (eds.) (2018): Indus­
tries w ithout Smokestacks: Industrialization in Africa Reconsidered. Ox­
ford: UNU-WIDER Studies; Oyebanke Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Karl Wohl- 
muth (2016): New Investment Policies in Africa for Structural Change, 
African Development Perspectives Yearbook 19: Africa's Progress in Re­
gional and Global Economic Integration, Towards New Trade and In­
vestment Policies: 169-206; Tilman Altenburg and Brahima Coulibaly 
(2018): Meeting Africa's Employment Challenge in a Changing World. 
Bonn: GDI Briefing Paper (18/2018). For additional concepts, strategies 
and measures stimulating FDI and supporting local businesses, cf. UN­
IDO (2018): Industrial Development Report 2018: Demand for Man­
ufacturing: Driving Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development. 
vienna; available at: https://www.unido.org/resources-publications-flag- 
ship-publications-industrial-development-report-series/industrial-devel- 
opment-report-2018; UNCTAD (2016): Structural Transformation and 
Industrial Policy. New York, Geneva; available at: https://vi.unctad.org/ 
stind/; UNCTAD (2019), World Investment Report. New York, Geneva.
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Despite the opening of African markets to a large extent, for­
eign trade has not developed favourably. There are still 
strong asymmetries, diversification in foreign trade has pro­
gressed only slowly and integration in value chains is weak. 
This means that knowledge and technology diffusion cur­
rently only play a marginal role at best, partly also because 
African educational efforts and research activities lag behind 
those in other regions. Africa's efforts to innovate are limited 
to initial attempts to imitate the abilities of successful coun­
tries and to use growth successes by importing modern 
goods to generate innovations in local companies. The start­
up scene is often in its infancy and only a few countries have 
had breakthroughs here (Morocco, Senegal and Ghana).
The implication could be to focus on the endogenous devel­
opment that can be promoted by a developmental state 
through reasonable protective measures and incentive sys­
tems. This is all the more urgent since the protectionism of 
the USA, China, the EU and other OECD countries, as well as 
the emerging economies, does not exactly offer good op­
portunities through integration, since the economic power 
constellations (large multinational corporations, subsidies in 
the OECD world) obviously lead to exclusion rather than in­
clusion and convergence. Asymmetries between the world's 
leading countries and Africa are deepening and, conse­
quently, the postulate of endogenous development will
have to be revived through selective dissociation policies.28 *
To summarise: The CwA takes into account the links be­
tween macroeconomic framework conditions, business 
frameworks and financial frameworks. The measures envis­
aged by the CwA are important building blocks for the de­
velopment of infrastructure, the flow of FDI and the debt sit­
uation. However, the CwA does not adequately factor in the 
links between good governance, EoDB and other similar in­
dicators, and business dynamics. On the contrary, asym­
metries are reinforced rather than addressed; The focus on 
large-scale investments leads to structural distortion rather 
than inclusive and sustainable growth, which would be nec­
essary to help reduce poverty and unemployment. In order 
to make a more useful contribution to the catch-up process, 
industrialisation and the modernisation of agriculture, the 
CwA measures should be revised. Numerous studies and 
strategy papers published by international organisations 
such as the ILO, UNDP, FAO, UNECA and UNCTAD, as well 
as the World Bank's World Development Reports cited in 
this paper illustrate that the orthodox agenda of the CwA is 
not sufficiently committed to the aforementioned goals of 
inclusiveness and sustainability.
28  Dani Rodrik (2015): Premature Deindustrialization. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University, Revised (November 2015); available at: 
drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/premature_dein- 
dustrialization_revised2.pdf?m=1447439197; Andy Sumners (2018): 
W hat is Premature Deindustrialisation and Does i t  Matter?. London: 
GPID; available a t: https://w w w .gpidnetw ork.org/w p-content/up-
loads/2018/03/Brief_9.pdf; Justin Lin and Celestin Monga (2010):
G row th Identification and Facilitation: the Role o f the State in the 
Dynamics o f Structural Change. Washington D.C.: World Bank Policy 
Research Paper 5313; available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/ 
curated/en/438321468164948980/Growth-identification-and-facili- 
tation-the-role-of-the-state-in-the-dynamics-of-structural-change
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3
THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE G20 
COMPACT WITH AFRICA
For Africa, the G7 or G20 summits have mostly evoked a mix 
of high expectations and disillusionment. All too often, aspi­
rations and declarations from these groupings have fallen 
into oblivion once the group photos of the assembled lead­
ers (occasionally dressed in traditional costume) have been 
disseminated by the world's media. Notably the G20 has 
displayed a tendency to launch new initiatives without fol­
lowing up on earlier ones.
There are noteworthy exceptions to this >summit amnesiac 
The Cologne G8 Summit, 1999 brought a breakthrough 
for the HIPC initiative29. The Gleneagles G8 Summit in 
2005 was perhaps the most productive in the 30-year his­
tory of the G7/8,30 finally adding multilateral debt relief to 
the bilateral HIPC relief. The Hamburg G20 Summit in 2017 
then focused attention on Africa and infrastructure fi­
nance. At the traditional meeting of G8 finance ministers 
before the 2005 summit, it was agreed to write off the en­
tire 40 billion US dollars of debt owed by 18 HIPCs to the 
World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Fund. 
Its pledges for Africa by 2010 included, among others, 25 
billion US dollars of aid for Africa, universal access to an­
ti-HIv drugs in Africa, and the establishment of the Infra­
structure Consortium for Africa (ICA) housed at the AfDB 
to monitor funding of Africa's infrastructure on a regular 
basis. The Gleneagles Summit was closely followed by the 
global financial crisis, and in 2009 the aid to GDP ratio 
tumbled.
The G20 started out in 1999 as a meeting of finance min­
isters and central bank governors. During the 2000s, the 
world economy saw a gradual shift towards emerging gi­
ants such as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia. Figure 4 
shows that the combined G7 GDP now totals just 30 per 
cent of world GDP in PPP terms, while at the inception of 
the G20 in 1999, its share was still equal to the combined 
share of the group of emerging and developing countries. 
The G20 members account for 85 per cent of global GDP, 
75 per cent of international trade and two thirds of the 
world's population. So the G20 seems a better equipped
29 Jürgen Kaiser (2019): 20 Jahre nach der Schuldenerlass-Initiative des 
Kölner G8-Gipfels: Was wurde aus den HIPC-Ländern?. Berlin: Fried- 
rich-Ebert-Stiftung, Globale Politik und Entwicklung (April).
30  Russia repeatedly explained the switch from  G7 to  G8 and back to  
G7.
forum than the G7 to navigate the challenges of the glob­
al economy. The G20 now plays an important role in glob­
al standard-setting, beyond the individual interests of its 
members. However, Africa remains significantly underrep­
resented, with only South Africa a permanent member. Re­
cently, the G20 has started to pay more attention to Africa, 
and the continent's future development is now somewhat 
higher up the grouping's agenda. According to African ob­
servers, »The G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialisation 
in Africa and Least Developed Countries, launched under 
China's G20 presidency of 2016, and the 2017 German 
presidency's Compact with Africa offered unprecedented 
moments of engagement.«31 Through its engagement 
groups32 the G20 has brought views from different stake­
holders into the forum, while in the formal participation 
processes of the sherpa (emissaries), finance and summit 
tracks it has sought to include other states.
Following the global financial crisis in 2008, the G20 con­
vened country leaders to address not only crises and emer­
gencies but also long-term structural challenges. A  G20 De­
velopment Working Group was established in 2010. Since 
then, on the initiative of the Korean G20 presidency, Africa 
also has two observer seats, one for the AU chair and the 
other for the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD) chair. The G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development was added in 2016 at the 
Hangzhou Summit in PR China. The 2016 summit also 
launched the G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialisation 
in Africa and LDCs,33 based on a report by the United Na­
tions Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) pre­
pared at the request of the G20 Development Working 
Group. The close relationship between Africa and China 
that had deepened over the 2000s had led to the triennial 
Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial 
conferences. Pressure from Africa increased Chinese will­
ingness to include African development plans, such as the 
AU Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, in China-Africa de-
31 Cobus van Staden and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (2019): G20-Africa En­
gagement: Finding A Roadmap to  Shared Development.  Johannes­
burg: SAIIA Occasional Papers No. 29 (February).
32 Business 20, Labour 20, Women 20, Think 20, Civil 20, Youth 20 and 
Science 20. South Africa co-chairs the AAG overseeing the Compact, 
but it has notably not joined the Compact itself.
33 http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/supporting-industralization.html
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velopment initiatives. Africa's quest for a focus on industri­
alisation also informed the G20's enhanced engagement 
with Africa under China's presidency,34 with a focus on 
skills transfer, notably in agribusiness.
The growing importance of Africa to the G20 was reflect­
ed in the creation of the A AG . Implementation of the 
CwA35 became a focal issue for the German presidency af­
ter it presented the initiative to the G20 in early 2017. For 
the purpose of CwA implementation, the A AG , an infor­
mal body comprising a sub-set of G20 member countries, 
the African compact countries, the World Bank, the AfDB 
and the IMF, was created. In addition, the German govern­
ment invited an African think tank, the ACET, to follow the 
process and provide research and knowledge and also ac­
cess to networks. As well as preparing for the implementa­
tion of the CwA, an annual Monitoring Report and dedi­
cated events to foster private investment are the core tasks 
of the A AG .
The AAG held its first meeting on 20 April 2017 in Wash­
ington, D .C., closely followed by another meeting on 4 
May 2017 in Durban, South Africa. The Durban meeting 
brought together Compact countries, development part­
ners and international organisations, and also representa­
tives from the private sector. The representatives from Mo­
rocco, Rwanda and Senegal presented their reform pro­
grammes as well as investment opportunities for the pri­
vate sector.
34  van Staden and Sidiropoulos (2018): op. cit.
35 https://www.com pactwithafrica.org/content/com pactwithafrica/ 
home.html
It is important to note, however, that African governments 
do not drive the preparation processes for the G20 summits 
despite their participation as observers during these events.
Africa remains >on the table< of the G20 instead of sitting >at 
the table< for global agenda-setting and rule-making (Lei- 
ninger, 2017),36 although the AAG is co-chaired by South 
Africa (together with Germany) and the UN Economic Com­
mission on Africa (with ACET and the OECD) also partici­
pates in the CwA. As to whether »countries are displaying 
ownership of the commitments made, unlike in the case of 
structural adjustment programmes that were externally im- 
posed«?37 ACET monitoring sheds doubts on this proposi­
tion, as will be discussed later in this study.
Compact Teams in each CwA country are set up to imple­
ment the initiative. A Compact Team coordinates in-country 
activities, including updating Policy Matrices, coordination 
among development partners and dialogue with respective 
governments. The Compact Teams consist of the CwA part­
ner government, representatives from the three coordinating 
international organisations (World Bank, IMF and AfDB) and 
bilateral partners, including Germany. Originally the plan was 
for Germany to play the role of an important steward in the 
CwA process. But Germany could not really accomplish this 
role as the implementation of the Compact was >outsourced< 
to the international organisations (see below).38
36 Jutta Leininger (2017): On the Table or a t the Table? G20 and its
Cooperation w ith  Africa, in: Global Summitry, 3, 2: 193-205.
37 Elisabeth Sidiropoulos (2019): South Africa's Changing Role in Global 
Development Structures -  Being in Them b u t Not Always o f Them. 
DIE/GDI Discussion Paper No. 4 (2019): 30.
38 In response to inquiries from  German government ministries, it was 
stated that Germany was very active in Tunisia's country team.
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We conjecture that CwA documents seem to be first draft­
ed in Washington, D .C., for example at the IFC (tasked to 
promote private capital flows for development). If this ob­
servation holds, it may well explain why Compact Teams 
do not seem to have worked out as planned. The Compact 
Monitoring Report April 2019 states: »While guidelines for 
Compact Teams have been agreed, in most cases the Com­
pact Teams are not operating effectively -  if at all. Of those
visited, in one country there has not been a Compact Team
meeting since October 2017, in two countries the first full 
Compact Team meeting took place in February 2019, and 
in numerous countries the private sector has not been in­
vited. Likewise, leadership of the Compact Team varies 
across countries, both with regard to seniority and focal 
points.«39
39 G20 Compact w ith Africa (2019): Compact Monitoring Report (April): 11
Figure 5
The G20 Compact w ith  Africa
Compact with Africa (CwA): Objective
The Compact with Africa is the central pillar of the German G20 Presidency’s Africa 
Partnership: African Countries, International Financial Institutions (IFIs: African 
Development Bank, World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund) and bilateral 
partners prepare comprehensive, coordinated, and country-specific Investment 
Compacts to promote private investment, including in infrastructure with early 
private sector engagement and political backing from the G20. The approach 
promises credibility, visibility, and scale.
Challenges 
for African Countries
Compact with Africa 
(CWA)
Benefits
for African Countries
Increase private 
investment towards
• Creating jobs
♦ Closing the 
infrastructure gap
Compact with Africa Modules
• Signals country's 
enhanced investment 
framework
• Secures comprehen­
sive and tailor-made 
approach
• Encourages private 
investors at home and 
from partner 
countries
Macroeconomic
Framework:
Makes investment 
projects viable by 
providing stable 
macroeconomic con­
ditions
e.g. Ensuring macro­
economic stability and 
debt sustainability
Business Framework:
Makes investment 
projects bankable by 
attracting private 
investors
e.g. Promoting reliable 
regulations and insti­
tutions
Financing
Framework:
Makes investment 
projects fundable by 
mobilizing private 
finance
e.g. Developing effi­
cient risk mitigation 
instruments
Source: German Federal Ministry o f Finance (BMF) (2017).
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THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE G20 
COMPACT WITH AFRICA
While there has been a long history of G7 initiatives relating 
to Africa, the CwA is the first major initiative of its kind be­
tween the G20 and Africa. Given the wider composition of 
the G20, the initiative includes all of Africa's important eco­
nomic partners — including China and India. The initiative 
is the main pillar of the G20 Partnership with Africa. The 
G20 initiative was launched under the Chinese presidency 
on Germany's initiative in October 2016. It was launched in 
March 2017 as an initiative of the G20 Finance Track under 
the German G20 presidency to promote private investment 
in Africa, with an initial focus on levering private infrastruc­
ture finance via blended finance to facilitate subsequent FDI 
flows. G20 leaders formally launched the new G20 CwA at 
the G20 Summit in Hamburg on 7-8 July 2017. Figure 5 
provides an at-a-glance overview of the objectives, actors 
and modules of the CwA. Ludger Schuknecht and co-au­
thors, then in top positions at the German Ministries of Fi­
nance and Cooperation and Development, succinctly out­
lined the paradigm, motivation, work mechanics and objec­
tives of the CwA:40
-  Paradigm: Acemoglu and Robinson's institutional ap­
proach (Why Nations Fail)41 emphasises the impor­
tance of »good« institutions and rules for sustainable 
growth. It is held that countries with »good« institu­
tions that promote the productive role of the state and 
the market might also be able to achieve greater devel­
opment success. The concept for the Compact is 
(wrongly) attributed to Paul Collier in the paper by 
Schuknecht et al. (2018): The international community 
of states contributes to the development of good eco­
nomic institutions by investing in a compact with »re- 
form-minded« poor countries, to which all partners 
contribute, in order to improve local framework condi­
tions for private investment.42
4 0  Ludger Schuknecht, Johannes W olff, Andreas Gies and Stefan
Oswald (2018): Der G20 Compact w ith Africa -  ein neuer Ansatz der 
wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit m it afrikanischen Ländern.  ifo  Sch­
nelldienst 4 (2018); available at: https://econpapers.repec.org/article/ 
cesifosdt/v_3a71_3ay_3a2018_3ai_3a04_3ap_3a20-24.htm
41 Note that Why Nations Fail has been criticised for i) reversed causality, 
ii) ignorance o f geopolitics and geography as well as lack o f evidence 
and iii) presenting merely anecdotal bu t no hard empirical evidence.
42  Paul Collier (2018): M eeting the M igration Challenge and Reforming
Capitalism through M utual Solidarity. Social Europe.
-  Motivation: Africa's demography and emigration poten­
tial; a nuanced perception of Africa as a continent of 
opportunity; the need for a more coherent G20 ap­
proach in combining economic and development policy.
-  Mechanics: African countries volunteer to join the Com­
pact and commit to specific reforms. These reforms fall 
into three areas — macroeconomic stability (with a fo­
cus on tax reform and debt sustainability), business (in­
vestment protection) and financing reforms. Once these 
reforms have been enacted, the aim is for the CwA to 
facilitate Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) with potential 
investors. While the CwA originated under the German 
G20 presidency of 2017, it is conceived as a long-term 
G20 commitment, extending beyond the German presi- 
dency.43
-  Objectives: One of its primary aims is to unlock funds 
that were previously inaccessible for African investment, 
for example pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. 
The CwA focuses on reforms to the local business envi­
ronment and the facilitation of investment relations, 
rather than on the skills transfer highlighted under Chi­
na's G20 presidency in 2016.
In 2017, G20 finance ministers made a commitment to con­
tinue the CwA after the end of the German presidency. 
Through the AAG they want to support the development 
of the CwA within the G20 and to track progress in the 
Compact countries. The current co-chairs are Germany and 
South Africa (with limited engagement by the latter, ac­
cording to our interviews). The AAG is tasked with the over­
all coordination of the CwA and meets twice a year to dis­
cuss the progress made and report to the G20 finance min­
isters and central bank governors.
The CwA's primary objective is to increase the attractiveness 
of private investment in Africa through substantial improve­
ments to the macro, business and financing frameworks. It 
brings together selected African countries who volunteer to 
participate in the Compact, international organisations — 
primarily the IMF, WBG and AfDB — and bilateral partners
43  Note that the documents from  the 2018 Buenos Aires Summit fail to  
mention the G20 Compact w ith  Africa; available at: h ttp ://w w w .g20. 
utoronto.ca/summits/2018buenosaires.html
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from the G20 and beyond to coordinate country-specific re­
form agendas, support the respective policy measures and 
advertise investment opportunities to private investors. So 
far, 12 African countries have joined the initiative: Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Tunisia. Nine of the 
12 CwA countries are former HIPCs.44
Germany's bilateral contributions to the CwA comprise what 
are referred to as reform partnerships. Germany has entered 
into bilateral partnerships with selected African Compact 
countries, initially with Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Tunisia. Sub­
sequently, Ethiopia, Morocco and Senegal have also re­
sponded positively. A parliamentary inquiry raised the ques­
tion of other partnerships but received an evasive answer 
from the German government: »The cooperation of the G20 
countries with the African Compact countries takes place in 
different ways and at different levels of intensity. An over­
view of bilateral cooperation (...) can be found in the Policy 
Matrices, at www.compactwithafrica.org.  As part of the 
G20 Africa Advisory Group (AAG), Germany, in its role as 
Co-Chairman, constantly promotes the further involvement 
of the G20 countries in the Compact with Africa.«45 We in­
vestigated the situation in France with the Agence frangaise
4 4  HIPC coordinated debt relief was provided by bilateral Paris Club 
creditors from  1996 and was reinforced by the MDRI in 2005 to  al­
low  fo r the cancellation o f claims on HIPC completion po in t coun­
tries by the IMF, WBG and the AfDB. See Jürgen Kaiser, Irene Knoke 
and Hartmut Kowsky (2009): Towards a Renewed Debt Crisis?. Ber­
lin: Occasional Paper, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (June).
45  Deutscher Bundestag (2018): Drucksache 19/5353 (29.10.2018),
translated from  German.
de developpement (AFD) and the Finance Ministry but this 
did not reveal any evidence of French bilateral investment 
partnerships in the context of the CwA initiative.46 At the 
Osaka G20 Summit in July 2019, leaders reiterated their com­
mitment to follow up on the Compact initiative; yet, for all 
intents and purposes, the management of the CwA initiative 
has largely been passed to the WBG and the IMF.
The CwA website collates an array of instruments available 
to governments, investors and firms from multilateral de­
velopment banks and the largest European Development 
Finance Institutions, in order to support private investment 
in the CwA countries. These are listed on the CwA website
in two >toolboxes< and presented in five groupings:
i. project preparation and advisory facilities
ii. risk mitigation vehicles and guarantees
iii. co-investment platforms
iv. project financial instruments
v. blended finance project instruments
Companies can participate in the implementation of the 
measures within the framework of the current tendering 
and award procedures of bilateral development coopera­
tion. However, by the end of 2018, no private companies 
appeared to have participated financially in the framework 
of the bilateral reform partnerships between Germany and
46  France maintained bilateral trade and investment partnerships w ith  
Africa on a sub-regional level long before the CwA. For a current 
list, consult https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Ressources/ac- 
cords-commerciaux-bilateraux-
Table 3
Compact Countries
Compact Countries GDP/Cap Income Status HIPC Risk D ebt Distress
2017 2018 2018
Benin 827 LIC x moderate
Burkina Faso 642 LIC x moderate
Cöte d'Ivoire 1,538 LMIC x moderate
Egypt 2,413 LMIC moderate
Ethiopia 768 LIC X high
Ghana 2 ,046 LMIC X high
Guinea 824 LIC x moderate
Morocco 3,007 LMIC low
Rw anda 748 LIC x low
Senegal 1,329 LIC X lo w
Togo 610 LIC x heightened
Tunisia 3,464 LMIC low
Notes: Senegal was reclassified as a LMIC in  July 2019; GNI/capita, Atlas method (current USD); Risk o f debt distress =  most recent IMF/World Bank assessments. 
Sources: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd; Jürgen Kaiser (2019): op. cit.
20
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE G20 COMPACT WITH AFRICA
Ethiopia, Ghana or Tunisia, despite the provision of a num­
ber of support measures, notably in the field of improving 
energy efficiency.47
Germany is therefore trying to develop further instruments
and incentives for >de-risking< to complement the CwA, 
beyond the 25 (!) existing measures48 (funding instruments, 
programmes and other initiatives) intended to foster pri­
vate investment. Part of Germany's support for the CwA is 
the DIF, which is financed by the BMZ and was started in 
June 2019.49 The new fund consists of four different pro­
grammes: AfricaConnect -  a financing solution for medi­
um-sized European companies; AfricaGrow, which aims to 
promote African SMEs with venture capital; Economic Net­
work Africa (Wirtschaftsnetzwerk Afrika), which bundles 
support services in development cooperation and foreign 
trade promotion; and the Special Initiative for Training and 
Employment (for details, see Box 1).
The many support measures across various government 
ministries have been subject to recent parliamentary in- 
quiries.50 The main criticism from the companies being 
courted remains the poor coordination of measures within 
the German Federal Government and the large number of 
parallel initiatives being conducted by different depart­
ments, such as the Pro-Africa initiative of the Federal Min­
istry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) and the CwA 
initiative. Officials do insist on regular rounds of meetings 
between the deputy ministries involved to indicate good 
coordination but, nevertheless, given the overlap between 
these initiatives, the accusation (e. g., by the Afrika-Verein 
der deutschen Wirtschaft, A v)51 that the German govern­
ment is pursuing a diffuse Africa strategy that has not been 
coordinated between the ministries persists.
The German support measures are mirrored by the prolifer­
ation measures required from the 12 CwA partners in each 
of the country Policy Matrices.52 Each country Policy Matrix 
comprises
-  government actions required from the CwA partner in 
the macro, business and finance frameworks;
-  specific (partly numerical) indicators and targets attached 
to these government actions;
-  various multi and bilateral agencies referred to as »part­
ners«.
Specific excerpts from the Policy Matrices are provided in 
the three country sections for Ethiopia, Ghana and Sene­
gal, including a comparison of 2019 indicators to measure 
policy reform efforts. For all 12 CwA partners combined, 
the total number of required government actions and pol­
icy targets as well as foreign partner institutions in the Ma­
trices easily added up to 300 in early 2018. In many cases, 
the number of required actions, targets and partners in­
creased with each Country Matrix update. It would appear, 
therefore, that the Policy Matrices fail take into account the 
limited administrative capacity in the CwA countries, the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as well as the 
colonial past and subsequent anticolonial sentiments of 
most CwA partners.
The proliferation of policy actions required from the 12 
CwA partners in each of the country Policy Matrices can be 
blamed for the fact that CwA country governments have 
been confused and thus failed to take ownership of the 
Compact initiative.53 It would be more realistic to say that 
the CwA initiative is owned by multilateral agencies, espe­
cially the World Bank's IFC. Multilateral agencies push their 
themes and indicators and the G20 leaders do not seem to 
be too concerned about prioritisation or considering the se­
verely limited government management capacities of most 
CwA partners. Multilaterals struggle to obtain mandates. It 
is no coincidence that each multilateral organisation has 
tried to shoehorn the work areas and indicators that they 
>own< into the CwA country Policy Matrices.
47 Deutscher Bundestag (2018): op. cit.: paragraph 6: 4.
4 8  Deutscher Bundestag (2019): Bundestagsdrucksache 19/10272 
(21.5.2019).
49  Agentur fü r W irtschaft und Entwicklung (2019): Start des Entwick­
lungsinvestitionsfonds (4 June 2019).
50  Notably, Deutscher Bundestag (2018): Drucksache 19/6066, op. cit. 
and Deutscher Bundestag (2019): Bundestagsdrucksache 19/10272, 
op. cit.
51 Ansgar Graw (2018): Marshallplan fü r Afrika hakt, in: Die W elt 
(4.12.2018).
52 https://www.com pactwithafrica.org/content/com pactwithafrica/
home/compact-countries.html
53 ACET (2019): Independent Review by The African Center for Eco­
nomic Transformation. Compact M onitoring Report (April).
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Box 1
The Germ an Governm ent's Developm ent Investm ent Fund fo r Africa
1. AfricaConnect (BMZ).
Fund fo r the financial prom otion o f German investment in  Africa by 
the German Investment and Development Corporation (DEG). A f- 
ricaConnect supports European companies to  invest in  Africa and 
primarily in  CwA countries:
-  Loans in euros or US dollars
-  Terms from three to seven years
-  750,000 to 4,000,000 euros
-  Risk sharing on attractive terms
-  Lean financing structure
-  Support for the implementation of international environmental, 
social and corporate governance standards
-  Use o f the DEG network and long-term experience w ith  investment 
in Africa.
2. AfricaGrow (BMZ).
Funds from the Kreditanstalt fü r Wiederaufbau (KfW) development 
bank to  support African enterprises. The AfricaGrow Fund is a fund 
of funds designed to invest in African venture capital and equity 
funds to  support SMEs and start-ups, primarily in countries associ­
ated w ith  the G20 CwA. As a legally independent entity, the Africa- 
Grow Fund is a key implementation instrument o f the CwA initiative. 
The project is intended to support the afore-mentioned states in at­
tracting private investment as well as technical and financial support 
and in return implementing reforms to improve the business climate, 
such as combating corruption or strengthening good governance.
Private equity and venture capital play a crucial role in promoting 
grow th and employment. However, equity and especially venture 
capital funds are still very much in their infancy in Africa and com­
panies face a large funding gap. It is estimated that, in 2015, only 
four per cent o f all African start-ups had access to equity. The total 
financing gap for SMEs in Africa is expected to exceed 300 billion 
US dollars. Rapid population growth and urbanisation are likely to 
widen this gap even further. In addition, the environment for rais­
ing finance has stagnated or even deteriorated in recent years. On 
the other hand, amounts below ten million US dollars, i.e., typical 
requirements for start-ups and SMEs, represent only a fraction o f 
the market.
The AfricaGrow Fund is designed to help close this gap by trigger­
ing a much-needed catalytic effect: As a strong and reliable anchor 
investor, it will enable venture and equity funds to raise private 
capital more easily. To achieve this goal, the AfricaGrow Fund will 
be launched as a structured fund. On behalf o f the BMZ, KfW  will 
provide w hat it refers to  as »first-loss tranche« at fund o f funds lev­
el, thereby leveraging additional funds from the DEG as an anchor 
investor and other investors for the emerging African venture and 
equity sector.
3. Economic N etw ork Africa (BM W i).
Partner network o f the key players in German foreign trade promo­
tion w ith tailor-made support services for German companies.
Sources: Reports from  the respective government ministries.
The focus o f the Economic Network is the CwA countries. The initi­
ative starts w ith Ethiopia, Ghana and Morocco. From autumn 2019, 
the business network will support enterprises in opening up African 
markets w ith tailor-made consulting and support services from a 
single source:
-  Advising companies on specific business opportunities, including 
foreign trade promotion and development cooperation measures, 
and in particular on financing, business case calculation and legal 
framework conditions.
-  Support and contact facilitation, in Germany as well as in Africa.
4. Special In itiative fo r Training and Employment (BMZ).
The aim is to create more and better employment opportunities in 
Africa. To this end, the initiative promotes business locations and 
clusters and sustainable investments.
Promotion o f business locations and industries (clusters)
-  Promotion o f industrial and business parks
-  Improving export opportunities
-  Addressing barriers to  investment: »from training to  customs clear­
ance«.
Promotion o f sustainable investments (Business &  Invest)
-  Collaboration w ith  companies: for example feasibility studies and 
corporate finance
-  Project development w ith  companies: e. g., training and qualification
-  Establishment o f sustainable value and supply chains: for example, 
quality improvements in the supply industry
-  Promotion o f SMEs (>African Mittelstand<) -  Improving the frame­
w ork conditions and increasing competitiveness
-  Support in opening up new markets
-  Stronger cooperation between African and German SMEs.
The aim o f the Special Initiative is to create 100,000 jobs and 30,000 
traineeships and to improve working conditions. To this end, the 
framework conditions and sustainability in selected locations and 
economic sectors (clusters) w ill be improved and sustainable invest­
ments leading to more employment will be promoted. The focus 
is on both African and European/German companies and investors.
-  Fields o f action: Promotion of business locations and industries 
(clusters); promotion o f industrial and business parks; improving 
export opportunities; addressing barriers to investment; stronger 
cooperation between African and German SMEs
-  Funding: From 2019, a separate budget line will be available (230 
million euros).
-  Country selection and instruments: The Special Initiative imple­
ments projects in the reform partner countries Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivo­
ire, Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. Projects in  Rwanda are
in the pipeline.
Already as early as 2018, it  was possible to  achieve an increase in the 
total volume o f export credit guarantees in Africa: Export credit guar­
antees amounting to  1.8 billion euros (2017: 1.1 billion euros) were 
granted for supplies and services. Africa's share o f the tota l covered 
volume thus increased to  nine per cent (2017: 6.3 per cent).
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5
CWA COUNTRY SELECTION AND THE 
USE OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
In theory, as the »CwA is seen as bottom-up demand-driv­
en cooperation, African countries volunteer to join the 
compact and commit to specific reforms«.54 It has indeed 
been claimed in official documents that the selection pro­
cess is »demand driven«.55 But it is striking that the current 
African CwA partner countries selected are identical to the 
beneficiaries of the HIPC initiative of the 1990s, suggesting 
a political >like-mindedness< in the selection of the African 
CwA partners. The nine LICs of the 12 CwA countries were 
part of the HIPC initiative and were granted debt relief by 
bilateral Paris Club creditors from 1996. Further, the MDRI 
in 2005 allowed for the cancellation of the claims of the 
IMF, WBG and the AfDB on HIPC completion point coun­
tries. These very multilaterals manage the Compact initia­
tive today.
What criteria are used to select African CwA partner coun­
tries? The answer is: good governance, or rather percep­
tions thereof. In a recent parliamentary session, the Ger­
man government was quite specific on this: »To measure 
the level of good governance in the partner countries, the 
German government relies, in particular, on internationally 
recognised indices such as the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception 
Index and the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index. 
These three countries met the criteria.«56 Moreover, these 
governance indicators not only serve to facilitate the selec­
tion of the CwA partner countries but they also keep the 
international organisations in the business of monitoring 
CwA governance outcomes.
These indicators of governance and institutional strength 
are composite (or >aggregate<) perceptions-based indica­
tors. Indicators like this aggregate often large amounts of 
information from diverse sources and reduce it to a single 
number — a single governance score —  per country, per 
year, to facilitate comparisons. The aggregated information 
consists of people's perceptions of the quality of govern­
54  Cobus van Staden and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (2019): op. cit.: 18.
55 Cf., e. g., IFC (2018): Trends in FDI and Cross-Border Investments in 
Compact w ith  Africa Countries (November). On page 1 o f the Fore­
w ord, it  states: »The initiative is demand-driven and open to  all A fri­
can countries.«
56  Deutscher Bundestag (2018): Drucksache 19/6066 (28.11.2018),
translated from  German.
ance, or some aspect of governance (e. g ., the rule of law, 
control of corruption), in different countries. Most of the 
people whose perceptions are used are diplomats or busi­
ness managers, and some live outside the countries they 
are rating.
-  The BTI is an annual evaluation of the quality of democ­
racy, market economy and political management using
data from 129 developing and transitional countries 
(2018), with scores ranging from one (low) to 10 (model 
achieved). Its critics say that the Index reflects a »West­
ern« model of governance. The 2018 average govern­
ance score was 4 .80 ; this is considerably lower than the 
average 2018 BTI score of 5.26 (see Table 6). According 
to the website, the BTI »aggregates the results of trans­
formation processes and political management into 
two indices: Status Index and Management Index. The 
Status Index, with its two analytic dimensions of politi­
cal and economic transformation, identifies where each 
of the countries stand on their path toward democracy 
under the rule of law and a social market economy. Fo­
cusing on the quality of governance, the Management 
Index assesses the acumen with which decision-makers 
steer political processes.«57 Importantly, local difficul­
ties with policy implementation are taken into account 
here.
-  According to its website, the CPI »scores countries on 
how corrupt their public sectors are seen to be.« Deter­
mined by annual expert assessments and opinion sur­
veys, the CPI defines corruption as »the misuse of public 
power for private benefit.«58 At present, the corruption 
index ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of 
public sector corruption currently according to 13 sourc­
es and using a scale of 0  to 100, where 0  is highly cor­
rupt and 100 is very clean. More than two thirds of 
countries scored below 50 on this year's CPI, with an 
average score of just 43. With an average CPI score of 
39.25 in 2018, the 12 African CwA partners were per­
ceived as slightly more corrupt than the world average. 
CPI source data capture various aspects of corruption, 
including bribery, diversion of public funds, nepotistic
57 https://www.bti-project.org/de/daten/rankings/governance-index/
58 https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
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appointments in the civil service or state capture by nar­
row vested interests. Importantly, the index does not 
capture citizen perceptions or experience of corruption, 
tax fraud, illicit financial flows, enablers of corruption 
(lawyers, accountants, financial advisors etc.), mon­
ey-laundering and private sector corruption.59 Since 
trade unions (via the ILO) or local/regional sources are 
also absent, the CPI largely reflects business and West­
ern opinions and thus marginalises the opinions of the 
labour force and populations in the Global South.
-  The World Bank's EoDB index60 measures the degree to 
which the regulatory environment is conducive to start­
ing and operating a local firm. The EoDB indicators 
were first published in 2004 and, since 2003, have been 
provided on an annual basis by the International Fi­
nance Corporation (IFC), the private finance arm of the 
W BG. Covering 190 economies, the EoDB index 2019 
measures the processes for business incorporation, ac­
quiring a building permit, obtaining an electricity con­
nection, transferring property, getting access to credit, 
protecting minority investors, paying taxes, engaging in 
international trade, enforcing contracts and resolving 
insolvency. The index ranges from 0 to 100 (perfect). 
The EoDB score benchmarks economies with respect to 
regulatory best practice, showing the absolute distance 
from the best regulatory performance on each EoDB 
indicator. When compared over the years, the EoDB 
score shows how much the regulatory environment for 
local entrepreneurs in an economy has changed over 
time in absolute terms. The EoDB index collects and 
publishes data on labour market regulation with a focus 
on the flexibility of employment regulation as well as 
several aspects of job quality. However, labour market 
issues (such as how easy it is to fire workers) have now 
been removed from EoDB rankings. For some time now, 
the EoDB index has been subject to heavy criticism 
(Arndt and Oman, 2006).61 In early 2018, the World 
Bank's chief economist at the time, Paul Romer, told the 
Wall Street Journal that he had lost faith in the integrity 
of the EoDB index, suggesting that it was being politi­
cally manipulated.
As well as the governance indicators presented above (BTI, 
CPI and the IFC's EoDB index), the quality of institutions is 
also of crucial importance in the design of the CwA. As al­
ready mentioned, Schuknecht et al. (2018) explicitly refer to 
the influential book Why Nations Fail by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012).62 The core thesis of the book is that the 
design of political institutions has a decisive influence on 
the design of economic institutions. These, in turn, influ­
ence the level of technological progress, which itself is a de­
cisive factor for economic growth. Economists find this mo­
nocausal (and anecdotal) explanation unsatisfactory, how­
ever. The most prominent rejection of the thesis has come 
by Jeffrey Sachs63 who points to the complex nature of de­
velopment. Many other leading social scientists have criti­
cised Why Nations Fail,  often for its monocausality, confu­
sion of cause and effect or lack of statistics-based evi- 
dence.64
The CwA, governance indicators and debt sustainability 
are closely interconnected in Africa's Compact partner 
countries. These are, after all, post-completion-point HIPCs 
and so countries with a history of low debt tolerance.
-  First, the Compact favours financial instruments that 
tend to raise infrastructure debt and implicit fiscal liabil­
ities, such as blending and PPPs.65 Blending, or the use 
of public funds to de-risk or leverage private invest­
ments in development, involves combining concession­
ary financing (grants or loans with a grant element) 
with debt finance from international financial institu­
tions (usually development banks) or market-based 
sources in order to maximise the volume of resources 
available for infrastructure projects. PPPs are an impor­
tant vehicle to incentivise private sector finance. How­
ever, their high rate of failure on the African continent 
underscores the need to make greater efforts to ad­
dress the capacity gaps in their implementation and en­
sure that the public sector does not bear all the costs 
(Della Croce et al., 2016).66
-  Second, an important indicator for measuring the
quality of a country's institutions is the World Bank's
CPIA. This index measures the institutional strength of
a country, with 1 = low and 6 = high. It scores countries 
against a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: 
economic management, structural policies, policies for 
social inclusion and equity, and public sector manage­
ment and institutions. Until mid-2018, the IMF and the 
World Bank had been relying exclusively on the CPIA 
to classify LICs' debt carrying capacity in their joint 
Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Coun­
tries (DSF). While other economic variables have been 
added since then, the CPIA is still relied on to provide 
a composite indicator of institutional strength meas­
ured by the World Bank to assess a country's debt car­
rying capacity.
The CPIA assessment of institutional strength translates in­
to one of three debt carrying capacity categories (strong, 
medium and weak), as indicated in Table 4 .
59 Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018: Fre­
quently Asked Questions.
60  http://www.doingbusiness.org/
61 Christiane Arndt and Charles P. Oman (2006): Uses and Abuses of Gov­
ernance Indicators. Paris: OECD Development Centre Policy Studies.
62 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012): Why Nations Fail: The 
Origins o f Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York.
63 Jeffrey D. Sachs (2012): Government, Geography, and Growth: The 
True Drivers o f Economic Development, in: Foreign Affairs (September).
64  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Why_Nations_Fail
65 Kappel, Pfeiffer and Reisen (2017): op. cit.
66 Della Croce, R. M . Fuchs and M . W itte  (2016): Long-term financing 
in sub-Saharan Africa, in  J. Stijns (ed.): Banking in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Recent Trends and Digital Financial Inclusion. Luxembourg: European 
Investment Bank.
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Table 4
D ebt Burden Thresholds and Benchmarks under the DSF
PV external d e b t, % External d e b t service, %
PV o f to ta l 
public d e b t, %
CPIA (e t al.) GDP Exports Exports Revenues GDP
W eak 30 140 10 14 35
M edium 40 180 15 18 55
Strong 55 240 21 23 75
Note: Given that concessionality is an im portant element in financing LICs, the debt concept used in the template focuses on the present value (Pv) o f debt. 
Source: IMF (2018): The Debt Sustainability Framework fo r Low-Income Countries.
The IMF assessment of debt sustainability provides an im­
portant signal to private portfolio investors and creditors, 
both domestic and foreign. Unsustainable public debt 
means either higher taxes, inflation, austerity or financial re­
pression in the future. Consequently, CPIA scores are an im­
portant determinant of the investability of CwA countries: 
High debt (service) levels combined with weak CPIA scores 
tend to dampen the attraction of private capital flows to 
and the mobilisation of domestic resources in CwA partner 
countries.
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6
THE CONTROVERSIAL ROLE OF PRIVATE
FOREIGN CAPITAL FOR SUSTAINABLE
TRANSFORMATION
Do good governance and good institutions help attract pri­
vate capital flows? If they do, can we expect these private 
flows to stimulate sustainable transformation by promot­
ing structural shifts towards higher productivity? As will be 
shown in the following paragraphs, there is no straightfor­
ward answer to this question.
-  Firstly, while global private capital has been shown to 
be highly cyclical, driven by US monetary policy and 
risk aversion and thus by push factors, equity flows 
(both portfolio equity and FDI) have been shown to be 
pulled in by better governance and institutional scores.
-  Secondly, private flows can be both disruptive and 
transformative: disruptive, often as a result of excessive 
and mismatched debt that eventually leads to financial 
crises; transformative, due to the benefits of integrating 
into G vCs, through the removal of infrastructure bot­
tlenecks or, indirectly, through lowering the cost of risk 
capital.
The CwA would imply a positive answer to both questions 
(notwithstanding caveats). After all, it has given foreign pri­
vate capital flows a central role as it seeks to help attract in­
ternational foreign private finance and mobilise domestic re­
sources to deliver the »billions to trillions«67 necessary to 
achieve the SDGs. It is therefore important to examine the 
evidence to ascertain whether these a priori assumptions of 
the CwA are broadly justified for the African Compact part­
ner countries. Let us first turn to the governance-flow nexus.
Pull or Push? It is not a country's framework conditions but 
rather US monetary policy that is one of the principal driv­
ers of capital flow cycles to poor countries. This latter point 
is especially pertinent today, given that we find ourselves at 
the tail end of a decade of extraordinary monetary stimu­
lus that is gradually being unravelled. Global risk aversion is 
another factor as it pushes money into LICs when it is low 
and pulls it out when heightened. v Ix 68 has recently been
67 The brazen term »Billions to  Trillions« was framed by the W orld Bank. 
See W orld Bank (2015): From Billions to  Trillions: Transforming Devel­
opment Finance, Post-2015 -  Financing for Development: Multilateral 
Development Finance. Washington, D.C. (April).
68  The v Ix  is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market volatility In­
dex. It is a measure o f the implied volatility o f S&P 500 index options.
shown to be a reliable predictor of global risk aversion and 
cyclical flow.69 On an aggregate capital level, push factors 
such as global risk aversion and external interest rates are 
found to be most important for portfolio debt flows, 
somewhat less for banking flows and least of all for FDI.70
According to empirical studies, portfolio inflows are gener­
ally significantly affected by governance measures such as 
the rule of law, property rights and institutional quality. 
Similarly, with regards to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), studies 
tend to find that the rule of law and institutional quality are 
significant but further report that political stability and gov­
ernment effectiveness are also decisive. However, even with 
relatively good governance indicators, portfolio flows have 
been deterred by the regions poor record when it comes to 
rule of law and political stability.71 So the CwA's emphasis 
on governance and institutions to attract private cross-bor­
der capital to relatively well-run African countries was co­
herent with respect to its initial focus on portfolio flows 
from large institutional investors such as pension funds.
Natural resources and the size of national markets have 
generally been considered the main drivers of FDI. The 
quality of local institutions has, by contrast, attracted less 
attention but the quality of governance seems to play a not 
insignificant role in the distribution of FDI in SSA. It has re­
cently been shown that factors such as political stability, 
government effectiveness, lower corruption, voice and ac­
countability are important for attracting FDI to the re- 
gion.72 *
Infrastructure funding is crucial for Africa's sustainable 
transformation. Yet, a significant infrastructure financing 
deficit — estimated at between 68 billion and 108 billion
69 Helene Rey (2018): Dilemma no t Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle
and Monetary Policy Independence. NBER W orking Paper No. 21162 
(February).
70 Robin Koepke (2018): W hat Drives Capital Flows to  Emerging Mar­
kets? A  Survey o f the Empirical Literature, in: Journal o f Economic 
Surveys, 33, 2 (April).
71 Sean Joss Gossel and Andrew Beard (2018): Governance and Port­
fo lio  Flows in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Applied Economics Letters 
(August).
72 Andres Rodriguez-Pose and Gilles Cols (2017): The determinants of
foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa: W hat role for gov­
ernance?, in: Regional Science Policy & Practice,  9, 2 (June).
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US dollars annually — needs to be bridged.73 Given the no­
torious lack of infrastructure in Africa, which acts as a bot­
tleneck to intraregional trade, urban habitat and rural de­
velopment, and hence also to transformative growth, the 
main sources of funding for infrastructure in Africa do not 
suggest that they have been held back by Western-style 
governance standards. CwA efforts focus on attracting pri­
vate financers to infrastructure investment. Table 5 , howev­
er, shows the very limited role of private funding for African 
infrastructure; in fact, the share actually dropped from a 
meagre 4.1 per cent in 2016 before the CwA launch to 2.8 
per cent in 2017.74 It is therefore questionable whether 
(positive) governance indicators such as BTI or EoDB are, in 
fact, drivers of infrastructure funding.
The fact that the response of private investors to funding 
African infrastructure is so negligible may partly be an in­
herent aspect of its drawbacks: higher funding costs than 
all other creditors with shorter maturities, lack of a devel­
opment mandate, narrow project selectivity and risk aver­
sion. These factors, coupled with weak institutional struc­
tures and a volatile macroeconomic environment in many 
African countries, make private finance less attractive.75
What about the flow-transformation nexus? The CwA aims 
to foster the conditions for long-term private investment, in­
vestment in infrastructure and also for economic partner­
ship and employment in African countries with the objective 
of promoting sustained and inclusive growth. Institutional 
investments by both pension funds and life insurers as well 
as FDI can benefit Africa. Institutional investors enjoy long­
term liabilities in their balance sheets (unlike commercial 
banks or hedge funds), which are essential to fund Africa's 
infrastructure and a key growth prerequisite for the conti­
nent. FDI, in turn, requires a modern infrastructure, particu­
larly energy and connectivity, to fully utilise its external ben­
efits. FDI can entail spillovers contributing to the modernisa­
tion of production capacity, knowledge transfer, integration 
into global and regional value chains, and also employment 
for the jobless. Unlike portfolio flows, corporate FDI reflects 
a long-term commitment and is hard to reverse, thus provid-
73 AfDB (2018): African Economic Outlook 2018.  Abidjan: Chapter 3. 
74 ICA (2017, 2018): Infrastructure financing trends in Africa 2016,
2017.  Abidjan: Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA). The most 
recent issue for 2018 had no t yet been released by summer 2019.
75 Cyril Prinsloo (2019): The Pitfalls o f Private Sector Investment in  In­
frastructure Financing. SAIIA Policy Briefing No. 187. Johannesburg: 
South African Institute o f International Affairs (June).
ing stability. However, in view of analytical and empirical ev­
idence for LICs, trust in the role of cross-border private cap­
ital flows to low-income Africa is controversial.
-  Although finance is needed for economic development, 
excessive or unstable cross-border flows can damage 
economic growth, impede poverty alleviation and exac­
erbate income inequality.76 LICs continue to experience 
strong pro-cyclical swings in external financing in terms 
of availability, maturity and cost. Yet they lack the finan­
cial safety net provided by swap arrangements among 
central banks in developed countries to manage these 
cycles. To a great extent, the recent surge in private cap­
ital flows has also been the result of international bond 
issuance by national governments, which has increased 
the risk of debt unsustainability, particularly because the 
bonds have been exclusively in >hard< currencies, bring­
ing significant currency-related risks. Indeed, 40 per 
cent of LICs are now at high risk of or already in debt 
distress.77
-  Empirical support for an independent growth impact of 
private cross-border flows has proved elusive. However, 
a Bank of Canada study did find evidence that capital 
inflows foster higher economic growth, above and be­
yond any effects on the investment rate, but only for 
economies where the banking sector has reached a cer­
tain level of development.78 These results suggest there­
fore that the domestic financial sector plays a pivotal 
role in ensuring that international capital flows do in­
deed promote economic growth in developing coun­
tries. A more detailed, disaggregated view revealed that 
the growth effect of the various broad categories of 
cross-border capital flows (in particular bond flows as 
well as short-term and long-term bank lending) can be 
negative in poor countries.79 Debt-creating flows, in the
76 Robust research and evidence for the LIC context was provided by a 
recent study by Judith Tyson and Thorsten Beck (2018): Capital Flows 
and Financial Sector Development in  Low-Income Countries. London: 
DFID-ESRC G row th Research Programme (DEGRP) (October).
77 IMF (2018): Regional Economic Outlook fo r Sub-Saharan Africa: Do­
mestic Revenue Mobilization and Private Investment. Washington, 
D.C.: IMF Regional Economic Outlook 2018 (October).
78 Jeannine Bailliu (2000): Private Capital Flows, Financial Development, 
and Economic G row th in Developing Countries. Bank o f Canada 
W orking Paper 2000-15 (July).
79 Helmut Reisen and Marcelo Soto (2001): W hich Types o f Capital In­
flows Foster Developing-Country Growth?, in: International Finance, 
4, 1: 1-14.
Table 5
African Infrastructure Com m itm ent Trends by Source, 2016 and 2017, per cent
African Govts ICA M em bers China Arab O th er b i/m u ltila tera l Private
2016 42.0 29.8 10.3 8.8 5.0 4.1
2017 42.0 24.0 22.8 3.7 3.6 2.8
Source: ICA (2017, 2018): Infrastructure Financing Trends in  Africa.
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presence of narrow and illiquid domestic financial mar­
kets, introduce currency and maturity mismatches into 
corporate and government balance sheets. These bal­
ance sheet mismatches have repeatedly proved to be 
time bombs. The nature of equity flows, by contrast, is 
much more development friendly. LICs seek to attract 
FDI to benefit from the associated external benefits (via 
technology, learning, integration into value chains and 
global market access). Portfolio equity inflows can, but 
do not necessarily, stimulate long-term growth pros­
pects. They help to develop efficient stock markets and 
foster economic growth by reducing the hurdle rate for 
investments and small business development.
-  FDI is an accounting convention80 and not a net private 
capital flow (as it may be funded by local debt or by 
imported machinery). Large one-off merger and acqui­
sition (M&A) deals and corporate restructurings may 
inflate FDI numbers, while greenfield investment counts 
mostly for productivity enhancement in a low-income 
economy. FDI statistics also reflect other factors, includ­
ing tax avoidance, which makes it difficult to differenti­
ate between FDI for >long-term< investments, which
serves as a source of growth, and FDI that is purely fi­
nancial and has little real economic impact as it merely 
passes through an economy. This latter type of FDI also 
obscures the ultimate sources and destinations of FDI. 
There is emerging evidence that FDI can also be pro­
cyclical, and there is mixed evidence on the relationship 
between FDI and productivity in different sectors. Re­
cent research has identified a negative relationship be­
tween FDI and productivity since 2000.81 It was found 
that the composition of FDI was concentrated by sector 
and that those sectors (such as extractives) had a nega­
tive impact on total factor productivity and for promot­
ing transformational growth.
In a much-cited paper, Helene Rey provides conclusive an­
alytical and empirical evidence to this effect: »Gains to in­
ternational capital flows have proved elusive whether in 
calibrated models or in the data. Large gross flows disrupt 
asset markets and financial intermediation, so the costs 
may be very large. To deal with the global financial cycle 
and the >dilemma<, we have the following policy options: 
(a) targeted capital controls; (b) acting on one of the sourc­
es of the financial cycle itself, the monetary policy of the 
Fed and other main central banks; (c) acting on the trans­
8 0  Maria Borga (2015): The OECD's Revised Benchmark Definition o f 
Foreign Direct Investment, in: OECDinsights.org (19.10.2015). 81 Tyson and Beck (2018): op. cit.
Figure 6
Financing M ix  During th e  Transition from  LIC to  HIC Status
--------------------------------- x ------------------------------------------------------------------►-----------
LICs LMICs UMICs HICs 
ODA /  Total external flow s OOF /  Total external flow s
Private flow s /  Total external flow s Remittances /  Total external flow s  
Remittances /  Total external flow s
Source: OECD (2019): Transition Finance: Introducing a New Concept. Paris: OECD Development Co-Operation Working Paper 54.
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mission channel cyclically by limiting credit growth and lev­
erage during the upturn of the cycle, using national mac­
ro-prudential policies; (d) acting on the transmission chan­
nel structurally by imposing stricter limits on leverage for all 
financial intermediaries.«82
Given this background to private capital flows, the CwA 
could be described as audacious. Let's not forget that the 
Compact postulates that macroeconomic stability, an inves­
tor-friendly business environment and effective financial 
sector intermediation are necessary conditions to spur pri­
vate investment. Kappel and Reisen (2017) argued in an ear­
lier FES study on the Compact that such premises are >un- 
suitable< for LICs.83 All 12 Compact countries produce such 
a low yearly income per head that they are either classified 
as LICs or lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), as has 
been shown in Table 3.
Although the mean annual PCI varies widely across the 
group of Compact countries — from 590 US dollars (Burki­
na Faso) to 3,490 US dollars (Tunisia) — they all remain sig­
nificantly below income levels where a substantial contribu­
tion of private external flows can reasonably be expected. 
Moreover, some Compact countries (Ethiopia and Ghana) 
have recently been categorised as being at >high< risk of 
debt distress in the IMF/WB DSF. Debt vulnerability is likely 
to further mitigate the role of external private flows to fund 
a country, assuming this comes in the form of debt-creating 
flows, including blended finance.
Figure 6 (from OECD, 2019)84 seems to support the Kappel/ 
Reisen hypothesis. It presents the evolution of the external 
financing mix for developing countries during the transition 
process. Its focus is on the distribution of external resources 
(left y axis) although it also includes the relative importance 
of domestic resources (right y axis) and shows the evolution 
of the mix as income per capita increases (x axis).
As the graph shows, the percentage share of private flows 
relative to total external flows for LICs and LMICs was, on 
average, well below 10 per cent during the 2012-2016 peri­
od preceding the Compact. Private external flows only start 
to dominate the external financing mix (with a more than 50 
per cent share) once countries graduate from upper-mid­
dle-income (UMICs) to high-income (HICs), with an annual 
gross national income (GNI) per capita of 12,375 US dollars 
or more since July 2019.85 *
The strong negative link between PCI and the relative im­
portance of private finance in cross-border financial flows 
may have driven the CwA, notably via instruments of risk
mitigation. Of course the negative link works both ways: It 
would be impressive if the CwA managed to meet the chal­
lenge of stimulating private flows into African compact 
partner countries. The same expectation should reasonably 
also hold ex ante for African infrastructure funding. Tradi­
tionally, the private response to funding African infrastruc­
ture has been negligible (as has been shown in Table 5). 
Now we turn to results from the first two years of the Com­
pact initiative.
82 Helene Rey (2018): Dilemma no t Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle
and Monetary Policy Independence. NBER W orking Paper No. 21162 
(February).
83 Kappel and Reisen (2017): op. cit.
84  OECD (2019): Transition Finance: Introducing a New Concept.  Paris: 
OECD Development Co-Operation W orking Paper 54.
85 W orld Bank (2019): New Country Classifications by Income Level:
2019-2020. Washington, D.C. (July).
29
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG -  G20 COMPACT WITH AFRICA
7
GOVERNANCE, DEBT AND PRIVATE 
FLOWS TWO YEARS ON
This chapter aims to trace the initial results in terms of ef­
fects on governance scores, debt sustainability, recorded 
capital flows and domestic resource mobilisation (national 
savings). A  mere two years since CwA inception is such a 
short time; arguably too short for private flows to react. 
Overall, governance scores have improved since 2016, the 
year preceding the launch of the Compact. However, FDI 
and national savings have not yet responded accordingly. 
Both in fact fell during the 2017-18 period.
A conclusive assessment will need more time (and the CwA 
is designed for the long haul). So it is hardly surprising that 
input orientation rather than output monitoring has per­
vaded the official documents for the first two years of the 
CwA. Firstly, we document important inputs provided to 
the CwA by governments and multilateral agencies. Sec­
ondly, we look for most recent data on governance, debt, 
flows and savings in the 12 current CwA partner countries. 
Periodic Monitoring Reports by AAG are documented on 
the CwA website.
-  In April 2018, the AAG assessed progress in identifying 
policy and support actions under the headings busi­
ness, macroeconomic and financing. There were 101 
commitments identified in the nine countries that were 
participants in the initiative at that time. 23 per cent of 
commitments were reported as fully achieved; and 74 
per cent of commitments were reported as on track.86
-  In October 2018, the AAG assessed private sector ac­
tivity in the Compact countries. The Monitoring Report 
signalled that investment interest in Compact coun­
tries was growing. Total FDI inflows to CwA countries 
amounted to 20 billion US dollars in 2017. The total 
annual volume of inbound FDI to all CwA countries has 
increased by 36 per cent over the past five years, from 
14.9 billion US dollars in 2013 to 20.2 billion US dollars 
in 2017.87
86 G20 African Advisory Group (2018): G20 Compact w ith Africa -  
Compact M onitoring Report (October).
87 IFC (2018): Trends in FDI and Cross-Border Investments in Compact 
with Africa Countries (November). Obviously, this IFC statement does 
not monitor what has happened since 2017 as the reported rise in 
FDI refers to  the five years before the CwA was initiated. Moreover, 
w ith  the inclusion o f 2018, the investment record has been slightly 
modified, as described later in this report.
In April 2019, the AAG gave an overall assessment of the 
first two years and included some statistical results.88 The 
World Bank characterised the overall assessment of progress 
in the following words:
»The picture of the G20 Compact with Africa that 
emerges after tw o full years in existence is of member 
countries committed to maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, continuing to implement business environment 
reforms, positive trends in economic growth and slow 
but encouraging progress in investment generation.«
And the World Bank continued with its assessment:
»Overall two patterns are very clear. First, Compact coun­
tries are significantly outperforming global and regional 
growth projections. Second, as demonstrated by Doing 
Business results, they remain extremely focused on con­
tinuing to undertake relevant business-related reforms. 
In the past few years, nearly all the Compact Countries 
have featured in the group of top ten reformers.«89
Lastly, however, the Bank cannot (yet) describe progress 
with private capital flows in such rosy terms:
»In connection with investments, the picture is more
mixed ... Across all the Compact countries .. . the trend
is downward, with $30.7 billion in 2018 down from
$54.4 billion in 2017.«
In the same document, the ACET provides what it refers to
as an >independent< review.90 The ACET review points to the
benefits and challenges of the CwA initiative. Among the
benefits, it cites »enhanced investor interest«,  as well as 
»better donor coordination, a >seal o f approval< for reform
88 G20 African Advisory Group (2019): G20 Compact with Africa -  
Compact M onitoring Report.
89 According to the World Bank, the EoDB scores equate to  »relevant 
business-related reforms.« Despite all the shortcomings and criticism
referred to earlier, the World Bank still seems to  >own< the EoDB. A f­
ter all, the scores are important to  the organisation as they enable it 
to  secure repeated mandates from  the G20 (rather than other organ­
isations).
90  The principal author, Rob Floyd, has worked as a World Bank o ffi­
cial and drafts from  Washington, D.C. The ACET board has a strong 
presence of former aid officials from OECD countries.
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countries, clarity to country reform programs, a forum/ven- 
ue to review implementation of overall reform programs, 
consolidating policy objectives across government depart­
ments, and additional technical assistance.«91
As key challenges for the CwA in its current setup, ACET 
identified expectations and ownership, the role and func­
tion of Compact Teams, communications, capacity support 
and the role of the private sector. Importantly, ACET found
out that the >value proposition was not clear to African 
partners as G20 governments had largely not promised di­
rect support within the CwA:
»While the CwA is a >compact<, it is unlike traditional aid 
programs, as the reciprocal investor commitment is not 
guaranteed. Within the CwA, the G20 governments nor 
their business nor their institutional investors have guar­
anteed or promised direct support. This is the implicit 
model -  but is either not fully understood or not fully 
owned by CwA country governments in many instances. 
This results in a value proposition that is not clear.«92
Perhaps it is this lack of >value proposition for the African
partners embedded in the CwA, or longstanding structural
impediments to private investment, or simply the bureau­
cracy-driven proliferation of support measures that can be 
blamed for the fact that CwA country governments have 
been confused and thus failed to own the Compact initia­
tive. Our interviews even revealed doubts in Berlin about 
the sequence envisaged by the CwA architecture: First Afri­
can CwA partners reform, then private flows will come.93
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 2017-19
According to a T20 report drafted ahead of the Osaka Sum- 
mit,94 by spring 2019, nine participating CwA countries had 
made 101 commitments, of which 43 per cent, 37 per cent 
and 21 per cent were related to macroeconomic stability, 
business and the financial environment, respectively. While 
33 per cent and 22 per cent of the commitments under the 
macroeconomic and business environment pillars were 
achieved, only five per cent of the commitments under the 
financial environment heading have been achieved so far. 
Thus, on the level of policy measures taken, there has been 
some progress in the reform process in the Compact coun­
tries. These reform measures have translated into better 
governance scores.
In the CwA Monitoring Report released in April 2019 ahead 
of the Osaka G20 Summit, the World Bank sounded trium­
phant:
91 ACET (2018): op. cit.
92 Independent Review by the African Center fo r Economic Transforma­
tion (ACET). Compact M onitoring Report (April 2019): 10.
93 Interview at the Federal M inistry o f Finance (May 2019).
94  Rob Floyd, Kapil Kapoor and Laura Sennett (2019): G20 Compact
w ith  Africa. T20 Japan2019 (March). Think20 (T20) is the research
and policy advice network for the G20.
»As demonstrated by Doing Business results, they (the 
CwA countries) remain extremely focused on continu­
ing to undertake relevant business-related reforms. In 
the past few  years, nearly all the Compact Countries 
have featured in the group of top ten reformers.«
Generally, given the narrow range of sources for the per­
ceptions that enter into governance scores, both indicator 
changes and levels should be treated with great caution in­
stead of being presented in CwA Monitoring Reports as ir­
refutable signs of progress. Firstly, tinkering with indicator 
changes is easier if the interviewees form a small and ho­
mogenous group. Secondly, indicator levels primarily reflect 
levels of per capita GDP, something which was criticised in 
the French Tresor / AFD study cited above; this association 
also holds for the group of CwA countries.
Table 6 shows the scores for three governance indicators 
(IFC EoDB, BTI and CPI) emphasised by the German govern­
ment. The 12 current CwA countries are generally managed 
better than in the period just prior to the launch of the Com­
pact in 2017. As indicated by the unweighted mean num­
bers (in red), governance indicators improved visibly, albeit 
not significantly. A  series of two-tailed t-tests comparing the 
pre- and post-CwA sub-periods for each of the three gov­
ernance indicators did not produce significant values. Al­
though the indicators improved, we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the indicators remained the same for the 
two sub-periods.95 *Note, however, that Benin's governance 
scores improved strongly on all three indicators.
CHANGES IN DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 2017-19
Countries with solid institutions are perceived as more debt 
tolerant in the IMF / WBG Debt Sustainability Framework 
(DSF), as shown in Table 4 . This requires LICs to have im­
proved CPIA scores. Lower public and corporate debt means 
less default risk, less exposure to currency and maturity mis­
matches in public and private balance sheets and better sov­
ereign ratings. Countries with sustainable debt levels have 
more fiscal space and buffers to engage in PPPs and other 
forms of bended finance that entail contingent public liabil­
ities. A sound debt situation is a prerequisite for portfolio 
and bank credit investment to fund infrastructure. As will be 
shown in this chapter, a solid debt situation is neither a giv­
en for all CwA countries nor has it improved anywhere.
As noted earlier, the nine LICs of the 12 CwA countries were 
among the so-called HIPCs in the 1990s. They were part of the 
HIPC initiative and were granted debt relief by bilateral Paris 
Club creditors from 1996. Further, the MDRI in 2005 allowed 
for cancellation of the claims of the IMF, WBG and AfDB on 
HIPC completion point countries. These very multilaterals man­
age the Compact initiative today. In this sense, the CwA initia­
tive is a deja vu experience for Africa's HIPC countries.
95 T-values all remained below the critical value o f 1.795 fo r 12 observa­
tions for each indicator.
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Table 6
African Compact Countries Governance Scores
Compact
countries
BTI 16 BTI 18 DB 16 DB 18 CPI16 CPI18
Benin 4.72 5.86 48.5 51.4 36 40
Burkina Faso 4.92 5.20 51.3 51.6 42 41
Cöte d 'Ivoire 5.13 5.54 52.3 58.0 34 35
Egypt 4.44 3.96 56.6 58.6 34 35
Ethiopia 3.49 3.65 47.2 49.1 34 34
Ghana 4 .44 6.18 58 .8 59.2 43 41
Guinea 5.83 5.82 46.2 51.5 27 28
Morocco 4.37 4.28 67.5 71.0 37 43
Rw anda 5.10 5.20 69.8 77.9 54 56
Senegal 6.65 6.70 50.7 54 .2 45 45
Togo 4.84 5.10 48.6 55.2 32 30
Tunisia 5.33 5.33 64.9 66.1 41 43
M ean 4.94 5.26 55.2 59.3 38 39
Notes: EoDB =  The Ease o f Doing Business score is depicted on a scale from  0 to  100, where 0 represents the lowest and 100 represents the best performance worldwide. Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation (BTI) gover­
nance comprises scores from  1  (lowest) to  10 (best), a composite o f scores fo r steering capacity, resource efficiency, consensus-building and international cooperation. The Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) uses a scale of 0 to  100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.
Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung, https://www.bti-project.org/en/data/;  http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data;  https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018.
The HIPC/MDRI initiative has clearly reduced the indebted­
ness of the beneficiaries and, in some cases, led to a >re- 
boot< after a >lost decade of development. Debt relief has 
enabled most countries to return to the capital market or 
access it for the first time. The new borrowing that has tak­
en place since then has already led a number of countries 
back into debt problems. For the risk of debt distress as­
sessment, the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) classi­
fied seven of the 35 post-completion HICs as high (and 
none in default) at the end of 2015; by the end of 2018, 10 
countries had been assessed as in high debt distress and 
two were in default.96
Table 7 provides a snapshot of the most recent indicators 
of debt sustainability since the launch of the CwA initiative 
for the 12 CwA countries. Only public debt figures are 
available for the CwA period; the first two columns refer to 
central government debt as a percentage of GDP, which 
excludes state-owned enterprises and subnational public 
authorities. While public debt ratios in CwA countries re­
main relatively low by OECD standards, so is their debt tol­
erance. The debt ratios were on an upward trend through­
out the 2017-19 period, from 60.4 to 63.5 per cent of
GDP. This trend was particularly pronounced in Senegal 
and Tunisia. Debt tolerance, as implied by CPIA scores, has 
remained stagnant, as have sovereign ratings by Standard 
& Poor's or Moody's.
96  Jürgen Kaiser (2019): op. cit.: Figure 7.
The growth forecasts and thus debt sustainability assess­
ments of the IMF and World Bank should be treated with 
scepticism, as the IMF has been found to be biased, especial­
ly towards IMF programme countries for which growth esti­
mates tend to be overly optimistic.97 Currently, the most re­
cent IMF/WBG assessments of CwA countries' debt sustaina­
bility would signal some scope for debt finance (including 
contingent liabilities implied by PPPs) only in Rwanda, given 
its moderate public debt ratio paired with good CPIA scores. 
By contrast, Ethiopia and Ghana are gauged as being in >high 
debt distress< meaning that they should have a preference for 
FDI, portfolio equity finance and grants over debt finance. 
Senegal tops the group of CwA countries with the worst pub­
lic debt dynamics as the respective debt/GDP ratio has soared 
by more than 14 percentage points since the launch of the 
Compact. Public debt ratios are largely driven by the differ­
ence between growth and interest rates98 on public debt, the 
primary budget balance, and, as emerging countries were 
forced to learn in the 1980s, by the exchange rate.99 *
97 Inderm it Gill, Kenan Karakülah and Shanta Devarajan (2019): 
Stressful Speculations about Public Debt in  Africa. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institute (June).
98  While IMF grow th  estimates tend to  be biased, effective interest 
rates on public debt are d ifficu lt (or costly) to  acquire. Senegal most 
recently paid 5.5 per cent on FCFA (=€) public treasury bonds. See 
https://agenceecofin.com/finances-publiques/0406-66690-l-etat- 
du-senegal-choisit-le-marche-des-titres-publics-pour-son-retour-sur- 
le-marche-financier-regional
99 Helmut Reisen (1989): Public Debt, External Competitiveness, and
Fiscal Discipline in Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Studies in International Finance No. 66.
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Table 7
Indicators o f D ebt Sustainability
Compact
countries
Public
debt 16
Public
Ratings 16 Ratings 19
IMF risk
debt 18debt 19
CPIA 16 CPIA 17
Benin 49.7 54.0 3.45 3.50 B B moderate
Burkina Faso 39.2 42.5 3.60 3.60 B - B moderate
Cöte d 'Ivoire 48.4 50.9 3.35 3.40 B+ B+ moderate
Egypt 96.8 86.9 n.a. n.a. B - B moderate
Ethiopia 56.1 57.4 3.55 3.40 B B high
Ghana 57.1 62.0 3.55 3.60 B - B high
Guinea 42.0 46.0 3.15 3.20 n. a. n . a. moderate
Morocco 64.9 65.1 n. a. n. a. BBB- BBB- low
Rw anda 32.9 50.0 4.00 4.00 B B low
Senegal 47.7 62 .0 3.80 3.80 B+ B+ lo w
Togo 81.1 70.4 3.00 3.10 n.a. n.a. low
Tunisia 62.3 81.5 n. a. n. a. B+ B low
M ean 60 .4 63.5 3.49 3.50
Sources: IMF: W orld Economic Outlook (April 2019); W orld Bank: CPIA Africa (July 2018); various ratings agencies; IMF/WBG: Debt Sustainability Analysis.
PRIVATE CROSS-BORDER FLOWS 2017-19
In its initial phases, the CwA initiative conceived a sequence 
of private cross-border flows to the Compact countries that 
would first stimulate portfolio flows into infrastructure from 
long-term institutional investors such as pension funds, life 
insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds. It was 
hoped that, in turn, as infrastructure bottlenecks were slow­
ly removed, FDI flows would follow. The CwA's financing 
framework aims to increase the availability of financing at 
reduced costs and risks, with a focus on infrastructure pro­
jects with long gestation periods. In particular, it targets 
pension funds and life insurers characterised by their long­
term balance sheet liabilities, which enable them to invest in 
infrastructure projects with long gestation periods. Kappel 
and Reisen (2017) project that their asset base will reach 
100 trillion US dollars by 2020.100
The initial emphasis on portfolio flows has, at least in Ger­
many, been replaced by a focus on the non-financial cor­
porate sector and its direct overseas investments in CwA 
countries, perhaps reflecting the relatively marginal impor­
tance of institutional savings in Germany. The second edi­
tion of the CwA investment Monitoring Report provides an 
update of country and sector-level trends in FDI flows and 
announcements in terms of cross-border investments (CBI) 
in CwA, covering the five-year period between 2013 and 
2017. CBI draw on project-level data and therefore com-
100 Kappel and Reisen (2017): op. cit.
prise announced, promised and planned but not necessar­
ily completed FDI. The Monitoring Report stays silent on 
portfolio flows, however.101
By their very nature, it is difficult to trace portfolio flows 
arising from, say, pension fund assets as these are not ear­
marked, shrouded in secrecy, liquid and reversible. The IFC 
is trying to help countries tap into assets held by institution­
al investors with its Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Pro­
gram (MCPP). This is a syndicated loan platform where in­
vestors can provide capital on a portfolio basis, which is 
then deployed by the IFC in the form of individual invest­
ments. Concurrently with the CwA, the IFC has offered an 
extension of MCPP specifically for infrastructure. This co-in­
vestment product enables institutional investors and private 
equity vehicles to leverage IFC's ability to originate and 
manage a portfolio of bankable infrastructure projects. The 
MCPP provides a credit enhancement through an IFC first 
loss tranche, in other words investors are attracted by a giv­
en return guaranteed for an initial period.
After an initial investment by the People's Bank of China in 
2013 (through SAFE, its State Administration for Foreign Ex­
change), Allianz Global Investors (2016), Eastspring Invest­
ments (2017), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2017), 
Liberty Specialty Markets (2017), Munich Re (2017), A xA
101 IFC (2008): Trends in FDI and Cross-Border Investments in Compact 
w ith  Africa Countries (November); available at: http://acetforafrica. 
org/acet/wp-content/uploads/publications/2019/02/CwA_FDI_Re- 
port_IFC_Final-1.pdf
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(2018) and Swiss Re (2018) have all joined MCPP. As of 
2018, the MCPP had raised seven billion US dollars from 
these eight global investors.102 While the amount raised by 
IFC via MCPP may sound impressive, the amount spent on 
infrastructure investments in CwA countries is so negligible 
that no direct data are provided. Information available on 
MCPP Infrastructure for the year 2018103 reports that 1.6 
billion US dollars in MCPP Infrastructure funds had been 
raised. Of these, 300 million US dollars of investments had 
been approved for nine projects in eight countries. Of the 
approved funds, only eight per cent had been allocated to 
SSA (and none to North Africa). So, just 24 million US dol­
lars of MCPP funds had been earmarked for SSA.
As already mentioned, the political focus related to the 
CwA has now shifted towards FDI. Reporting on FDI must 
be careful not to confuse concepts. The amount and allo­
cation of actual or implemented FDI are the litmus test of 
how effective the CwA has been in helping attract private 
capital flows to the African Compact partners. But actual 
or implemented FDI are easily muddled with merely an­
nounced,  approved or planned FDI, a large percentage of 
which will never come to fruition.104 The United Nations
102 www.ifc.org/m cpp
103 https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/a5affca5-d77d-4fec-8804- 
97df4f036f13/MCPP+Infrastructure+Flyer+2018.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
104 Deborah Brautigam, xinshen Diao, Margaret McMillan and Jed Silver 
(2017): Chinese Investment in  Africa: How Much Do We Know? Lon­
don: PEDL Synthesis Series No. 2 (October), provide a clear account of 
the difference between FDI concepts. Available at: https://pedl.cepr. 
org/publications/chinese-investment-africa-how-much-do-we-know
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is the 
organisation officially charged with collecting international 
statistics on actual FDI, alongside the IMF which collects 
balance of payments statistics.
Often, when agencies or Monitoring Reports brag about 
large FDI numbers, these are just announced, approved or 
planned. This FDI may ultimately never be implemented. 
Project data such as from fDi Markets allow coding and thus 
assignment of FDI to specific industries but fDi Markets da­
ta include several approved projects which are not opera­
tional. The primary source for the fDi Markets database is 
announcements in the press or other media outlets about 
project plans. The other drawback of project-level data is 
that the dollar values of projects are not recorded, making it 
difficult to assess the relative importance of these projects.
For the transformational impact of FDI, it is useful to distin­
guish between greenfield and brownfield FDI as well as 
M&As. Greenfield and brownfield investments are two dif­
ferent types of FDI. Greenfield investments occur when a 
parent company or government begins a new venture by 
constructing new facilities in a different country to its head­
quarters. Greenfield investment, which involves new facili­
ties being built from the ground up, are generally preferred 
by developing countries. Brownfield investments occur 
when an entity purchases an existing facility to begin new 
production. In a brownfield investment, a company either 
invests in existing facilities and infrastructure through an 
M&A deal or leases existing facilities in the foreign country. 
Compared to greenfield FDI, brownfield FDI can therefore 
be much faster.
Figure 7
Gross FDI Inflows, Africa, 2013-2018, billion US dollars. Compact Countries Versus Non-Compact Countries
CwA non-CwA Expon. ( CwA)
Source: UNCTAD FDI statistics.
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The most recent CwA Monitoring Report proclaimed at the 
end of 2018:
»Compact with Africa countries have demonstrated re­
silience as a destination for FDI in the region against the 
backdrop of declining FDI inflows into Africa.«105
Figure 7, based on UNCTAD FDI statistics, rejects the CwA
Monitoring Report as >spin< related to a period prior to the 
launch of the CwA. The 12 CwA countries (and the rest of 
Africa) received more FDI in 2018 than in 2017 but the ex­
ponential upward trend of FDI (line) established in CwA 
countries between 2013 and 2016 has not been main­
tained in 2017/18.
How did gross FDI inflows into CwA countries fare be­
tween 2016, the last pre-CwA year, and 2018, the first 
post-CwA year? What share of gross fixed domestic capital 
formation (GFCF) did those gross FDI inflows account for? 
Finally, how did the unweighted106 average FDI figures for 
CwA countries compare to the rest of Africa? Only since 
the release of UNCTAD's World Investment Report in June 
2018 have we been able to provide data to answer these 
questions, which are so crucial to evaluating the effective­
ness of the Cw A. Of course, it is still early days for the
105 IFC (2018): op. cit.: 4.
106 Given the strongly asymmetric size o f the CwA countries, only un­
weighted numbers make sense. Weighted numbers would be heav­
ily distorted by the inclusion o f Egypt, fo r example. The comparison 
o f 12 unweighted numbers fo r three years each, by contrast, pro­
vides a m inimum o f statistical confidence fo r initial conclusions.
CwA, and the FDI data are quite erratic due to the underly­
ing lump sum nature, notably of M&As.
Table 8  does not give us reason for celebration when it 
comes to trends in gross FDI inflows since the launch of the 
CwA initiative. On the contrary, and with all the caveats 
that apply to the volatile nature of FDI data, if anything, 
gross FDI inflows have been on a continuous downward 
trend in CwA countries since 2016. This observation holds 
both for the volume of flows measured in US dollars (which, 
has certainly been rising and thus depressing the value of 
euro investments, for instance) and for FDI flows as a frac­
tion of gross fixed capital investment in the unweighted av­
erage of the 12 CwA partner countries. While FDI inflows to 
Africa recovered from the 2017 slump over the course of 
2018, in terms of investment sums and as percentage of lo­
cal investment (GFCF), the upturn was less apparent.
If the CwA has not so far been successful in stimulating 
cross-border flows into Compact partners, have they instead 
managed to mobilise higher national savings to finance trans­
formative investment via GFCF? Again, the answer tends to­
wards the negative for the unweighted average of the 12 
countries. To arrive at data on the national savings-GDP ratio 
as a measure of domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) for
the most recent period 2016-18, we had to rely on national
account identities and current account imbalances to indi­
rectly derive the data presented in Table 9.107
107 S/Y = I/Y +  CAD/Y, changes in foreign exchange reserves are not 
included. S =  savings, I =  GFCF, CAD =  current account deficit; all 
terms expressed in per cent o f GDP.
Table 8
Gross FDI Inflows, CwA Countries, 2016-2018
$m n, 2016 $m n, 2017 $m n, 2018 % , GFCF 2016 % , GFCF 2017 % , GFCF 2018
Africa 46,482 41,390 45,902 9.8 8.7 9.4
CwA
Benin 132 201 208 6.7 8.4 7.5
Burkina Faso 390 3 480 21.8 0.1 20.4
Cöte d 'Ivoire 578 973 913 8.9 13.1 9.8
Egypt 8,107 7,409 6,798 16.9 21.1 16.8
Ethiopia 3,989 4,017 3,310 14.8 13.6 12 .1
Ghana 3,485 3,255 2,989 23.5 26.8 22.3
Guinea 1,618 577 483 75.2 46.5 21.0
Morocco 2,157 2,686 3,640 7.0 8.6 10.5
Rw anda 342 356 399 16.0 16.7 17.7
Senegal 472 587 629 10.6 11.7 10.3
Togo 0 88 102 0 7.0 6.8
Tunisia 885 881 1,036 11.0 11.8 13.3
CwA: Sum /M ean 22,155 21,033 20,987 17.7 15.5 14.0
Source: UNCTAD FDI statistics.
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Box 2
Germany's FDI to  Africa: Still M odest
The Deutsche Bundesbank published its latest inventory o f FDI in 
2019.108 The publication contains data on German gross assets from 
active direct investment and, corrected fo r associated liabilities, also 
net assets. The key figures o f the German companies investing in the 
target countries are also informative, i. e., number o f firms, number 
o f employees and turnover. Table 1 summarises German FDI in  Africa 
fo r the last observation year o f 2017.
Box 2, Table 1
German FDI in Africa, Stocks 2017
Billion euros /  
number
Share Africa /  
world, %
Gross claims, billion euros 9.2 0.6
Net claims, billion euros 8.4 0.8
Number of companies 849 2.2
Staff, thousands 201 2.6
Annual turnover, billion euros 30.8 1.0
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2019).
A t the end o f 2017, gross claims o f German companies from active 
direct investments amounted to  1,568 billion euros worldwide; A f­
rica's share amounted to  9.2 billion euros, or 0.6 per cent. In terms 
o f net claims, Africa's share was slightly higher at 0.8 per cent. The 
explanation fo r this is that direct investments can be hedged against 
exchange rate risks by borrowing in the host country, which is why 
worldwide net claims amount to  only two-thirds o f Germany's gross 
receivables. In Africa, however, local financial markets are less devel­
oped than in the rest o f the world, which is why FDI made there is not 
hedged by offsetting loans to  the same extent.
Africa's share o f the worldwide turnover o f German companies w ith  
active direct investments was just one per cent. Companies investing 
in Africa were comparatively more numerous w ith  a share o f 2 .2 per 
cent. The proportion o f people employed in Africa was even more 
important in  comparison, a t 2.6 per cent o f those employed in Ger­
man companies worldwide. These numbers indicate that the German 
companies invested in Africa are smaller and more labour-intensive 
than those investing in other parts o f the world. This means that their 
developmental contribution in Africa is likely to  be more significant, 
relatively speaking, than their percentage share o f world investment 
stocks would suggest.
The importance even o f Africa as a whole for German direct investment 
is very minimal; however, it  tends towards zero if North Africa, South
Africa and the tax haven o f Mauritius (buzzword: Mauritius leak) are 
excluded. German companies traditionally concentrate almost exclu­
sively on North Africa (particularly Egypt) and South Africa. Germany's 
development bank KfW recently stated: »There are hardly any German 
companies between Cairo and Johannesburg. Companies from the 
other major industrial nations France, Great Britain and the USA have 
a broader regional base. The common language and the cultural prox­
imity due to  the African diaspora are important reasons for this.«109
The focus o f German companies outside the OECD area, on the other 
hand, is on Asia and Eastern Europe. The level o f direct investment 
in these regions is more than 10 times higher than in Africa. In East­
ern Europe, low-cost production was available close to  the European 
sales markets. So far, Asia has been attractive thanks to  its higher 
degree o f industrialisation and larger middle class. Of course, the 
Maghreb is geographically close and Africa's middle class is growing 
—  so an increase in German FDI in Africa can certainly be expected in 
the future. However, Africa's high un it labour costs act as a brake on 
direct investment in  industrial manufacturing.110
Box 2, Table 2
Geographical Distribution of German FDI in Africa, 2016, 
billion US dollars
Germany France Italy UK USA
North
Africa 3.7 16.2 18.2 16.3 28.4
SSA 1.8 30.1 2.0 30.1 23.9
South
Africa 5.2 2.0 1.6 19.7 5.0
Total 10.7 48.3 21.8 66.1 57.3
Source: Tim Heinemann, KfW.
As part o f the CwA, since 2017, the German government has been 
trying to  boost German direct investment in  12 selected African part­
ner countries. These include three promising emerging countries in 
North Africa (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), but also nine o f the poor­
est countries south of the Sahara (Ethiopia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo). Companies can 
participate in the implementation o f the measures w ithin the frame­
work o f the current tendering and award procedures of bilateral de­
velopment cooperation.
Box 2, Table 3
German Net FDI in Africa, 2016-18, million euros
(Transaction values according to balance of payments statistics)
2016 2017 2018
North Africa 1,198 418 1,445
CwA 1,037 -4 1,325
SSA 82 145 66
CwA 23 8 15
South Africa 445 553 429
Total 1,725 1,116 1,940
CwA 1,060 4 1,340
Note: Transaction values may be negative; the positions listed are netted.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Balance o f payments statistics, M icrosoft Excel file, 14 August 2018.
Unpublished flow  data111 provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank re­
cord German FDI in individual African countries up to 2018. Morocco 
as an outlier received 1,199 million euros in German net FDI in 2018, 
presumably due to construction investments for the Ouarzazate solar 
power plant,112 which was initiated long before the CwA. Apart from 
the individual case of Morocco (and Ethiopia), the African CwA part­
ners received less German FDI on balance over the past tw o years. So 
far, the CwA resembles a >Potemkin villager, w ith impressive displays 
in the form of declarations o f intent and many conferences.
In 2017, German investors ranked 11th in  Africa (12 billion US dol­
lars). W ith the exception o f South Africa, German companies have 
invested relatively little  for many decades, although more companies 
are considering increasing their presence in African countries. About 
1,000 German companies are active in the African continent, em­
ploying around 200,000 people, 400 o f these are entrepreneurs w ith  
70,000 employees in South Africa alone. Germany's relatively low  
level o f economic involvement is mainly due to  the fact that German 
companies have hardly any raw material interests and the African 
markets have so far been too small and insignificant fo r German 
investors.
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GOvERNANCE, DEBT AND PRIvATE FLOWS TWO YEARS ON
Box 2, Figure 1
FDI Stocks in  Africa, by Investor Country, billion US dollars
Table 9
National Savings Rate and Gross Investment Rate, CwA Countries, 2016-18, per cent o f GDP
Countries S/Y 2016 S/Y 2017 S/Y 2018 GFCF 2016 GFCF 2017 GFCF 2018
Benin 15.2 18.5 15.9 24.6 28.4 25.8
Burkina Faso 17.4 15.3 15.3 25 24.8 22.8
Cöte d'Ivoire 17.1 17.1 17.4 18.3 19.5 20.8
Egypt 8.5 8.7 15.1 14.5 14.8 16.3
Ethiopia 28 29.9 27.6 37.3 38 .4 34.1
Ghana 21.8 17.2 27 20.6
Guinea 20.8 13.8 3.4 52.4 20.6 19.5
Morocco 24.2 26.3 15.5 28.4 29.9 19.1
Rwanda 11 16.1 15.9 25.3 22.9 23.7
Senegal 21.5 17.4 17.7 23.5 24.6 25
Togo 18.8 17.4 17.4 28.1 22.5 25.3
Tunisia 10 6.5 19.3 16.7
M ean 17.86 17.02 16 .12 26.98 23.64 23.24
Source: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/BCA@WEO/OEMDC/ADvEC/WEOWORLD https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS?locations=BJ ; UNCTAD FDI Statistics.
Table 9  documents that, looking at the average of the 12 
CwA countries, neither national savings nor gross fixed 
investment have risen since the CwA launch. In fact, the 
national savings effort tailed o ff, on average. The savings 
ratio has increased only in Egypt and Rwanda since 
2016.108 109 110
108 Deutsche Bundesbank (2019): Bestandserhebung über Direktinves­
titionen 2019. Statistische Sonderveröffentlichung 10 (30 April).
109 Tim Heinemann (2018): Warum halten sich deutsche Unterneh men 
m it Investitionen in Afrika zurück?. K fW  Research Nr. 171 (27 De­
cember).
110 Robert Kappel (2018): Afrika braucht einen anderen Entwicklungs­
weg. MAKRONOM (29 May).
African countries engaging in the Compact are not to 
blame, as their governance scores mostly improved. While 
they fulfilled their part of the deal, the anticipated private 
cross-border equity flows did not materialise and nor did 
domestic resource mobilisation. Consequently, it often 
proved impossible to tame public debt dynamics. The pos­
itive tone of the CwA Monitoring Reports so far sounds 
hollow in view of the macroeconomic data recorded here.112
111 Deutsche Bundesbank (2019): Inländische Netto-Direktinvestitionen 
im  Ausland, Transaktionswerte lt. Zahlungsbilanzstatistik. Excel file 
(14 August).
112 Individual details are no t published by the Bundesbank fo r reasons 
o f confidentiality.
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8
WHAT DRIVES STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION?
We focus on the elements of transformation that are re­
garded as particularly important in the literature on African 
development. In this chapter, we will consider sectoral shifts 
within African economies (industrialisation, agriculture and 
the service sector), and informal sector development.
As we have learned from the previous chapters, the agenda 
of the CwA is focused on improving the economic environ­
ment (including governance indicators) to stimulate higher 
FDI in the partner countries. As we have shown, there is no 
direct link between, for example, better EoDB indicators and 
FDI inflows. The assessment of the debt situation is also im­
portant, as is financing for infrastructure expansion. The 
measures envisaged by the CwA have helped to improve 
economic stability in the CwA countries. However, the Com­
pact lacks an analysis of trends in structural change. Thus 
the CwA measures overlook opportunities to exploit the po­
tential for catching up, such as inclusive growth through the 
modernisation of agriculture, the development of local en­
trepreneurship and decent jobs.
very different forms of structural change occur across the 
CwA countries. These changes illustrate the tasks facing the 
countries and the potential that can be exploited. If a coun­
try continues to be strongly influenced by agriculture, differ­
ent strategies will have to be pursued than in countries with 
a high level of informality. The North African CwA countries 
face completely different challenges related to their proxim­
ity to the EU than the LICs. As well as the purely macroeco­
nomic, fiscal and business-related frameworks of the CwA, 
it is therefore particularly important to consider develop­
ments in individual countries to work out strategic ap­
proaches.
For almost two centuries, development theory and policy 
has centred on structural transformation characterised by 
massive migration of labour from a relatively low-income ru­
ral agricultural sector to a high-wage urban industrial sector. 
McMillan et al.113 define structural change or transformation 
as »moving labour and other resources from lower to high­
er productivity sectors.« An agricultural transformation de-
113 Margaret McMillan, Dani Rodrik and Claudia Sepulveda (2017): 
Structural Change, Fundamentals and Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: 
NBER W orking Paper 23378; available at: http://www.nber.org/
papers/w23378
fined in terms of rapid and sustained farm productivity is a 
necessary component of structural transformation. Devel­
opment policies in many African countries were designed to 
encourage this type of transformation. This includes the 
adoption of new technologies and management practices 
that can increase the efficiency of production or reallocating 
resources away from the least productive towards more pro­
ductive firms.114 However, many African countries have not 
achieved this kind of transformation, even though a large 
number of them adopted policies in the 1970s that aimed to 
increase productivity through massive government support 
to agriculture. An analysis of changes in land and labour 
productivity shows that many African countries have by far 
the smallest increase in labour productivity.115
Many researchers have found that high economic growth is 
not necessarily accompanied by structural change leading to 
a transformation into a modern economy in which agriculture 
becomes more productive, industry creates jobs and incomes 
rise.116 On the contrary, in many African countries, migrating 
agricultural labourers are employed in the low-productivity 
service sector and the informal urban sector. A number of 
countries depend on resource sectors (oil, iron ore, etc.) with 
very high productivity, which do not absorb much labour. In 
short, many African countries are characterised by four main 
trajectories: (1) resource dependence with a capital-intensive 
form of production and limited employment generation, (2) a 
small manufacturing sector and, in many countries, de-indus­
trialisation, (3) a small medium-sized enterprise sector (>miss-
ing middle< phenomenon), and (4) informal labour in the ser­
vice sector. This dynamic reveals a tendency not only towards 
large capital-intensive companies but also towards microen­
terprises in the low-productivity informal sector.117 *
Nevertheless, several African economies have moved from 
lower-income status to middle-income status owing to ma­
jor structural and economic transformation policies (includ­
114 McMillan, Rodrik and Sepulveda: op. cit.; W . A rthur Lewis (1954), 
Economic Development w ith  Unlimited Supplies o f Labour. M an­
chester School o f Economic and Social Studies 22: 139-191.
115 Samuel Benin (ed.) (2016): Agricultural Productivity in  Africa: Trends,
Patterns, and Determinants. Washington, D.C.
116 McMillan, Rodrik and verduzco-Gallo (2014): op. cit.
117 Gelb, Meyer and Ramachandran: op. cit.; Akinkugbe and W ohlmuth
(2016): op. cit.
38
WHAT DRIvES STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION?
ing the CwA countries Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal and Moroc­
co). The evidence from these countries shows that, coun­
tries that tend to undergo structural and economic trans­
formation are characterised by conditions such as a decline 
in the importance of agriculture for GDP and employment 
(see Table 10).
Numerous analyses assume that a process of catch-up in­
dustrialisation is possible, but in contrast to the East Asian 
experience, none of the recent growth accelerations118 in 
Africa were driven by rapid industrialisation. The African 
experience is particularly intriguing as growth-enhancing 
structural change appears to have typically come at the ex­
pense of declining labour productivity growth in the more 
modern sectors of the economy.119
INDUSTRIALISATION AND EMPLOYMENT
As labour shifts from lower- to higher-productivity sectors, 
value-added increases (static gains) and rapid technological 
change further boosts economic growth (dynamic gains).
118 Ricardo Hausmann, Land Pritchett and Dani Rodrik (2005): Growth
Accelerations, in: Journal o f Economic Growth, 10, 4: 303-329; Olivier 
Cadot, Jaime de Melo, Patrick Plane et al. (2016): Industrialisation et 
transformation structurelle: l'Afrique sub-saharienne peutelle se devel- 
opper sans usines?. Clerment-Ferrand: FERDI Working Paper 143; 
available at: https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/fdiwpaper/2537.htm
119 xinshen Daio, Margaret M cMillan and Dani Rodrik (2017): The Re­
cent G row th Boom in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: IFRI 
W orking Paper; available at: https://www.ifpri.org/publication/re- 
cent-growth-boom-developing-economies-role-services
Employment and the share of manufacturing and agricul­
ture in total employment are crucial indicators of structural 
change.120 Since the mid-1990s, many African countries, in­
cluding CwA countries, have recorded faster economic 
growth than before (see Chapter 1). However, this growth 
has often been with no significant diversification of produc­
tion and exports, with only limited improvements in export 
competitiveness, with no important productivity increases 
(especially labour productivity), no significant technological 
upgrading or improvements in human well-being, and with 
no profound employment effects. Instead, growth has been 
highly skewed and non-inclusive.121 The consequence is that 
not enough jobs are created to absorb rapidly expanding 
workforces. Instead, economic activities in many CwA coun­
tries remain concentrated in the low-productivity, low-val­
ue-added agricultural and informal sector. In the absence of 
significant increases in productive employment opportuni­
ties in urban areas, large numbers of internal migrants end 
up engaging in low-productivity informal service activities 
or in service jobs that offer few prospects of meaningful 
productivity increases.
Agriculture dominates in many CwA countries. Table 10 
shows that in most CwA countries, agriculture accounts for
120 Felix Kwame Yeboah and Thomas S. Jayne (2019): Africa's Evolving 
Employment Trends, in: The Journal o f Development Studies, 54, 5: 
803-832; Jesus Felipe, Aashish M ehta and Changyong Rhee (2014):
Manufacturing Matters ... b u t It's the Jobs that Count. Manila: ADB
Economics W orking Paper Series No. 420; available at: https://pa- 
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2558904
121 McMillan, Rodrik and verduzco-Gallo (2014): op. cit.
Table 10
Share o f Value Added o f M anufacturing, Agriculture and Services/GDP, 2010 and 2018, per cent
Countries Share o f m anufacturing/GDP Share o f agriculture/GDP Share o f service sector/GDP
2010 2018 2010 2018 2010 2018
Benin 13.8 12.3 22.8 22.6 44.7 46.2
Burkina Faso 7.2 5.2 32.5 28.6 46.7 43.2
Cöte d 'Ivoire 12.6 12.8 14.5 19.7 53.1 32.6
Egypt 16.1 16.3 13.3 11.2 46 .2 51.4
Ethiopia 4 .0 5.8 41.5 31.9 41.8 36 .5
Ghana 6 .4 10.9 18.0 19.7 48 .2 42 .8
Guinea 10.6 10.0 17.5 17.8 43.4 41.7
Morocco 15.6 15.7 12.9 12.0 51.0 50.5
Rw anda 6.2 5.9 28.1 29.0 49.1 47.8
Senegal 15.5 18.7 15.8 16.6 52.7 50 .4
Togo 7.2 8.0 28.7 23.6 48.9 29.0
Tunisia 16.5 14.5 7.5 9.5 56.7 60.3
SSA 9.5 10.3 16.0 15.2 50.7 52.5
Source: World Bank data.
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only about 20 per cent of GDP. A  special case is Ethiopia, 
where agriculture still plays a large, but declining, role and 
where the majority of the population is employed in the ag­
ricultural sector. Another case is Tunisia. Here, the share of 
agriculture is particularly low, while the service sector dom­
inates. In Ghana, employment in the service sector is equal 
to that in agriculture. The share of agricultural employment 
has decreased from over 60 per cent in 1992 to a low of 40 
per cent in the period 2011-2013. This is consistent with ag­
ricultural productivity growth.
In the North African CwA countries, the service sector 
makes a particularly high contribution to GDP and also to 
industry. With the exception of Senegal, the sub-Saharan 
CwA countries only have a low degree of industrialisation 
(see Figures 2 and 3). The LICs Rwanda and Ethiopia also 
started at a particularly low level. The number of industrial 
employees is also extremely low in these countries (for ex­
ample, 29,000 workers in the Ethiopian leather industry 
and 100,000 in the textile and garment industry).122 The 
share of Ghanaian manufacturing employment increased 
from 10 per cent in 1992 to 15 per cent in 2013. The rising 
share of manufacturing is consistent with the start of struc­
tural transformation, but the low share is consistent with 
global de-industrialisation and the observation that Africa 
is seeing manufacturing employment peak earlier in the 
structural transformation process and at lower levels. Ser­
vice sector employment in Ghana increased from less than 
30 per cent in 1992 to over 40 per cent from 2010 on.
Employment in the services and industrial sectors over the 
same period increased with rising income levels. The implica­
tion of these trends is that the rising income level in Africa has 
been associated with a change in the employment structure, 
from the agrarian sector to the industrial and service sectors.
INFORMAL SECTORS -  A DRIvING FORCE?
African employment remains overwhelmingly informal.123 
African labour markets are characterised by dualism with 
very limited formal employment. Agricultural and urban in­
formal sectors feature pervasive underemployment rather 
than open unemployment. Labour force participation rates 
in SSA do not differ from other developing regions. The his­
torically unique aspect of African labour markets is the ex­
tent of informality.124
For sub-Saharan LICs, informal employment accounts for 
about 80 per cent of total employment. In many low-in­
come SSA countries — including CwA countries — govern­
ment employment exceeds formal private sector employ­
ment (Benin, Burkina Faso and Rwanda), in some other 
countries (Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal), the opposite is 
true. In all these countries, however, both formal private 
and government employment are under 10 per cent, and 
often below five per cent of the labour force. Egypt is an in­
termediate case, with 60 per cent informal employment, 
with the bulk of the remainder employed in the public sec­
tor (30 per cent). In Morocco and Tunisia, both MICs, the in­
formal sector is small, but unemployment is very high.125 As 
the rate of informal employment and informality of house- 
holds126 varies within regions, so does the nature of infor­
mal jobs. Informal employment in sub-Saharan countries is 
often self-employment, for instance.
In a study of the urban informal sectors of 10 francophone 
countries, Roubaud and Torelli (2013)127 confirm the domi­
nance of informal employment even in the capital cities, 
finding that, on average, 77 per cent of these cities' labour 
forces is informally employed. Africa has the highest rate of 
informal employment in cities. African cities in CwA coun­
tries have a higher prevalence of informal employment, as
seen in the cases of Dakar (79 per cent), Lome (83 per cent),
Cotonou (81 per cent), Ougadougou (80 per cent) and Abid­
jan (79 per cent). Informal employment in African cities is 
the norm rather than the exception and this phenomenon is 
more acute in African cities.128
Informality is generally associated with low productivity, 
low incomes that are just enough to live on, widespread 
poverty and the unsatisfactory nature of African employ­
ment opportunities. Since the era of structural adjustment, 
employment opportunities in the public sector have dwin­
dled and the formal private sector has failed to grow suffi­
ciently to absorb the vast majority of the working popula­
tion. Due to rapid population growth combined with limit­
ed development of the formal sector and industries, low-in­
come Africa is dominated by subsistence agriculture and 
small-scale informal enterprises, which play a particularly 
important role in the LICs with small middle classes. In 
some of the countries with larger middle classes, the share 
of African medium-sized enterprises is growing and formal 
enterprises are beginning to play a bigger role. There is evi­
dence that, in urban centres with larger middle classes, the
122 GTAI (2019): Äthiopien. Die Textil-, Bekleidungs- und Lederindustrie. 
Berlin; available a t: https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/DE/Trade/ 
Maerkte/allgemeine-broschueren,t=studie-aethiopien--die-tex- 
til-bekleidungs-und-lederindustrie,did=2354558.html
123 See the conceptual paper by Ravi Kanbur (2014): Informality: 
Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses. Ithaca: Charles H. 
Dyson School W orking Paper 2014-2018; available at: http://pub- 
lications.dyson.cornell.edu/research/researchpdf/wp/2014/Cor- 
nell-Dyson-wp1418.pdf
124 Stephen Golub and Faraz Hayat (2014): Employment, Unemploy­
ment, and Underemployment in Africa. Helsinki: WIDER Working Pa­
per 2014/014; Leandro Medina, Andrew Jonelis and Mehmet Cangul 
(2017): The Informal Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Size and Deter­
minants. Washington, D.C.: IMF Working Paper WP/17/156.
125 Bass, Kappel and W ohlmuth (2017): op. cit.
126 OECD (2019), Key Indicators o f Informality Based on Individuals and 
their Households (database); available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary. 
org/development/tackling-vulnerability-in-the-informal-econo- 
my_56928b69-en#page6
127 Francois Roubaud and Constance Torelli (2013): Employment, Un­
employment and W orking Conditions in Urban Labor Markets o f 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Main Stylized Facts, in: Philippe de vreyer and 
Francois Roubaud (eds.): Urban Labor Markets in  Sub-Saharan Af­
rica. Washington, D.C.: 37 -80.
128 Medina, Leandro, Andrew Jonelis and Mehmet Cangul (2017), The 
Informal Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Size and Determinants. 
Washington, D.C.: IMF W orking Paper WP/17/156.
40
WHAT DRIvES STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION?
Figure 8
The Informal Economy in Some CwA countries, 2010-2014, Average as a Share o f GDP, per cent
Source: Leandro Medina, Andrew Jonelis and Mehmet Cangul (2017): The Informal Economy in  Sub-Saharan Africa: Size and Determinants. Washington, D.C.: IMF Working WP/17/156.
number of African medium-sized enterprises is on an up­
ward trend.129 *The thesis that there is a typical form of Afri­
can structural change, in which an informal sector, charac­
terised by low-productivity micro and small informal enter­
prises, remains dominant, is not the full story. Develop­
ments show that, in countries with higher incomes and 
higher economic growth, a class of medium-sized entrepre­
neurs is emerging that generate employment and pay high­
er wages.
are on the rise and, at the same time, agriculture is declin­
ing. Agriculture barely benefits from the activities of the 
CwA. On the other hand, industrial hubs and modern ser­
vice sectors with start-up companies and better-paid jobs 
are emerging. The heterogeneous structure is associated 
with inequality and differences in living conditions. The 
CwA does not depict heterogeneity, it reinforces it.
In summary, the following statement can be made: In order 
to implement an appropriate policy, it is necessary to un­
derstand the ongoing processes of transformation. These 
processes culminate in growing inequality, with different 
opportunities in the modern sectors and the increasingly 
marginalised areas in which the majority of people in the 
CwA countries live. The CwA focuses on the essential build­
ing blocks of the business framework. The instruments 
used are suitable for promoting entrepreneurship, although 
a large proportion of micro and small enterprises do not 
benefit from the measures. Macroeconomic measures, as il­
lustrated in the Country Matrices, are also necessary. They 
create a stable environment for enterprises in the service 
sector, industry and agriculture. Investment in infrastruc­
ture, leading to greater market integration and competi­
tion, also contributes to generating growth.
Nevertheless, the CwA concepts fail to address these issues 
adequately and there is a danger that the heterogeneous 
structure in the CwA economies will become more en­
trenched. On the one hand, unemployment and informality
129 Robert Kappel (2019): From Informal Enterprises to  an African M it­
telstand? Differentiations in African Entrepreneurship. Leipzig: un­
published manuscript; Akinkugbe and W ohlmuth (2019): op. cit.
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9.1 ETHIOPIA
With a population of more than 100 million, Ethiopia is Af­
rica's second most populous country and it has become a 
leading investment destination in SSA. Ethiopia has experi­
enced rapid economic growth since 2005, with GDP grow­
ing at an average rate of 10.5 per cent per annum in real 
terms for the period between 2004-05 and 2012-13 and 
nine per cent since 2015. In 2017/18, Ethiopia's economic 
growth fell to 7.7 per cent. Political uncertainty, lower pub­
lic investment and severe foreign exchange shortages damp­
ened growth.130 Figure 9  shows trends in GDP growth in 
Ethiopia since 1982.
Several factors have contributed to recent economic growth 
in Ethiopia, including government policies focusing on mar­
ket reforms. Improvements in access to health and educa­
tion and major investment in roads and telecommunica­
tions have made it possible to remove some significant bar­
riers to economic growth. Overall, growth has been accom­
panied by greater commercialisation of agriculture and pri­
vate sector development. The rapid economic growth has 
had multiple effects on social, economic and political devel­
opments. Although poverty in both urban and rural areas 
has declined, it remains widespread. Ethiopia is one of the 
world's poorest countries, with about 25 per cent of its 
population living below the poverty line.131 Ethiopia still be­
longs to the group of LICs with an average GDP per capita 
of 1,800 USD/PPP (see Figure 10).132 In the HDI ranking, 
Ethiopia is in 174th position out of 188 countries. Although 
Ethiopia's HDI has improved from 0.283 (2000) to 04.63 in 
(2017), the country is still in the »low human development« 
category.
130 IMF (2019): https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/04/ 
na120418-ethiopia-remarkable-progress
131 See https://www.undp.org/content/dagethiopia/en/home/library/ 
poverty-and-economic-growth-in-ethiopia.htm l
132 http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH
Figure 9
Ethiopia: Growth o f GDP, 1982-2018
20
-15
Source: World Bank data.
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Figure 10
Ethiopia: GDP Per Capita, PPP, 1990-2017
Source: W orld Bank data.
Table 11
Ethiopia: FDI, 2016-2018
FDI 2016 2017 2018
FDI inward flo w  (m illion USD) 3,989 4,017 3,310
FDI stock (m illion USD) 14,926 18,943 22,253
Num ber o f greenfie ld  in vestm ents *** 16 24 29
FDI inwards (in  %  o f G F C F ****) 11.4 n/a n/a
FDI stock (in  %  o f GDP) 18.9 n/a n/a
Note: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) measures the value of additions to  fixed assets purchased by business, government and households less disposals o f fixed assets sold o ff or scrapped. 
Source: UNCTAD (2019): World Investment Report 2019.
There has been a surge in local and foreign investment. Pub­
lic investment has been the main driver, including invest­
ment from the many state-owned enterprises (SOEs).133 In­
flows of FDI to Ethiopia have accelerated in recent years. 
However, in 2018, FDI inflows fell to 3 .3 billion US dollars in 
2018 compared to four billion US dollars in 2017.134 In total, 
FDI stocks were estimated at 27.7 per cent of GDP in 2018, 
or 22.2 billion US dollars (see Figure 11 and Table 11). De­
spite a fall in investments to 3 .3 billion US dollars in 2018,
133 Keynote address by Abebe Aemro Selassie, D irector, A f­
rica Departm ent, IMF: Contextualising Ethiopia's Recent Eco­
nom ic Performance, 17th International Conference on the  Ethi­
opian Economy Ethiopian Economics Association, Addis Ababa 
(18 July 2019); available at: https://w w w .im f.o rg /en/N ew s/A rti- 
cles/2019/07/18/sp071719-contextualizing-ethiopias-recent-eco- 
nomic-performance
134 UNCTAD (2019): W orld Investment Report 2019. Geneva; available 
at: https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publica- 
tionid=2460; the CwA flagship list for Ethiopia contains detailed in­
formation on FDI projects in the pipeline up until the end o f 2018, 
w orth  a tota l 2.8 billion US dollars.
Ethiopia maintained its number one position in East Africa, 
with investments in petroleum refining, mineral extraction, 
horticulture, real estate, manufacturing and renewable en­
ergy. The main investor countries are Saudi Arabia, China, 
USA, India and Turkey. China has significantly increased its 
investment in the country over the past decade, notably in 
the construction, textile, power generation and telecommu­
nications sectors. There are around 400 Chinese investment 
projects valued at more than four billion US dollars already 
in full operation in Ethiopia. Chinese firms are based in in­
dustrial parks and the real estate sector. The country also 
took advantage of the crisis in the Bangladeshi textile sector 
to attract foreign companies to its textile industry.
Despite the improvements achieved, the WBG, the IMF, UN­
DP and local associations of enterprises still complain of nu­
merous obstacles to investment, specifically the significant in­
terference of the state in the economy, the poor condition of 
infrastructure, difficulties related to land acquisition, strict for­
eign exchange controls, very high transportation and trade
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Figure 11
Ethiopia: FDI, million dollars, 1992-2017, and FDI, percent o f GDP
Foreign Direct Investments, million dollars
Foreign Direct Investment, percent o f GDP
Source: World Bank data.
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Figure 12
Industrial Employment as Percentage o f Total Employment
Source: World Bank data.
costs, and weak institutions.135 The government's interven­
tionist policies, which are not focused on developing the pri­
vate sector, have also proven to be a major obstacle. Having 
said this, significant progress has been made in terms of 
transport infrastructure and access to electricity production.
Ethiopia lags behind in manufacturing and the production of 
technologies is yet to increase. Industrial development re­
mains a critical step in Ethiopia's development. The industrial 
sector — which includes construction, manufacturing, min­
ing and utilities subsectors — remains underdeveloped and 
contributed only about 15 per cent of GDP in 2017. Employ­
ment in industry (percentage of total employment) in Ethio­
pia was reported to be 9.4 per cent in 2017136 (see Figure 12).
The industrial sector, which made a declining contribution 
to growth during the 1990s, has reversed its momentum. 
The increase in the industrial sector's contribution to growth 
is largely accounted for by the construction subsector. The 
contribution of the manufacturing subsector to GDP is only 
five per cent (see Figure 13), which is very low even against 
the SSA average (see Figures 2 and 3). Manufacturing firms,
135 See IMF (2018): The Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia: Se­
lected Issues. Washington, D.C.: Country Report 18/355; see also 
Compact w ith  Africa (2019): Compact M onitoring Report (April 
2019); available at: https://www.com pactw ithafrica.org/content/ 
compactwithafrica/home.htm l
136 https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/employment-in-industry-
percent-of-total-employment-wb-data.html
including foreign companies, rely heavily on imported raw 
materials, which generally does not play to their advantage 
given the limited availability of foreign exchange and lack of 
access to adequate credit — particularly for SMEs. There is 
also lack of appropriately skilled labour to support the pro­
duction of high-quality manufacturing goods.137
Although the manufacturing sector is said to play a unique 
role in structural transformation, the potential of other sec­
tors, such as natural resource-based activities and tradable 
services, to provide exports and drive growth should not be 
underestimated. These industries include tradable services 
(IT, tourism and transport), horticulture and agro-industry. 
They can provide new opportunities for export development. 
Ethiopia provides a suitable environment for producing hor­
ticultural products, including temperate, tropical and sub­
tropical crops. The fruit and vegetable subsector is of major 
importance for improving food security (and nutrition) as 
well as in the development of agro-processing industries.
The high rate of public investment in infrastructure has gen­
erated growth in construction and related industries and al­
so triggered growth in other sectors through linkage ef­
fects. Investment in infrastructure and buildings led to high­
er employment among urban youth and rural migrants in 
the construction sector.
137 Admasu Shiferaw and Mans Söderbom (2019): The Ethiopian Manu­
facturing Sector Productivity, Export, and Competitiveness. Oxford: 
The Oxford Handbook of the Ethiopian Economy.
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Figure 13
Manufacturing Value Added as Percentage o f GDP, 2005-2017
Source: World Bank data.
Ethiopia is rapidly urbanising, but there has been little 
change in the structure of its urban labour markets. Shifer- 
aw and Söderbom (2019)138 show that the employment 
structure of the country has not changed significantly de­
spite the rapid economic growth recorded recently. Non­
wage employment is still dominant. The informal sector 
plays an important role in employment creation and pover­
ty reduction. However, jobs in the informal sector tend to 
be insecure, income is low and work is less sustainable. Un­
employment is generally higher in urban areas and for fe­
male and young workers. Another feature of the urban la­
bour market is that real wages have been stagnant or de­
creasing.
Economic growth is largely >jobless<, not generating enough 
jobs for the large number of young people. The World Bank 
estimates that around 600,000 individuals139 enter the Ethi­
opian labour force every year. The imbalance between the 
increase in the supply of and demand for workers is creating 
higher and long-lasting unemployment among Ethiopian 
youth.
138 Shiferaw and Söderbom (2019): op. cit.
139 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/publica- 
tion/fifth-ethiopia-economic-update-why-idle-wages-employ- 
ment-crowded-labor-market. Other W orld Bank sources mention 
the figure o f tw o  million young people entering the labour market. 
Available a t: https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/blog/can-ethiopia-cre- 
ate-2-million-jobs-every-year
THE PROMISE OF INDUSTRIAL PARKS
One of the government's strategies to reduce unemploy­
ment is to establish industrial parks. The goal is for the 
manufacturing sector to contribute 20 per cent of Ethio­
pia's GDP and 50 per cent of its export volume by 2025. In­
dustrial parks have the potential to address key barriers to 
industrialisation and transformation, including the lack of 
capital, foreign exchange and knowledge, as well as specif­
ic constraints related to the manufacturing sector (includ­
ing land acquisition, customs and logistic services, weak 
administrative capacity and a lack of coordinated efforts in 
the development and provision of infrastructure and public 
services). The government has declared the establishment 
of industrial zones a key measure to promote economic 
transformation. FDI in industrial parks is intended to con­
tribute to knowledge transfer, technological learning, in­
novation and the generation of stable and decent employ­
ment.
The development and construction of industrial parks 
started in 2014 when the Ethiopian Industrial Parks Devel­
opment Corporation (IPDC) was established. Several indus­
trial parks were built and opened for operations. Bole Lemi 
I and Hawassa industrial parks were inaugurated in 2016, 
and in 2017, two additional parks were opened in Kombol- 
cha and Mekele. Together, these two new sites are expect­
ed to create around 40,000 new jobs. Around 10 more 
parks are under construction and expected to be opera­
tional in 2019.
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Figure 14
Ethiopia: Trade, 2011-2017, billion dollars
Source: World Bank data.
A study on garment enterprises in the industrial zones140 
shows that the government assured Asian and European 
suppliers that Ethiopian sewing machine operators would 
happily accept extremely low wages, set at 26 US dollars a 
month. On an annual basis, this entry-level salary amounts 
to just 312 US dollars, or 40 per cent of the average PCI. 
Ethiopia has no legally mandated minimum wage for the 
private sector.141 There are also problems with raw materials, 
almost all of which need to be imported into Ethiopia.
CRITICAL TRADE BALANCE
Despite its substantial efforts, the Ethiopian export sector has 
so far made only a limited contribution to structural change. 
This is mainly due to the fact that relatively few jobs have 
been created, there are hardly any forward and backward 
linkages and the number of employees falls far short of the 
target figures. Furthermore, exports are not increasing as 
strongly as planned. The consequence is that imports are sig­
nificantly higher than exports. Most of the intermediates
140 Paul M. Barrett and Dorothee Baumann-Pauly (2019): Made in Ethi­
opia: Challenges in the Garment Industry's New Frontier. New York.
141 The Labour Proclamation o f 2019 does not establish a minimum
wage standard in industrial parks, leaving wages to be determined
by the employer or by collective agreement between the employer
and workers' union. While the Constitution and the Labour Procla­
mation set specific legal parameters, a range of policy and strategy
plans and frameworks establish areas o f government commitment
to address the development challenges identified.
used in the industrial parks come from outside Ethiopia. There 
are hardly any linkages to local producers. In 2018, imports 
far outranked exports by more than 400 per cent (see Figure 
14). The trade deficit is increasingly high and unsustainable. 
Even more worrying is that the export basket has remained 
less diversified despite efforts to diversify over the past two 
decades. More than three quarters of the merchandise ex­
port revenue in Ethiopia still comes from agriculture. The 
surge in imports and sluggish export growth has led to a 
shortage and, thus, rationing of the foreign currency that is 
crucial for importing capital goods and intermediate inputs.
DEBTS ARE RISING
Ethiopia is classified as being at risk of debt distress. Ethio­
pia's rapid economic growth has been driven by public in­
vestment that has mainly relied on Chinese loans. However, 
economic growth has not enabled the country to increase 
its debt service capacity. To mitigate these risks, restrained 
public sector borrowing —  particularly on non-concession­
al loans — will be key, say IMF economists.142 *By 2018, the 
country's external debt stock had reached 28 billion US dol-
142 IMF (2018): The Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia: 2018 Ar­
ticle IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by 
the Executive Director fo r The Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethi­
opia. Washington, D.C.; available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publi- 
cations/CR/Issues/2018/12/04/The-Federal-Democratic-Republic-of- 
Ethiopia-2018-Article-Iv-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-46434
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lars.143 The level of public debt increased from some 40 per 
cent of GDP in 2008 to 60 per cent of GDP in 2018. About 
half of Ethiopia's external debt is owed to China,144 which 
has invested in several huge projects in the country. Ana­
lysts estimate that, since 2000, Ethiopia has borrowed over 
12 billion US dollars from China. For some decades now, 
Ethiopia has been struggling to manage its debt service ob­
ligations. Because the government was not in a position to 
repay the loans to China, negotiations were started be­
tween the two states. These ultimately led to China dissolv­
ing all interest-free contracts granted to Ethiopia. At the 
same time, the government began to seek financial and 
technical support from the World Bank, and to look for 
new investment from Gulf States and Western partners.145
THE ETHIOPIAN CWA AGENDA
Ethiopia is under great pressure to facilitate the necessary 
reforms in difficult times of transformation, rising debt and 
an extremely unequal trade balance. Foreign partners can 
support the government's reform process and help to stabi­
lise the country.146 While the IMF is pursuing a stabilisation 
programme for Ethiopia (macroeconomic stability, the fight 
against corruption, a balanced government budget, meas­
ures to reduce debt, privatisation, an export offensive), the 
measures being implemented by the CwA, the World Bank 
and other international organisations go one step further. 
The reform programme, supported by the World Bank,147 in­
cludes strengthening competition in the industrial and agri­
cultural sectors and inviting foreign and domestic private in­
vestors to acquire stakes in SOEs. The unbundling of regula­
tory, infrastructure operation and service provision func­
tions in sectors currently dominated by SOEs would encour­
age competition and create the conditions necessary for in­
creased private sector participation. The government intends 
to introduce reforms to promote SMEs, which possess the 
potential for growth and employment, rather than hinder­
ing them as it had done in the past. So far, Ethiopia has pro­
vided little support to the private sector, as is evident from 
its poor ranking in the EoDB index, which shows that the 
country has a lot of catching up to do. Ethiopia is ranked
143 See National Employment Policy and Strategy (2017); Business and
Employment Creation Strategy (2016); UNDP (2018): Ethiopia -  Hu­
man Development Report; available at: hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ 
files/ethiopia_national_human_development_report_2018.pdf
144 In February 2019, Prime Minister Abiy to ld parliament that his 
government had successfully renegotiated the repayment period 
for 60 per cent o f its external debt.
145 https://www.theafricareport.com/11080/ethiopias-china-chal- 
lenge/ ; https://qz.com/africa/1634659/ethiopia-kenya-struggle- 
with-chinese-debt-over-sgr-railways/. A t the same time, the govern­
ment abolished the model o f the developmental state, which had 
controlled economic and social processes.
146 International Crisis Group (2019): Managing Ethiopia's Unsettled 
Transition. Report 269 (21 February 2019); available at: https:// 
www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/269-managing- 
ethiopias-unsettled-transition
147 W orld Bank (2019): Ethiopia's Steady Economic G row th Leads to  
Poverty Reduction. Washington, D.C.; available at: https://w w w . 
worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/publication/ethiopias-steady- 
economic-growth-leads-to-poverty-reduction
159th among 190 economies in the EoDB index (2010: rank 
104). The Compact Monitoring Report from April 2019 
notes that the EoDB index has improved slightly since 2017 
from 47.25 to 49.06 but with no impact on its ranking.148
Table 12 juxtaposes the major CwA targets for Ethiopia with 
implementation deficits .  Note that this is just a selection of 
an array of 16 government actions required of the Ethiopian 
authorities.149 Given the urgency of Ethiopia's external cur­
rent account deficit and low inflows of FDI, the stipulated 
actions and indicators are more macroeconomic in nature 
than about stimulating sustainable transformation and the 
creating decent jobs.
A look at the CwA Monitoring Report reveals the main meas­
ures being pursued.150 Regarding the macroeconomic frame­
work, the report states that Ethiopia is at high risk of debt dis­
tress. As regards the business framework, it is recommended 
that Ethiopia prioritise its reforms. Ethiopia was urged to pay 
attention to reforms that would promote diversification.
The Monitoring Report calls for more attention to be paid to 
financial sector reforms. Ethiopia should embark on finan­
cial sector reform, including the creation of a legal regime to 
regulate PPPs. The IMF is one of the main actors supporting 
the CwA process. Ethiopia's 2018 Article Iv  Consultation 
with the IMF highlighted the government reforms that 
aimed to mobilise private investment.
The CwA flagship list for Ethiopia151 shows that real GDP 
growth remained strong despite slowing somewhat to 7.7 
per cent in 2018 due to weak commodity export prices, 
public spending restraint and political unrest. The external 
current account deficit fell to 6 .2  per cent of GDP in FY17/18 
from 8.1 per cent in 2016/2017 due to reduced imports as 
well as increased services and manufacturing exports. The 
report also states that FDI had declined. As the most impor­
tant challenges and constraints, the flagship list identified 
forex shortages that adversely affect private sector activi­
ties, delaying critical public projects and signalling an ab­
sence of buffers against external shocks. The lack of support 
for the private sector is criticised as a major problem to be 
addressed. The complex and restrictive regulatory environ­
ment for starting and operating businesses is also identified 
as a major constraint. Regarding the finance market, the re­
port said that financial repression, notably negative real in­
terest rates and the discretionary allocation of credit to se­
lected sectors, remains a key challenge. The report also out­
lines which key tasks currently have to be carried out:152
148 https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home. 
html; https://tradingeconomics.com/ethiopia/ease-of-doing-business.
149 https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/ 
home/compact-countries/ethiopia.html#tab_ (2 January 2018).
150 https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/ 
home/documents.html
151 Compact w ith  Africa (2019): Compact M onitoring Report (April 
2019); available at: https://www.com pactwithafrica.org/content/ 
compactwithafrica/home.html
152 Ethiopia is now one o f the signatories o f the AfCFTA. The treaty 
was ratified in July 2019.
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Currently, meetings of the CwA country team on Ethiopia 
do not seem to be taking place. This finding confirms the 
ACET statement in the most recent 2019 CwA Monitoring 
Report.153
While the CwA does not provide a framework for recipro­
cal obligations and no accountability mechanism is in place 
for G20 countries, CwA partners are monitored by interna­
tional organisations via country Policy Matrices.
Ethiopia's Policy Matrix is full of government actions re­
quired from the CwA partner in the macroeconomic, busi­
ness and finance frameworks; specific indicators and tar­
153 ACET (2019): Independent Review by The African Center fo r Eco­
nomic Transformation. Compact M onitoring Report (April): 11.
gets attached to these government actions, and a list of 
various multi- and bilateral agencies. This chapter will thus 
only present the key CwA targets for Ethiopia, point to im­
plementation deficits and identify inconsistencies as well as 
policy conflicts within the CwA Policy Matrix for Ethiopia. 
Let us recall the central goal of all CwA Policy Matrices: 
»Improve framework conditions for private investment (do­
mestic and foreign).«
Table 12 juxtaposes the major CwA targets for Ethiopia 
with implementation deficits. The CwA concluded that key 
reforms needed in Ethiopia are:
-  Macroeconomic reforms in the area of SOEs, govern­
ance to narrow the budget deficit and domestic re­
source mobilisation (primarily focusing on strengthen­
ing tax administration capacity)
Table 12
Ethiopia Policy M a trix  (31.01.2018)
G overnm ent action Targets 2020-25 Indicators 2019
1. Macro Prudent monetary policy Infla tion <  10 %  in 2020 G row th 9 .3%  p . a.
-  Improve external debt distress 
rating and
-  govt budget deficit.
-  IMF/ WBG debt distress rating low  
or moderate
by 2020;
-  D eficit =  3 %  by 2020
Risk o f debt distress: h igh
Debt %  o f GDP =  57.4 %
Deficit =  4 .5 %  (ex grants)
Improved tax collection -  Ratio o f domestic 
tax revenue to  GDP (17.2 %  by
2020)
12.4 %  o f GDP
Strengthening public 
investment management
PEFA scores in 2020 
be tter than 2015
PEFA assessments no t 
available since 5/2015
2 . Business Enhance EoDB in  Ethiopia through 
trade logistics and business regulati­
on reforms
-  Average tim e to  im port dow n by
20%  to  40  days by 2025
-  Average tim e to  export dow n by
20%  to  14 days by 2025
-  Increased investor satisfaction w ith  
business regulation and adminis­
tra tion
Trading across borders unchanged 
from  2018 to  2019, according to  the 
W orld Bank DB:
Rank: 154/190
Score: 56
Expand productive infrastructure 
fo r business
Number o f industrial parks fully 
developed (10 by 2020)
15 parks planned by 2020 as part 
o f GTP-II.
But: rising worker turnover and 
unrest show lim its o f low-wage 
frontier (NYU Center)
Targeted investor recruitment in  
prio rity sectors o f manufacturing, 
industrial park development, energy 
generation and logistics services
-  Investment p rom otion strategy 
adopted and implemented (in
2020)
-  Average annual percentage 
increase in FDI (20%)
No bonds, capital controls.
FDI, %  rise p. a.: negative since 2017
Introduce a comprehensive legal 
regime (Proclamation) tha t governs
PPPs
-  Number o f public-private dialogues 
organised (5 by 2020)
-  Number o f legal reforms on PPPs 
(1 by 2020)
PPP law  introduced 3/2018
https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home/compact-countries.html
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-  Ensuring EoDB by revising the commercial code and in­
vestment law and by modernising business service de­
livery
-  Accelerating financial development to support private 
sector activities. An important focus here is a policy that 
contributes to reducing the serious debt problems.
Another key issue is improving the business environment 
(EoDB) for local and foreign companies so that higher FDI will 
flow into the country. This is because the desired increase in 
private investment is lagging behind the expectations outlined 
in the economic plans. FDI is stagnating, despite substantial 
effort by the government to promote the attractiveness of the 
investment location. The government considers the further 
development of the industrial parks to be particularly impor­
tant, as they are intended to advance the planned industriali­
sation process. Here, tens of thousands of new industrial jobs 
are to be created. However, the model is controversial to the 
extent that wages for workers are classified as low, so low that 
they are not sufficient for them to make a living.
The CwA is encouraged by the institutions involved, such as 
the IMF and the IFC, to further advance the reforms of the 
business framework. Country Private Sector Diagnostics 
(CPSDs) are the main focus here.154 CSPDs should deal with 
the key policy and structural issues hindering private invest­
ment. The WBG is also funding growth and competition pro­
jects to the tune of 1.2 billion US dollars. The IMF and the 
Ethiopian authorities jointly organised a High-Level Forum on 
Private Sector-Led Diversification and Growth that took 
place in Addis Ababa in July 2019. The objective of the Fo­
rum was to discuss and propose guiding principles for the 
design of a comprehensive strategy for sustained growth, di­
versification and private sector development, a task that is 
particularly difficult to tackle in Ethiopia, where SOEs are a 
major economic power.155 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed an­
nounced that reforms to step up private sector activities are 
key for robust growth. Consistent with the Ethiopian author­
ities' strategy, public sector retrenchment needs to be com­
bined with reforms to crowd in private resources: privatisa­
tions, PPPs with adequate safeguards, private concessions, 
and removal of obstacles to domestic and foreign private in- 
vestment.156 Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director, African Depart­
ment, IMF Addis Ababa, stated on 17 July 2019: »that mac­
roeconomic stability, access to credit, good infrastructure, a 
conducive regulatory environment, a skilled workforce, and 
more equality have been associated with higher economic 
diversification.«157
154 Creating Markets in  Ethiopia (April 2019); available at: https:// 
www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home/ 
compact-countries/ethiopia.html#tab_2
155 G20 Compact w ith  Africa Peer Learning Workshop on Private 
Sector-led Diversification and G rowth. Available a t: h ttps://w w w . 
compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home/compact- 
countries/ethiopia.html#tab_2
156 IMF (2018): op. cit.
157 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/07/17/sp071719-g20-
cwa-peer-learning-workshop-on-private-sector-led-diversification-
and-growth
CWA -  GERMAN ACTIvITIES IN ETHIOPIA
From an economic point of view, Ethiopia has so far been of 
marginal significance for Germany, but Germany is an im­
portant partner in development cooperation.158 In 2017, 
Germany imported goods worth 172 million euros from 
Ethiopia and exported goods worth 328 million euros in the 
opposite direction. Germany is one of the largest purchas­
ers of Ethiopian goods, especially coffee and textiles. Ger­
man exports to Ethiopia consist primarily of finished prod­
ucts such as machines, engines, motor vehicles, chemicals 
and medicines. More recently, German companies have al­
so begun to invest in Ethiopia. In 2016, companies such as 
MAN, Siemens, DHL and volkswagen began investing in 
the country.159
Ethiopia is a priority area for German development cooper­
ation. Since bilateral cooperation began, 55 years ago, Ethi­
opia has received a total of more than 1.25 billion euros 
from Germany within the framework of technical and fi­
nancial cooperation. In consultation with the Ethiopian gov­
ernment and international development partners, develop­
ment cooperation focuses on three priority areas: educa­
tion (vocational school and higher education), food security 
(agriculture) and protection and sustainable use of natural 
resources (biodiversity).
During government negotiations in November 2017, new 
commitments totalling 126 million euros were made for 
state development cooperation for the period up to 2020. 
Approximately 48 million euros will be made available for 
the priority area of education until 2020. The German Fed­
eral Government is supporting the establishment and ex­
pansion of a vocational training system. Cooperation in the 
priority area of agriculture and food security will be expand­
ed with a new commitment of 66.5 million euros for the 
years from 2017 to 2020 to strengthen drought resilience 
and increase agricultural productivity. This focus is comple­
mented by a cooperation project in agricultural policy (seed 
development, training and agricultural dialogue). The BMZ's 
Special Initiative is implementing additional measures fo­
cused on industrial clusters for the development of the tex­
tile industry and agriculture and food processing. Fields of 
activity for the German Federal Enterprise for International 
Cooperation (GIZ) in Ethiopia are the promotion of industri­
al parks, social and environmental standards in the textile in­
dustry and health. In addition, GIZ is involved in local devel­
opment partnerships with the private sector.
Germany's activities should also be seen in a European con­
text. The EU has numerous programmes supporting Ethio­
pia's structural change. The European Development Fund 
supports measures for the development of sustainable ag­
riculture and food security, targeting vulnerable population
158 https://www.bmz.de/en/countries_regions/subsahara/aethiopien/ 
index.jsp#section-30021283
159 See, among others, the CwA's Flagship Investment List;  available at: 
https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/ 
home/compact-countries/ethiopia.html#tab_2
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groups. Additional support to Ethiopia is channelled 
through other EU initiatives. France pursues its own bilater­
al agenda,160 but, so far, none of these activities are inte­
grated into the CwA strategy.161
The following critical remarks should be made regarding ac­
tivities in Ethiopia: 1. The German commitment to develop­
ment cooperation is — if at all — only weakly linked to the 
CwA. The actors operate side by side. 2 . The CwA agenda is 
obviously largely steered by the IMF and the World Bank. 
The Monitoring Report on the agenda of the G20 CwA in 
Ethiopia and the statement by the IMF representative in 
Ethiopia show that the IMF and the World Bank are largely 
pursuing a traditional agenda, focusing on structural adjust­
ment and stability measures, while the challenges of inclu­
sive growth, poverty reduction and employment policies are 
not prioritised. 3 . The implementation of the DIF (Africa- 
Grow, AfricaConnect etc.) did not start until 2019. It is, 
therefore, too early to conduct an evaluation. The extent to 
which the vocational training concepts in Ethiopia, which 
have been pursued for many years, will be integrated into a 
government-led concept in the country, remains to be seen. 
4 . The coexistence of various bilateral initiatives shows that 
German soft power to integrate the G20 states into a more 
coherent strategy has not, or at least not yet, taken place in 
Ethiopia. 5 . The effectiveness of the governance of the 
measures necessary for the CwA agenda by the country 
teams remains unclear. It would be an unmistakable sign 
that the CwA agenda had failed in Ethiopia if the country 
team, consisting of actors from Germany, Ethiopia, South 
Africa and the IMF, the World Bank, the IFC and the AfDB, 
did not meet regularly. 6 . Within the framework of existing 
cooperation, the Federal government should evaluate Ger­
man activities in order to arrive at a focused new agenda on 
the basis of findings from the process of transformation. 7. 
The European countries and the EU should work together 
on a strategy based on Ethiopian approaches to develop­
ment. France and Germany can be mutually supportive part­
ners as they share similar approaches. They could also bring 
other actors on board.
With its measures within the framework of the DIF, the Ger­
man government has taken a comprehensible approach. A 
focus on measures to promote German enterprises, support
160 For France-Ethiopia cooperation, see: http://addisstandard.com/ 
news-ethiopia-france-to-sign-space-economic-cooperation/. v ia  
the Choose Africa initiative, France has decided to  spend 2.5 bil­
lion euros on funding and supporting African start-ups and small 
businesses by 2022, including Ethiopian start-ups. Available at: 
https://www.afd.fr/en/choose-africa-french-initiative-acceler-
ate-growth-small-businesses-africa
161 This also applies to  emerging economies and members o f the G20,
such as India and China. China is heavily engaged in bilateral coop­
eration. China plays a particularly im portant role in  the expansion 
o f infrastructure and the development o f industrial parks in which 
Chinese companies operate. These do no t comply w ith  interna­
tional standards on suitable w ork and m inimum wages. Chinese —  
as well as multinational corporations —  take advantage o f the ex­
tremely low  wage costs. They have purely commercial interests and 
some strategic interests. They are, in  no way, interested in inclu­
sive g row th, m inimum wages and the development o f forw ard and 
backward linkages w ith  local industry.
for local start-up companies, measures to foster African 
SMEs and a focus on vocational training fit in with Ethiopia's 
transformation strategy. These initiatives complement the 
measures of the G20 CwA, but at the same time also con­
tradict their more orthodox approach.
CWA'S CONTRIBUTION TO ETHIOPIA'S
REFORM CHALLENGES
The question arises as to how far the CwA is able to con­
tribute to the most serious challenges in Ethiopia.
Economic growth in Ethiopia has been accompanied by a 
structural shift away from traditional and primary sectors 
towards secondary and tertiary ones. The danger is that the 
structural transformation now taking place in Ethiopia in­
volves a shift from a low-productivity agricultural sector to 
an even lower productivity service sector which is predom­
inantly informal. Nevertheless, agriculture remains of critical 
importance: Farmers and agricultural workers make up 
roughly three quarters of the country's labour force. Ethio­
pia remains largely rural and agrarian.162 *
The reform measures are undoubtedly fully justified, but 
they are not really suited to promote Ethiopian structural 
change and to offer economic prospects to the majority of 
people, especially the rural and youth population. In particu­
lar, there is a need to respond to the fact that an increasing 
number of individuals, including well-educated people, are 
entering the labour market. The model of credit-financed 
growth with large-scale government investments in infra­
structure and the development of industrial parks is clearly 
reaching its limits. The rising debt, the very high trade defi­
cit, stagnating inflows of FDI, an insufficient number of jobs 
in the industrial parks and rising unemployment are clear in­
dicators of the impasse Ethiopia has reached.
The focus on the tasks outlined in the CwA Matrix cannot 
boost structural change as long as they do not address the 
fundamental challenges. These are the extreme poverty, the 
high unemployment, the neglect of agriculture, the lack of 
property rights for private farmers, the lack of support for 
SMEs and their lobbying associations, and the lack of meas­
ures to enable cooperation between foreign and domestic 
companies. The progress achieved so far, e. g ., through the 
massive expansion of infrastructure and significant industri­
alisation efforts, has not been sufficient to lift the country 
out of poverty. The labour market situation may even dete­
riorate. The CwA instruments will ultimately encourage de­
velopment in favour of large investors, while SMEs and the 
rural economy will be marginalised due to the lack of meas­
ures implemented by the CwA and the Washington institu­
tions. This will make it impossible to achieve the goal of in­
clusive growth, which ultimately can only come from within. 
Ethiopia's serious challenges must be solved, above all by re-
162 Yared Seid, Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse and Seid Nuru A li (2015):
Ethiopia -  an Agrarian Economy in Transition. Helsinki: WIDER
W orking Paper 2015/154.
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forming agriculture and rural areas, because this is where 
the majority of the population lives. A major challenge in 
the urban centres and medium-sized towns is to provide 
prospects to the informal sector.
While the CwA's actions focus on institutional measures 
and one goal (»Improve framework conditions for domestic 
and foreign private investment«), the measures planned by 
the government and other international organisations go 
beyond stabilisation and reform measures. The national 
strategy papers focus on the following measures, which do 
not necessarily conflict with the CwA.163 As we have seen 
from the reforms outlined above, the focus is on providing 
support in several main areas: 1. Jobs for millions of job­
seekers who are unable to find employment in the industri­
al parks and with foreign companies and SOEs. To support 
this, first and foremost, SMEs must be promoted because 
the necessary jobs can only be created by this type of enter­
prise. 2 . The enabling environment for SMEs must be up­
graded so that they can act as subcontractors for foreign 
companies in value chains. In other words, a holistic ap­
proach is required that focuses on vocational training and 
the removal of constraints on firms. Therefore, not only the 
EoDB is important but also an industrial and agricultural en­
vironment that contributes to the development of Ethiopian 
entrepreneurship. 3 . Ethiopia is generally lagging behind 
technologically, which is why measures for tertiary educa­
tion and for the development of management capacities 
are of particular relevance. The promotion of start-up com­
panies can provide a technological boost and knowledge 
transfer in the urban centres and also contribute to the de­
velopment of local companies. Only dynamic and growing 
local companies will be able to act as subcontractors, i. e., 
only then will horizontal and vertical linkages to major for­
eign and local companies be achieved. Incentive systems, 
e. g., in the form of tax exemptions, can be used as instru­
ments and the German DIF can be used to promote indus-
163 National Employment Policy and Strategy (2017); Business and Em­
ployment Creation Strategy (2016); Second Growth and Transfor­
mation Plan (2016-2020); The Plan fo r Accelerated and Sustained
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). The five-year National De­
velopment Plan fo r 2005/2006 to  2009/2010 underscored the
challenges o f unemployment and underemployment, especially 
for youth and women. Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I: 
2010/2011 to  2014/2015 and II: 2015/2016 to  2019/2020) aim to  ad­
dress unemployment and labour market issues. Private sector devel­
opment and improving access to  and the quality o f education remain 
im portant strategies fo r employment generation. As emphasised in 
GTP II, industry is given priority as an engine o f grow th. W ithin in­
dustry, light manufacturing is prioritised, partly because the sector is 
believed to  generate significant employment opportunities. Job cre­
ation is usually mentioned as one o f the justifications for the gov­
ernment's efforts to  promote the manufacturing industry by estab­
lishing industrial parks. See Arne Bigsten, M ulu Gebreeyesus and 
Mans Söderbom (2015): Tariffs and Firm Performance in Ethiopia, 
in: The Journal o f  Development Studies 52, 7: 986-1001; See Kap­
pel, Pfeiffer and Reisen (2017): op. cit; Tilman Altenburg and Wilfried 
Lütkenhorst (2015): Industrial Policy in Developing Countries. Chel­
tenham.; Altenburg and Coulibaly (2018): op. cit. Cf. IFC (2019): Cre­
ating Markets in Ethiopia: Country Private Sector Diagnostic. Wash­
ington, D.C.; available at: https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
publications_ext_content/ifc_external_publication_site/publica- 
tions_listing_page/cpsd-ethiopia; UNDP (2018): Ethiopia -  Human 
Development Report; available at: hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ 
ethiopia_national_human_development_report_2018.pdf
trial clusters or industrial parks. 4 . The agricultural sector in 
Ethiopia has great economic potential. Ethiopia is a produc­
er of export goods such as coffee and, due to country's 
growing cities, there is also demand for food that can be 
produced by Ethiopian agriculture. The modernisation of 
agriculture is of crucial importance as the majority of the 
population lives in rural areas. 5 . The Ethiopian model of 
the developmental state involving initiating an industrialisa­
tion process through large foreign investors initially brought 
investors into the country. This is because the investors pri­
marily sought to exploit the large wage differences with 
other countries. This strategy is, however, not sustainable 
and leads to structural heterogeneity, which can be over­
come by the aforementioned measures. These can, in turn, 
only be successful if adequate wages are paid and sustain­
able labour and environmental standards are respected.
9.2 GHANA
THE CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL 
OF THE ECONOMY
Formed through a merger of the British colony of the Gold 
Coast and the Togoland trust territory, in 1957, Ghana be­
came the first sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to 
gain its independence. Today, Ghana is an emerging econ­
omy (GNI/Cap 1,875 US dollars) and a trade hub for much 
of West Africa. The country sits on the Atlantic Ocean and
borders Togo, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. It has a pop­
ulation of about 29.6 million (2018). Agriculture is the
mainstay of its economy: it accounts for around 20 per 
cent of GDP and employs more than half of the workforce, 
mainly smallholders. Owing to its ability to produce a wide 
variety of tropical and subtropical crops, Ghana has the po­
tential to be an important supplier of fruit and vegetable 
products to both its neighbours in Africa and to the EU.
In the past two decades, Ghana has taken major strides to­
wards democracy under a multi-party system, with its in­
dependent judiciary winning public trust. Ghana consist­
ently ranks among the top three countries in Africa for 
freedom of speech and press freedom, with strong broad­
cast media, and radio the medium with the greatest reach. 
Factors such as these provide Ghana with solid social capi­
tal, according to the WBG.164 *
Recently, a marked improvement has been seen in the coun­
try's international competitiveness. Ghana ranks 106th out 
of 140 countries in the World Competitive Report (2018), 
published by the World Economic Forum. The competitive­
ness rank in Ghana reached an all-time high of 119 in 2016, 
just ahead of the CwA launch, so it has climbed 13 ranks 
since then. Ghana's total exported goods represent nine per 
cent of its overall GDP for 2018 (in PPP). Ghana also provid­
ed exports-related services to global customers for an addi­
164 Presentation by the WBG, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/
en/country/ghana/overview#1.
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tional four per cent of GDP. So, with total exports making 
up a combined 13 per cent of GDP, Ghana can be called 
semi-open.
Gems, gold, oil and cocoa still provide the bulk of Ghana's 
exports, a combined 85 per cent in 2018.165 Ores, slag and 
ash were the fastest-growing among the top 10 export cat­
egories, led by manganese or aluminium ores and concen­
trates. In second place when it comes to improving export 
sales was fruit and nuts which rose 45.4 per cent. It is inter­
esting to note that South-South trade dominates: India (21.5 
per cent of its global total), China (11.9 per cent) and South 
Africa (10.2 per cent). A total of 48 per cent of Ghanaian ex­
ports by value were delivered to Asian countries, while al­
most a third (31.4 per cent) were sold to importers from Eu­
rope (primarily Switzerland). Ghana shipped another 15 per 
cent worth of goods to African nations.
Small farm operations account for the bulk of total agricul­
tural production and are largely dominated by rain-fed pro­
duction of crops for local consumption. With a small aver­
age farm size, agricultural productivity is limited by low 
cropping intensity, few market linkages, and limited use of 
fertilisers, insecticides, high yielding varieties or irriga­
tion-based techniques. Additionally, high transport costs 
have restricted access to major domestic and international 
markets, and poor access to basic services in rural commu­
nities has reduced the ability to attract and retain entrepre­
neurs or workers.
According to the last CPSD,166 Ghana has achieved signifi­
cant poverty reduction and >shared prosperity< in the last 
25 years, and has been at the forefront of poverty reduc­
tion in Africa since the 1990s. The country achieved the 
goal of reducing the poverty rate by half in line with the 
first target of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Between 1991 and 2012, the national poverty rate fell to 
less than half, from 51.7 to 24.2 per cent. In 2012, Ghana's 
poverty rate, at 1.90 US dollars a day, was down to 13.6 
per cent, which is much lower than not only the mean pov­
erty rate of SSA but also lower than LMICs. Although ine­
quality in household consumption increased slightly during 
the 2000s, Ghana still compares favourably with other 
LMICs in Africa as its Gini coefficient is still below the me­
dian of these peer countries.
The impact of growth on poverty has slowed since 2012. 
This challenge reflects the declining contribution of agri­
culture, in which the majority of poor households are en­
gaged, the limited opportunities for higher-productivity 
jobs in the service sector and largely capital-intensive in­
dustrial development. Ghana's major structural shifts have 
only marginally contributed to labour productivity growth 
and as a result have had a minimal impact on poverty re­
duction. In >traditional< structural change, labour and eco­
nomic activity move from agriculture to higher-productivi­
ty sectors such as manufacturing. In Ghana, however, la­
bour moved into the service sector, low-productivity 
wholesale and retail trade (productivity in these sectors is 
less than in agriculture). Spatial inequalities persist, notably 
the traditional economic and social inequality between the 
north and south of Ghana (a result of geography and colo­
nial legacy).
Arguably Ghana's most acute challenge (and a barrier to 
blended finance approaches with contingent liabilities) is 
the country's debt overhang. Growing natural resource de­
pendency and weaknesses in fiscal governance have in­
creased economic volatility and complicated macro-man­
agement. In 2015, natural resource rents reached 20 per 
cent of GDP, thus political consensus on sustainable fiscal 
management has been difficult to achieve, weakening 
Ghana's nominal fiscal rules. Fiscal volatility increased 
markedly, with deeper deficits followed by stabilisation 
measures and then further slippage. This cost Ghana about 
0.3 per cent of its annual growth during 2000-2015, with 
the heaviest toll in the early 2010s (0.7 per cent per year). 
Over time, these cycles have resulted in public debt increas­
ing from 39 per cent to 73 per cent of GDP between 2011 
and 2016. This compares with the 50-53 per cent average 
range for SSA, LMICs and structural peers, and 39 per cent 
for aspirational peers. Ghana has been at high risk of exter­
nal debt distress since 2014. With the current stabilisation 
efforts, the recent decline of gross financing needs has 
benefited from measures to lengthen domestic debt ma­
turities and active debt management, but any »derailment 
from the planned fiscal adjustment path could seriously 
jeopardize debt sustainability.«167 In fact, Ghana's fiscal sit­
uation has not been sustainable for several years with com­
paratively low revenue mobilisation and high public wage 
costs. Tax revenues are below potential by an estimated 
five percentage points of GDP and far below regional com­
parators.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWA
AND EvALUATION OF THE INDIvIDUAL 
CWA MEASURES
On assumption of office in early 2017, President Nana Ad- 
do Dankwa Akufo-Addo espoused his government's desire 
to manage the country's natural resources in a manner that 
would allow the country's development agenda to be fi­
nanced without recourse to external assistance — encap­
sulated by the slogan Ghana Beyond Aid .168 *Rather than 
the CwA (according to local observers virtually unknown in 
Ghana), it is Ghana Beyond Aid that sets the strategic eco­
nomic framework. It has since come to represent an entire 
initiative for the development of national resources de­
signed to lift more people out of poverty. The strategy em-
165 http://www.worldstopexports.com/ghanas-top-10-exports/
166 W orld Bank Group (2018): Systematic Country Diagnostic.  Report 
No. 132010-GH (November). More recent poverty data are not 
available.
167 G20 (2019): CwA M onitoring Report 04/19, op. cit.
168 Cf. Ghana Beyond Aid: Charter and Strategy Document.  Accra
(April 2019).
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phasises i) industrialisation through increasing refinement 
of natural resources (especially for job creation); ii) agricul­
ture (irrigation and the food sector); iii) tackling corruption; 
and iv) education (of the workforce).169
Nonetheless, the CwA aligns rather well w ith Ghana's cur­
rent needs. In the 2019 budget statement, the government 
reiterated that support for the private sector was a top pri­
ority. Like all West African countries, Ghana needs decent 
jobs for the young. On the demand side of the jobs equa­
tion, the economy will require more space and a better en­
vironment for a more dynamic private sector. Key reforms 
up until early 2019 focused on business facilitation.
Measures of macroeconomic progress are distorted by re­
defining the GDP, an important denominator of fiscal and 
debt ratios. However, Ghana's tax ratio still remains below 
target, at 16.5 per cent of GDP. Macro balancing has im­
proved with the conclusion of Ghana's IMF-supported pro­
gramme. This paved the way for significantly improved 
macroeconomic performance. »various reforms have also 
seen critical progress. The implementation of the 2016 
Public Financial Management Act has brought greater dis­
cipline and transparency; memorandum of understanding 
between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana 
(BoG) to refrain from central bank financing to the budget 
has significantly helped reduce inflationary pressures; debt 
management has improved; substantial banking sector re­
forms (with nine banks resolved in 18 months) has en­
hanced financial stability; and greater oversight of the inef­
ficient energy sector is taking hold.«170 In fact, the Bank of 
Ghana resolved seven banks, approved three bank merg­
ers and oversaw an increase in statutory capital for banks.
Table 13 juxtaposes the major CwA targets for Ghana with 
implementation deficits. Note that this is just a selection of 
an array of 22 government actions required of the Ghana­
ian authorities, along with 34 quantitative indicators.171 
Given the urgency of addressing Ghana's external con­
straint, the stipulated actions and indicators are more mac­
roeconomic in nature than about stimulating sustainable 
transformation and creating decent jobs.
Ghana has been at high risk of external debt distress since 
2014. With the current stabilisation efforts, the recent de­
cline in gross financing needs has benefited from measures 
to lengthen domestic debt maturities and active debt man­
agement. Notwithstanding the CwA, Ghana currently has a 
severe financing constraint. Aware of the risks of excessive 
debt accumulation, the authorities have decided to respect 
severe debt limits for new external borrowing following the 
completion of the recent IMF program. It is important to 
note in this context that the Public Private Partnership Bill 
has not yet been passed. Yet Ghana's capital account still
appears to be debt-addicted as »Ghana has emerged as an 
attractive destination for portfolio investment in 2018, with 
the corresponding vulnerabilities to shifting investor senti­
ment. Ghana has had two very >successful< Eurobond cam­
paigns, in May 2018 and March 2019, with the latter being
oversubscribed by a factor of six.«172 Even though Ghana's 
current FDI inflows of 3-4  per cent of GDP outperform its 
peers, these inflows are predominantly in capital-intensive 
sectors, providing little labour demand.173
Ghana's authorities completed five of the seven targets in 
the business framework. Ghana's EoDB score improved by 
0 .4  points between 2017 and 2019 although its EoDB 
ranking has deteriorated slightly over the past two years. 
Ghana currently ranks 9th among the sub-Saharan coun­
tries in the EoDB rankings. Ghana's lowest scores in the 
EoDB indicators are in registering property, trading across 
borders and resolving insolvency. The financing framework 
has already advanced quite substantially: De-risking instru­
ments to leverage private finance were recently introduced 
in the housing and agriculture sectors. Lengthening debt 
maturities is a top priority in view of Ghana's debt profile 
(see Table 13).
Despite financing constraints, major infrastructure invest­
ments are being made, notably in fossil energy (oil and 
gas), electricity power and transport. An important port 
expansion project, which began in October 2016 and was 
completed in June 2019 at a cost of 1.5 billion US dollars, 
is expected to boost trade in Ghana and the West African 
region. The authorities have also been working on a large 
off-balance transaction. This would involve the provision of 
infrastructure by China's Sinohydro against refined bauxite 
proceeds. Sinohydro will provide two billion US dollars in 
infrastructure (including roads, bridges, interchanges, hos­
pitals and affordable housing) in exchange for Ghana's re­
fined bauxite.
So, what measures have proven to be particularly viable in 
terms of promoting structural change towards more (and 
more sustainable and better) employment and poverty re­
duction? Ghana faces the traditional economic and social 
inequality between the north and south of the country 
(due to geography and colonial legacy). The impact of 
growth on poverty has slowed dramatically since 2012, ac­
cording to the World Bank (2018).174 This reflects the de­
clining contribution of agriculture, in which the majority of 
poor households are engaged, the limited opportunities 
for higher-productivity jobs in the service sector, and large­
ly capital-intensive industrial development. Ghana's major 
structural shifts have only marginally contributed to labour 
productivity growth and as a result have had a minimal im­
pact on poverty reduction.
169 Fatuma's Voice (2018): Ghana Beyond A id  Agenda -  An Independ­
ent Africa: Is the Proposed Policy Feasible?. Accra (26 November).
170 IMF Country Report No. 19/97 (April 2019).
171 Report to  G20 Compact w ith  Africa -  Ghana's Policy Matrix 
(March 2018).
172 G20 (2019): CwA M onitoring Report (April).
173 W orld Bank (2018): Ghana -  Priorities fo r Ending Poverty and Boost­
ing Shared Prosperity, Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD). Wash­
ington, D.C. (November).
174 W orld Bank (2018): op. cit.
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Table 13
Ghana Policy M a trix  (15.03.2018)
G overnm ent action Targets 2019-21 Indicators 2019
1. Macro Fiscal restraint Fiscal deficit <  5  %  o f GDP
Public debt <  70 %  o f GDP by 2019
(GDP redefined +  24.6 % )
Fiscal deficit =  5 .6 %
Public debt =  62 %  o f GDP
Improved tax collection (non-oil) Share o f domestic tax revenue to
GDP >  19 %
16.5 %  o f GDP
Enact the PPP Law PPP Bill subm itted to  parliament 
by 2018
Increase share o f renewable energy 
in the energy mix
>  10 %  by 2030
526 M W  by 2020.
Renewable generation capacity 2019 
=  45 M W  (only solar), i. e., 8 .9 %
2 . Business Create the Ghana Business Registry Establish electronic registry o f 
business and investment laws, regu­
lations procedures and administrative 
notices by end o f 2019
Done
Review and reduce number o f steps 
in the acquisition o f the various 
business operating perm its.
Autom ate and integrate processing 
and issuance o f licenses and permits
Ghana to  rank am ong the top  five (5) 
countries in  SSA fo r the WBG DB by 
2020/2021
114/190 = 9 th SSA
3 . Business Develop de-risking instrument to  
leverage private investment
Increase number o f de-risking 
instruments used by government to  
leverage private capital by 2019
Active policy. Examples:
-  affordable housing and mortgage 
scheme
-  Ghana Amalgamated Trust (GAT) 
fo r agricultural credit
Normalise and extend the yield curve 
in domestic debt market
M aintain normal yield curve —  a 
positive spread between the longer 
dated instruments and shorter dated 
instruments
The govt securities yield curve 
extended to  7  years w ith  benchmark 
points along the curve (3 -6  months,
1, 2, 3 and 5  years)
Introduce a w ider spectrum o f instru­
ments in domestic debt market
Introduction o f the  20-year bond Lengthening the  domestic m aturity 
profile  to  7  years. Short-term dome­
stic debt constitutes 59.4 %  o f to ta l 
borrow ing
https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home/compact-countries.html
In >traditional< structural change, labour and economic ac­
tivity move from agriculture to higher-productivity sectors 
such as manufacturing. In Ghana, however, labour has 
been moving into the informal service sector, low-produc­
tivity wholesale and retail trade (productivity in these sec­
tors is less than in agriculture) since the 2000s. This sub­
sector has very low productivity, which, over time, even 
experienced negative labour productivity change. In fact, 
the wholesale and retail trade sectors had the lowest pro­
ductivity in the economy (even lower than agriculture) 
over the period 1990-2010. This suggests that the capac­
ity of the service sector to absorb labour in a higher-pro­
ductivity sector (higher than agriculture) has decreased 
since the 1990s, as wholesale and retail trade has come to 
predominate in the service sector and absorbs most labour 
from other sectors. Its share of total employment had ris­
en to 24.3 per cent by 2010, and the wholesale and retail
trade constitute more than half of all employment in the 
service sector.175
The Labour Intensive Public Work (LIPW) programme, un­
der the Ghana Social Opportunity Project (GSOP) is a social 
protection programme initiated by the Government of 
Ghana to offer jobs and income-earning opportunities to 
specific targeted rural communities by applying labour in­
tensive technology in the construction of a community in­
frastructure. This has the potential to generate secondary 
employment.176
175 Geiger, Michael, Jan Trenczek and Konstantin M . Wacker (2019): 
Understanding Economic G row th in Ghana in Comparative Perspec­
tive. Washington, D.C.: Policy Research W orking Paper Series 8699, 
The W orld Bank.
176 https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/EJC-155ff31fb0
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9.3 SENEGAL
THE CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL 
OF THE ECONOMY
Senegal can rely on a number of advantages: its democratic 
tradition, its geographical position on Africa's western At­
lantic coast, a young population, huge agricultural and min­
ing potential, and the dynamism of its diaspora of migrants. 
Senegal is often celebrated as a symbol of democracy and 
peace on the African continent. It frequently participates in 
peacekeeping throughout the region. The second largest 
economy in francophone West Africa has been experiencing 
strong growth since 2012, exceeding an annual real rate of 
six per cent over the past years. Recent growth has been 
driven by significant improvements in agricultural produc­
tion, but also by the implementation of infrastructure pro­
jects, which have supported domestic consumption.177
Senegal aims to be an emerging country by 2035. To achieve
this objective, the country has put in place a ten-year devel­
opment strategy for the period 2014-23, the Plan Senegal 
Emergent (PSE). This plan is based on three strategic orien­
tations or axes: the structural transformation of the econo­
my, the population's living conditions and good governance. 
After implementing the first part of the Plan (PSE I) during 
2014-2018, the second part (PSE II) started in 2019 for an­
other five-year period, up until 2023.
International competitiveness has improved since the late 
2000s, according to the WBG (2018) Systematic Country 
Diagnostic of Senegal. The country's share in global exports 
rose from 0.015 per cent in 2008 to 0.025 per cent in 2017. 
Senegal is a relatively closed economy but unrecorded (nat­
ural) trade seems important. Its exported goods represent­
ed 4 .4  per cent of its overall GDP for 2018 (59.5 billion in 
PPP US dollars). Exports of services (remittances, tourism) 
added another 2 .4 per cent of GDP in the same year. In 
2018, the bulk of merchandise exports was earned from in­
organic chemicals (phosphoric or polyphosphoric acids) — 
526.1 million US dollars (20.2 per cent of total exports) —, 
gems and precious metals —  510.2 million US dollars (19.6 
per cent) — and fish — 502.6 million US dollars (19.3 per 
cent).178
The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) aims to infer informa­
tion about countries' productive capabilities by making rel­
ative comparisons across their export baskets. The ECI cap­
tures the diversity and sophistication of the productive ca­
pabilities embedded in the exports of each country. The in­
dex has been successful in explaining cross-country differ­
ences in GDP/capita and in predicting economic growth. 
According to The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
the economy of Senegal has an ECI of -  0.519, making it 
the 93th most complex country in 2017, out of 133 (similar
177 OECD (2017): Examen multidimensionnel du Senegal: Volume 1. 
Evaluation initiale, Les voies de developpement. Paris: OECD.
178 http://www.worldstopexports.com/senegals-top-10-exports/.
to Australia).179 Over the last decade, Senegal's ECI has os­
cillated but trended downwards, putting it into the country 
group of biggest fallers. Consequently, growth projections 
derived from the country's productive capabilities place it 
in the middle of African peers in the coming decade, at just 
about four per cent a year in real terms.180 These projec­
tions fall short of the ambitious GDP growth targets (7-8 
per cent) set by the PSE.
Poverty in Senegal is mainly rural and principally affects 
large, poorly educated households. In 2011, nearly 70 per 
cent of the poor and 84 per cent of the extreme poor lived 
in rural areas, accounting for 57 per cent of the total popu­
lation. Apart from geography, the main correlates of pover­
ty are education, the size of the household and sector of oc­
cupation. Higher growth is estimated to have reduced pov- 
erty.181 Compared to its neighbouring countries of Ghana 
(13.6) and Cote d'Ivoire (27.9), Senegal is poor(er). However, 
since 2011, when extreme poverty stood at 38 per cent 
based on the international poverty line,182 *poverty is esti­
mated to have decreased to 35.4 per cent by 2016 (latest es­
timate available).
Agriculture appears to have been one of the main drivers of 
this reduction, as it has registered low but positive expansion 
with two exceptionally good years during 2015-17. At the 
same time, rural areas have witnessed some job reallocation 
out of the primary sector, as households diversified their live­
lihoods by tapping into a growing rural non-farm economy. 
Moreover, moderate improvements in general value added 
per agricultural worker reversed a negative trend that had 
prevailed for more than a decade, pointing to signs of nas­
cent structural transformation. In urban areas, labour income 
among the poor has been supported by growth in labour-in­
tensive sectors, such as commerce and construction.
Although inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is 
relatively low when compared to SSA at 0.38 in 2011, the 
current level of inequality of consumption in Senegal still 
indicates that the top 20 per cent of the distribution enjoys 
almost 45 per cent of the total wealth. Recent data based 
on asset indicators also suggests that the economic growth 
between 2011 and 2015 may have been disproportionate­
ly captured by the better-off. The provision of basic public 
utilities is another determinant of inequality. Uneven provi­
sion may intensify with climate change. The challenges 
here are to upgrade the power grid, ensure access to drink­
ing water and prevent floods.
One of Senegal's major challenges is to provide sustainable 
high-quality (decent) jobs. As a result of the current fertility 
rate of 4.8 — which is high even by SSA standards — 260,000
179 http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/2017?country=senegal.
180 http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/growth-projections/.
181 World Bank Group (2018): Systematic Country Diagnostic o f Senegal. 
Dakar (October).
182 Percentage o f the population living below the international poverty
line o f 1.90 US dollars (in PPP terms) per day. See http://hdr.undp. 
org/en/composite/MPI
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young Senegalese people enter the labour market every year. 
Overall levels of education in Senegal are low — according to 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) it was 
three years in 2015 (and about five years for the population 
under 20 years of age), compared to an average of seven 
years in SSA. Low quality of education (including high drop­
out rates for girls in secondary school due to early marriage 
and pregnancy) exacerbates the fertility problem.
By contrast, the IMF has assessed Senegal as having achieved
macroeconomic stability since PSE I (2014-18).183 It remains 
to be seen, however, whether macroeconomic stability can 
be maintained during PSE II. PSE II aims to get Senegal onto 
the road to development by 2035. Senegal remains at low 
risk of debt distress, but public debt has risen in recent 
years. This reflects a combination of factors, including accel­
erated public investment spending and the inclusion of the 
debt of public entities outside central government.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWA 
AND EvALUATION OF THE INDIvIDUAL 
CWA MEASURES
The Government of Senegal has fully committed to its am­
bition to use all available resources —  public, private, do­
mestic and international — to finance its development vi­
sion under PSE I: »An emerging Senegal in 2035 with an in-
183 IMF (2019): Senegal Staff Report fo r the Article IV Consultation. 
IMF Country Report No. 19/27 (January).
clusive society in a state of law« (OECD, 2018),184 Senegal's 
financing ambition corresponds well to a new metric — to­
tal official support for sustainable development (TOSSD). 
TOSSD measures official flows and private flows mobilised 
(including from China and other emerging providers) to 
support sustainable development. Senegal was the first 
TOSSD pilot study, and gives us a good grasp of financial 
flows from all sources as revealed by the authorities. Table 
14 provides a detailed and comprehensive overview (for 
2014 only), by including China and remittances, two fi­
nancing sources that are notoriously hard to trace.
Table 14 provides some interesting information —  not just 
about Senegal but also beyond — on the providers and 
structure of cross-border finance to poor countries (and 
thus CwA motivation):
-  Remittances by Senegal's diaspora of migrants topped 
the ranking of cross-border flows and providers, with 
more than a third of total inflows in 2014. This is still the 
case. During the 2010s, remittances constituted the most 
important inflow in Senegal's current account, exceeding 
ten per cent of GDP.185 In view of the importance of re­
mittances, it is striking how little emphasis has been
184 OECD (2018): Senegal's Perspective on Total Official Support for 
Sustainable Development (TOSSD). OECD Development Co-Oper­
ation W orking Paper 43 (February). The OECD quotes Senegal's f i­
nance ministry bu t the hyperlink has been removed (as sometimes 
happens in official Senegalese documents).
185 IMF (2019): Senegal Staff Report fo r the Article IV Consultation. 
IMF Country Report No. 19/27 (January).
Table 14
TOSSD Gross Inflow s to  Senegal in  2014, m illion US dollars
B ilateral o fficial >  2090 43 .4  %
W est DAC grants 567
Concessional loans 224
Non-concessional 17
East/South Emerging lenders > 1,282 -2 6 .6%
M u lti o fficial 476 9.9%
Grants 164
Concessional loans 192
Non-concessional 120
Private 301 6.3
H ybrid De-risked private 60
Export credits 11
Investors M arket term  flows 99
FDI 31
Securities, bonds 68
Charitable grants 32
M igrants Remittances 1,644 1,644 34.2
Total 4,812 100.0
Sources: OECD (2018): Senegal's Perspective on TOSSD.  Annex 1; own calculations
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placed on this type of financial flow in the CwA initia- 
tive.186 Perhaps, the CwA initiative has given remittances 
such a low profile so as to avoid conflicting messages 
because another aspect of the rationale for the CwA is to 
avoid excessive migration. This is all the more astonishing 
as the June 2017 international conference »G20 Africa 
Partnership -  Investing in a Common Future« had fea­
tured a group entitled »Remittances for Investments«, 
which focused on bundling and leveraging remittances 
with ODA funds, particularly to foster economic develop­
ment in rural and marginalised areas.187
-  Loan commitments from China (estimates based on 
interviews) were the second most important flow in 
2014, making up at least 26 per cent of total inflows. 
China's lending is shrouded in secrecy as China has so 
far refused to join the Paris Club of official (mostly 
Western) creditors. Until recently, China's investment 
in Africa took the form of loans in exchange for infra­
structure development. Future finance could increas­
ingly be administered via new China-led multilateral 
development banks, such as the AIIB and the NDB. A  
recent scientific Kiel Working Paper188 lists the world's 
top 50 recipients in terms of external debt stock as a 
percentage of GDP, with Senegal just short of 10 per 
cent in 2017.189 Ghana, assessed as being at high risk 
of debt distress, is, unlike Ethiopia, not listed among 
China's top debtors in the Kiel study.
-  In contrast to remittances and China loans, corporate 
FDI and private portfolio flows were negligible in 2014 
(with around one per cent of gross inflows each). Ac­
cording to recent IMF data these remained low, at bare­
ly two per cent of GDP for the period 2015-17; in 2018, 
however, the IMF recorded Eurobond issuance worth 
almost 9 per cent of GDP among portfolio flows.190 Pri­
vate equity flows to Senegal have been very low indeed. 
Portfolio equity flows are predicted to remain modest in 
the future, assuming there are no major stock market 
listings. However, annual corporate FDI inflows could 
triple, according to IMF projections for 2020-23.
FDI inflows may well be boosted in future years. The PSE II 
growth strategy aims to develop clusters of economic activ­
ity, with SEZs now up and running. Planned investments in 
the three established SEZs Diamniadio, Diass and Sandiara 
amount to about 3.7 per cent of GDP, with investors coming 
from several countries, including China and Tunisia, and rep­
resenting different sectors including plastics, food process­
ing, bank cards, medical services and research. In view of 
modest CwA results concerning private flows, the BMZ 
started co-financing CwA initiatives with grants of up to 100 
million euros per country, and implementation has already 
begun in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Tunisia. Discussions are 
under way for initiatives in Senegal, Ethiopia and Morocco. 
This increased cooperation seeks to improve the environ­
ment for private sector investment, boost economic growth 
and create sustainable jobs, especially for young people.
As for employment targets, both planned and achieved, 
770 jobs have been created so far in the three SEZs men­
tioned (compared with a planned total of 11,679), according 
to data provided by Senegal's authorities for the last Article 
Iv Consultation of the Fund. Thus there seems to be a signif­
icant gap between ambition and reality. This may also hold 
for Senegal's start-up plan, administered by Entrepreneuriat 
Rapide, which is committed to creating 275,000 jobs (of the 
one million included in the PSE II objective) within the 2013­
2019 period.191
In the agricultural sector, three integrated agricultural growth 
poles or >agropoles< are being launched to help the sector in­
crease the value added of agro-business and reduce reliance 
on imported foodstuffs. A  similar approach is planned for 
the tourism sector. All these initiatives contribute to advanc­
ing economic activity outside Dakar. The development of the 
plateformes d'investissement, which aims to give enterprises 
and households access to administrative services outside of 
Dakar, is also consistent with this strategy.
The national development plan Senegal Emergent (PSE I) 
had put the private sector at the heart of the country's fi­
nancing strategy for sustainable development and has 
placed »public-private financing at the heart of its growth 
strategy.« This ambition has also recently been reflected in 
modestly improved scores and rankings on the IFC EoDB 
indicator, as reported in Table 15. However, progress was 
much less impressive than in CwA country peers Cote
d'Ivoire, Rwanda or Togo.
However, as noted in the OECD report on Senegal's TOSSD, 
PPPs were used much less frequently than expected, de­
spite the law governing PPPs having been revised in 2014. 
PSE II aims to rectify this, with potential financing and tech­
nical assistance also coming under the CwA framework.
The CwA flagship list for Senegal contains detailed infor­
mation on the FDI pipeline by the end of 2018,192 worth a
186 Remittances are not counted as capital flows by the IMF; they are cate­
gorised as unrequited transfers in the current account of a country's bal­
ance of payments. Yet, they do constitute cross-border financial flows.
187 G20 (2017): G20/Chairs_Summary_G20_Africa_Partnership_Con- 
ference.  Berlin (June).
188 Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch (2019): 
China's Overseas Lending.  Kiel W orking Paper No. 2132 (July).
189 Ethiopia's external debt stock to  China was almost 20 per cent o f its 
GDP, according to  the Kiel paper cited above.
190 IMF (2019): Senegal Staff Report fo r the Article IV Consultation,
op. cit., Table 2. Senegal: Balance o f Payments, 2015-23.
191 Papa Amadou Sarr (2019): Nous sommes en train de creer le plus
grand centre d'incubation d'A frique de l'Ouest, in: Jeune Afrique
(15 July).
192 Senegal Agriculture Kagome's Agriculture Business of Tomatoes for 
Processing 1.0 Japan Implementation Established (December 2017) 
Senegal Infrastructure Room2Run 57.0 EU Pipeline AfDB Senegal In­
frastructure Resilient City Development 115.0 EU Pipeline AECID Sen­
egal Other sectors (Energy) Senergy 2 S.A.S -  Solar Pv Project 15.1 
Implementation Signed on 13th of November 2017; planned to be 
commissioned in June 2018 Senegal Other sectors (Energy) Tobene 
Power SA 31.6 Senegal Other sectors (Energy) Gauff Engineering 
Germany Pipeline Electrification o f 300 villages, MoU signed Senegal
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Table 15
Doing Business: Progress in  Senegal, April 2019
DB 2017 Rank (o f 190 
countries) /  EODB Score
DB 2019 Rank (o f 190  
countries) /  EoDB Score
+ / -  Change in Rank /
EoDB Score DB 2019 Reforms
147/50.68 141/54.15 +6/+3.47
S  Registering property 
S  Enforcing contracts
Source: G20 (2019): Compact M onitoring Report (April).
total 244.6 million US dollars. Investment opportunities, as 
advertised in the investment prospectus of Senegal's coun­
try page on the CwA website, highlight:
-  Energy; to improve the energy mix through: (i) the de­
velopment of new electricity production capacities, (ii)
diversification of energy generation sources, and (iii) 
enhancement and development of the transmission 
and distribution network.
-  Agriculture, fisheries and food; to reduce Senegal's de­
pendence on imported food (cereal corridors for rice, 
millet and maize) and to promote Senegalese agriculture 
(aquaculture industry, horticulture) as a growth driver.
-  Services; to establish Dakar as the region's service hub in 
areas such as corporate headquarters, health services, 
education facilities and tourism (after years of neglect).
Currently, meetings of the CwA country team on Senegal 
do not seem to be taking place. This finding confirms the 
ACET statement in the most recent 2019 CwA Monitoring 
Report: »While guidelines for Compact Teams have been 
agreed, in most cases the Compact Teams are not operat­
ing effectively -  if at all. Of those visited, in one country 
there has not been a Compact Team meeting since Octo­
ber 2017, in two countries the first full Compact Team 
meeting took place in February 2019, and in numerous 
countries the private sector has not been invited. Likewise, 
leadership of the Compact Team varies across countries, 
both with regard to seniority and focal points.«193
ASSESSMENT OF THE CWA AGAINST 
THE BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL DEvELOPMENT
While the CwA does not provide a framework for recipro­
cal obligations and no accountability mechanism is in place 
for G20 countries, CwA partners are monitored by interna-
Other sectors (Energy) Novis GmbH Germany Implementation W ithin 
the framework o f international development cooperation Novis has 
completely electrified the village o f Kalom (Senegal), start-up 02.2012 
Senegal Services Bitzer GmbH 2.9 Germany Implementation Sales, 
marketing, support, industrial machinery, equip. and tools Senegal 
Other sectors Pasteur 22.0 France Implementation The Pasteur Foun­
dation is investing EUR 22M in a new vaccine manufacturing facility.
193 ACET (2019): Independent Review by The African Center fo r Eco­
nomic Transformation, Compact M onitoring Report (April): 11.
tional organisations via country Policy Matrices. President 
Macky Sall's government, which aims to get Senegal onto 
the road to development by 2035 recently posted on the 
presidential website: »Fighting inequalities and social injus­
tices are the President's main objectives. President Sall be­
lieves that politics has meaning only if it effectively tackles 
social discrepancies.« In the view of Senegal's government, 
this goal sets the major policy objectives of the PSE II: 
structural transformation of the economic framework, pro­
motion of human capital, good governance and rule of 
law.194 How does Senegal's CwA Policy Matrix align with 
the broad priorities set out by its president?
Each country Policy Matrix has a long list of government ac­
tions required of the CwA partner in the macroeconomic, 
business and finance frameworks. There are also specific in­
dicators and targets attached to these government actions, 
and various multi- and bilateral agencies labelled as »part­
ners«. The Senegalese authorities are faced with 28 gov­
ernment actions, 28 targets and 37 foreign agencies (Sene­
gal Policy Matrix, September 2018). The Policy Matrix cov­
ers four narrowly spaced pages, too long to be replicated 
here. (As mentioned in Part 1, international agencies shoe­
horn their themes and indicators into the Matrix and G20 
leaders do not appear to care much about prioritisation. It 
is also important to note here that the governance indica­
tors are more World Bank centred and differ from those 
emphasised by the German government in Bundestag hear­
ings.) This chapter will thus only present the major CwA tar­
gets for Senegal, point to implementation deficits and iden­
tify inconsistencies as well as policy conflicts within the 
CwA Senegal Policy Matrix. The central goal of all CwA Pol­
icy Matrices, once again is to: »[i]mprove framework condi­
tions for private investment (domestic and foreign).«
Table 16 juxtaposes the major CwA targets for Senegal 
with implementation deficits. Note that this is just a selec­
tion of long list of 28 government actions required of the 
Senegalese authorities, accompanied by 28 quantitative in­
dicators. In 2018, implementation, even by the darling of 
the donor world Senegal fell short of the ambitious targets 
in all focus areas (macro, business and financing). The IMF 
assessment (most recent Article 4  Consultation, p. 13) pro­
vides the following explanation of these shortcomings: 
Constraints to private sector development persist, despite
194 https://www.sec.gouv.sn/dossiers/plan-s%C3%A9n%C3%A9gal-
emergent-pse
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Table 16
Senegal: Policy M atrix  Targets and Im plem entation Deficits
Focus areas G overnm ent action Im plem entation
Macroeconomic stability -  Reduce fiscal deficit to  3  %
-  Ensure debt sustainability
-  Reduce current account deficit
-  The 2018 d ra ft budget shows a deficit 
o f 3 .5 %  o f GDP
-  Joint IMF/ WBG DSA: »debt risk low «.
»But debt dynamics w ill need to  be 
closely m onitored«
-  W idened in  2017, projected to  remain >  7 %  
o f GDP
Domestic resources mobilisation -  Increase tax revenues to  a t least 20%  o f GDP 
over the next three to  five years based on 
rebased GDP
-  Rapid refund system: p u t in  place in 2018 o r in
2019 budget
-  18.7 %  in  2018. Need to  raise additional tax 
revenue o f 4  %  o f GDP
-  transfer pricing regime subm itted to  parlia­
m ent and approved
Performance o f 
public services
-  Improve citizen and stakeholder access to  
economic and financial inform ation
-  Upgrade public administration
-  »Improve from  10th to  8th in  the Ibrahim Index 
o f A frican Governance (IIAG).« In fact, the 
porta l notes »slowing improvement« and
Senegal's rank has remained a t 10 (h ttp://iiag. 
online/)
-  »Improve to  a t least 50  in  all percentile ran­
kings o f the WB Governance Indicators.« On 
government effectiveness, Senegal fell slightly 
in  the WGI ranks from  36.5 in  2016 to  40.4 
in 2017
Business fram ework -  Facilities fo r project preparation and use o f 
standard clauses in PPPs
-  Accompany p ilo t countries in  PPPs
-  Finalisation and harmonisation o f the  institu ti­
onal and legal fram ework on PPPs
-  Double the share o f FDI: from  3 %  o f GDP 
in 2015 to  6  %  in  2020.« Last observation in
2017: FDI =  2 .4 %  o f GDP. Projected fo r 2020:
4.1 %  o f GDP (IMF, 2019)
Financing fram ework -  A ttrac t institu tional investors by supporting 
the regional p ilo t project fo r market develop­
m ent (in CFAF) fo r long-term  bonds
-  Create a risk m itiga tion fund  by issuing bonds
-  WBG: Ongoing w ork by J-CAP initiative w ith  
the BCEAO to  improve regulatory framework 
fo r capital m arket/bond issuances
-  »Fully functioning m itiga tion fund, w ith  a USD
* * *  m illion in itia l capital, by end 2018«
Sources: Senegal Policy Matrix 09/18; IMF (2019); IMF Senegal Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation (April).
PSE I. Constraints include: (i) access and cost of energy, (ii) 
heavy procedures in the tax system and the judiciary, (iii) la­
bour regulations, (iv) access and cost of credit, (v) efficien­
cy of public investment, and (vi) weak human capital.
How do all the government actions and indicators stipulat­
ed by the Policy Matrix align with Senegal's priorities? First, 
Senegal's PSE II seems to align more or less fully with the 
Senegal Policy Matrix as far as good governance and rule of 
law are concerned and the same applies to the authorities' 
quest for private funding. Second, interests only seem to 
align indirectly when it comes to the goal of strengthening 
human capital, especially via SME vocational training — an 
important AFD project. Third, there are very few initiatives 
in the Policy Matrix in support of the need for structural 
transformation via sectoral, rural-urban or informal-formal 
shifts.
Finally, it is also important to point out the potential incon­
sistencies and policy conflicts in the most recent Senegal 
Policy Matrix (09/18):
-  Macroeconomic stability trumps social cohesion in the 
CwA design. But is this a sustainable reform sequence?
-  One objective is to raise post-tax business profitability 
to attract private inflows. But how does this policy tar­
get correspond with increased tax revenues postulated 
to mobilise domestic resources?
-  The policy target of slimming down Senegal's bureau­
cracy sits uneasily with the overload of >government 
actions<, indicators and targets< and >partners' sup­
port (a euphemism for international organisations and 
bilateral aid agencies) stipulated in the Policy Matrix.
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-  Safeguarding Senegal's public debt sustainability could 
interfere with the required bond market development 
to attract institutional investors. Similarly, promoting 
PPPs (and other blending instruments, such as guaran­
tees) to facilitate infrastructure lending to the private 
sector could undermine sustainable fiscal space 
through the build-up of public contingent liabilities).195
Three major policy streams not highlighted in the CwA 
seem, in our view, to be very promising avenues for the 
promotion of structural change towards more (sustainable 
and decent) employment and poverty reduction, at least in 
Senegal:
-  The CwA should emphasise longer and better school­
ing for girls to upgrade human capital and dampen 
fertility.
-  Remittances should play a central role in the CwA as 
the most sizeable, developmental and equitable form 
of private cross-border flow.
-  Rather than mimicking former Asian industrialisation 
strategies, which put the focus on urban development 
and the manufacturing sector, structural transforma­
tion and higher productivity in Senegal require a focus 
on the primary sector and services as well as rural de­
velopment.
Overall, levels of education in Senegal are low — according 
to UNDP average length of education was three years in 
2015 (and about five years for the population under 20 
years of age), compared to an average of seven years in 
SSA — which exacerbates the fertility problem. Girls' com­
pletion rates in secondary education and enrolment in ter­
tiary education are still substantially lower than those of 
boys. Secondary education is especially important as it pro­
vides crucial skills for the job market. The gender gap in 
tertiary education is also wide. Authorities could play an 
important role in encouraging girls to continue their stud­
ies. Measures to achieve this objective include: (i) reducing 
the indirect costs of studying, (ii) investing in safe transpor­
tation so that children can travel to school, (iii) providing 
transfers to families who keep their teenage daughters in 
secondary school until completion, (iv) campaigns for the 
prevention of child marriage and pregnancy, and (v) en­
forcing civil, rather than customary laws.
Remittances should play a much greater role in the CwA, 
rather than unrealistic FDI promises and debt-building 
portfolio flows. More than half a million Senegalese live 
outside their homeland, sending back more than 1.64 bil­
lion US dollars a year in remittances to their families, ac­
cording to International Organization for Migration figures. 
With a sizeable diaspora providing skills, networks in Eu­
rope and North America, and remittances, all these assets 
should be conducive to solid socio-economic develop­
ment. To avoid large-scale money laundering, compliance 
with the FATF standards have to be ensured. This would 
prevent pressure on correspondent banking relationships, 
which could increase financial intermediation costs, includ­
ing for trade and remittances.
Senegal's agricultural sector has shown signs of structural 
transformation due to incipient diversification and a grow­
ing role of irrigated products. In effect, sales of fresh hor­
ticultural produce for exports multiplied almost ten times 
in ten years, while irrigated rice production has also sus­
tainably increased. Rural-urban migration only played a mi­
nor role in poverty reduction, as migrants remained poor 
across all periods analysed. Senegal's urbanisation rate has 
almost doubled since 1960, increasing from 23 to 44 per 
cent by 2016 (against the 38 per cent SSA average). How­
ever, Senegal's cities, and Dakar in particular, have failed to 
fulfil the hopes of the migrating population, who left the 
countryside in search of better living conditions. Almost 
two thirds of the poor in Dakar are internal migrants, with 
a poverty incidence of up to 72 per cent.
Senegal has the potential to become a diversified econo­
my, mostly driven by services, if it can support the expan­
sion of its most productive and competitive sectors. Cur­
rently, Senegal's strongest comparative advantages are 
identified as being linked to its primary sectors.196 Apart 
from recently discovered oil and gas resources, the largest 
natural endowments in Senegal are cropland, forestry and 
pastureland. Marine fishing stocks are also substantial. A 
recent IFC product space analysis, which identifies indus­
tries where a country has well-developed capabilities in 
terms of the skills and technologies required to be a glob­
ally competitive exporter, emphasised fishing, food and 
forestry as the three top sectors with the highest global 
competitiveness for Senegal. Agriculture, defined broadly 
as including crops, forestry and livestock, employs more 
than a third of the Senegalese workforce and the largest 
share of the poor, and could therefore have a significant 
and direct impact on poverty reduction. Food products 
identified by the IFC product space analysis include horti­
cultural goods, prepared foods (e .g ., soups and malt ex­
tract) and nuts.
195 Kappel and Reisen (2017): op. cit.
196 W orld Bank Group (2018): Systematic Country Diagnostic o f Senegal. 
Dakar (October).
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THE IMPACT OF THE CWA
Two years is perhaps not long enough to allow for an ap­
praisal of how effective the CwA has been in achieving its 
aims. With this caveat in mind, we will nevertheless at­
tempt to draw some conclusions from the study.
-  The concept of the CwA is well designed. The frame­
works for macroeconomic stability, finance and busi­
ness have indeed set the necessary course in many 
countries. The fact that economic development in par­
ticular has been placed at the top of the agenda can 
also be seen as a positive shift. The recognition that 
Africa has a lot of catching up to do in two areas, 
namely a severely inadequate infrastructure and too 
few local and foreign resources to fund it, prompted 
the G20 to establish the CwA.
-  The verdict on the CwA two years on is, however, that 
the anticipated private cross-border equity flows did 
not materialise and neither did domestic resource mo­
bilisation. Consequently, public debt dynamics fre­
quently remained untamed. The African countries in­
volved in the Compact are not to blame, as their gov­
ernance scores have mostly improved. While they have 
fulfilled their part of the deal, there has been no im­
provement in private cross-border equity flows or do­
mestic resource mobilisation.
-  For the majority of CwA countries, there has also been 
no tangible upswing of private cross-border flows. To 
revive the Compact initiative, we would need to raise 
expectations and CwA partner ownership, clarify the 
function of the Compact Teams and provide better ca­
pacity support. As stressed by ACET, the implicit CwA 
model is neither fully understood nor owned by the 
governments of the CwA countries. The value proposi­
tion of the initiative is not clear. Moreover, it is highly 
uneven as the CwA Country Matrices are full of stipu­
lated government actions and quantitative monitora­
ble targets while G20 countries do not assume imme­
diate responsibility for the Compact.
-  Currently, it seems that the CwA is primarily owned 
(and scripted) by civil servants from the WBG and, to a 
lesser extent, the IMF. African governments do not
drive the preparation processes for the G20 summits 
despite their participation as observers during these 
events. Africa remains >on the table< of the G20 in­
stead of sitting >at the table< for global agenda-setting 
and rule-making. The assignment of CwA implemen­
tation and lack of African voice is reflected in a choice 
of governance indicators that keep the World Bank 
and other organisations involved in monitoring out­
comes. Importantly, however, governance indicators 
promoted by the CwA focus less on the driving forces 
behind institutional, economic, political and social 
change than on the level of development.
-  The CwA Policy Matrices impose a bewildering array of 
government actions and specific targets on the African 
partner countries. For all 12 CwA partners combined, 
the total number of required government actions and 
policy targets as well as foreign partner institutions in­
volved easily added up to 300 in early 2018. In many 
cases, the number of required actions, targets and part­
ners rose with each update of the Country Matrix. As 
multilaterals struggle to obtain mandates, they push 
their themes and indicators without G20 leaders prior­
itising or even considering the severely limited govern­
ment management capacities of most CwA partners. 
Clearly, the intentions and postulates of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action have been 
ignored. The proliferation of policy actions required of 
the 12 CwA partners can be blamed for the fact that 
the CwA country governments have become confused 
and thus failed to own the Compact initiative.
-  Potential inconsistencies and policy conflicts may harm 
the Compact's effectiveness and durability: Macroeco­
nomic stability trumps social cohesion in the CwA de­
sign, a reform sequence which is likely to fail. One ob­
jective is to raise post-tax business profitability to 
attract private inflows, a policy target that is not really 
in keeping with the increased tax revenues postulated 
to mobilise domestic resources. Promoting blending 
instruments, such as guarantees, to facilitate infra­
structure lending to the private sector can undermine 
sustainable fiscal space through the build-up of public 
contingent liabilities. Public debt sustainability can in­
terfere with the bond market development required to 
attract institutional investors.
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-  On a fundamental level, the Compact fails to directly 
address the most serious challenges: the fight against 
extremely high unemployment, especially among young 
people, and against widespread poverty, which is par­
ticularly serious in rural areas and for women and chil­
dren. Structural deformation, to borrow a term from 
geology, is not on the CwA agenda. These weaknesses 
in the CwA approach illustrate the need for a new 
agenda for development cooperation and for the CwA. 
Priority issues on this new agenda should be how to 
make growth inclusive and sustainable and how to 
eliminate poverty. The CwA currently being implement­
ed represents a departure from the earlier focus on pov­
erty reduction and neglects the empowerment goals 
(health and education) set out in the MDGs and SDGs.
-  The number of jobseekers continues to grow as the 
population rises. The transformation process is creating 
a growing urban informal sector, which is largely gener­
ated by rural-urban migration. Only very few CwA coun­
tries (Morocco, Egypt) have a significant and dynamic 
medium-sized enterprise sector. In most countries, in­
formal micro-enterprises dominate. Since the mid- 
1990s, many African countries, including CwA coun­
tries, have recorded faster economic growth than in the 
past. However this growth has often been with no sig­
nificant diversification of production and exports, with 
no improvement in export competitiveness, with no 
productivity increases (especially labour productivity), 
and with no technological upgrading or improvements 
in human well-being. Instead, growth has been highly 
skewed and non-inclusive. The consequence is that not 
enough jobs are created to absorb rapidly expanding 
workforces or generate sustained increases in income. 
Instead, economic activities in many CwA countries re­
main concentrated in the low-productivity, low-val­
ue-added agricultural and informal sector. In the ab­
sence of significant increases in productive employment 
opportunities in urban areas, large numbers of internal 
migrants end up engaging in low-productivity informal 
service activities or in service jobs that offer few pros­
pects of meaningful productivity increases.
-  The institutions of the W BG involved in the CwA are 
deploying significant financial resources to pursue 
their agenda; they are relying on large-scale invest­
ment in infrastructure and, above all, they are attract­
ing major investors so that they can invest in the CwA 
countries. In doing so, they are quite possibly exacer­
bating existing problems rather than contributing to 
solutions. The focus on capital-intensive investment 
leads to an increase in productivity in the sectors or 
hubs where the investment is made. Investments tend 
to target urban hubs, while the countryside is neglect­
ed. They can also contribute to the expansion of well- 
paid jobs, but this does not always happen (wage 
dumping in Ethiopia, for instance). However, high pop­
ulation growth and rural-urban migration are also re­
inforcing the trend towards further informalisation of 
living conditions in cities. This process can only be
counteracted if economic policy adopts an integrative 
approach. Strengthening local entrepreneurship and 
farmers, for instance, will facilitate inclusive growth.
The boost in investment intended by the CwA agenda 
could bring technological change, digitisation and 
knowledge transfer as exports increase and hard curren­
cy flows into the country. But, as we have shown, it does 
not increase the inflow of FDI. The potential can only be 
exploited if the necessary conditions are created. This, in 
turn, is only possible if, on the one hand, the well quali­
fied can get jobs and, on the other hand, the less well 
qualified and the companies and farmers excluded from 
transformational processes can be integrated through 
supporting measures and thus also contribute to value 
added. Minimum standards and norms, such as decent 
work, minimum wages and security in companies, are 
on the agenda of national governments, the ILO, UNIDO 
and UNECA, and can accelerate the process.
Policies that increase the complementarities between 
FDI and domestic investment should be promoted to en­
sure inclusive and sustainable growth. By inviting African 
participants to represent their interests (e.g., UNECA), 
the CwA country teams should devote more attention to 
these investment complementarities by including FAO 
(agriculture), UNIDO (industry) and UNCTAD (transfor­
mation) in the process. The CwA strategy assumes that 
high infrastructure investment and FDI will automatically 
result in linkages. However, the development of back­
ward linkages and local supply chains depends on (a) a 
favourable investment climate — which is addressed by 
the CwA — and (b) proactive measures to support local 
businesses generating growth and employment. An in­
crease in backward and forward linkages can lead to 
greater dissemination of knowledge, technology and 
expertise and generate employment.
Many countries, such as Ethiopia, Ghana and Senegal, 
are investing in the development of SEZs and industrial 
clusters to attract foreign investors. However, some 
SEZs have had and continue to have major problems, 
either with regard to job creation or technology devel­
opment. Some of these SEZs remain isolated enclaves 
linked to the surrounding area only by labour force 
employment. Nevertheless, they also have many po­
tential advantages, including better transport systems, 
qualified labour and reliable access to electricity. In­
dustrial clusters can also generate external economies. 
Although many clusters accommodate micro-enter­
prises and are informal, some also become dynamic 
hubs where start-up companies also become active.
The CwA measures show that some of the most funda­
mental developments have been conceptually ignored. 
The solutions pursued by the CwA and much of G20- 
CwA policy conversations neglect to factor in the source 
of the problem. The kind of structural deformation of 
the African economies that is of concern (poverty, high 
unemployment, informality) is not addressed by the
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CwA's management. The current situation in some CwA 
countries is, on the one hand, characterised by a con­
centration of industry in industrial hubs and the capi­
tals, which exacerbates inequality by allowing foreign 
investors to use their power in labour markets to drive 
down wages. On the other hand, the transformation 
process of most other African CwA countries, charac­
terised by strong rural-urban migration, does not create 
enough new jobs, but rather leads to large and growing 
informal economies, as is the case in all CwA countries. 
One of the reasons for this is that there is a >missing 
middle< of enterprises. The phenomenon of unlimited 
supply of labour is pronounced in both country groups.
-  The CwA should focus its activities on the developmen­
tal role of SMEs. Dismantling market entry barriers for
SMEs can stimulate economic growth and thus boost 
employment and raise incomes. Although the overall 
environment for enterprise development has improved, 
the World Bank's Doing Business indicators show that 
the situation remains critical for SMEs in many CwA 
countries. Dual vocational training schemes, such as 
those supported by GIZ and the German Chambers of 
Commerce in Ghana, assure employability of young la­
bour market entrants in CwA countries. For its part, the 
recently established German DIF for Africa provides in­
centives for German SMEs to invest in Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Senegal and elsewhere on the continent — a precondi­
tion for creating decent jobs and providing training op­
portunities. Whether it will turn out to be an efficient 
and successful initiative still remains to be seen.
-  I nterventions at sector level, coordinated around a tar­
geted set of activities and embedded in a competitive 
framework, can be an important driver of economic 
transformation. This, in turn, is crucial for sustained job 
creation, inclusion and a diversified economy. The key 
factor here is that sector-level interventions (and not just 
interventions at the company or country level) are im­
portant and have implications for actors looking to sup­
port economic transformation. Economic opportunities 
have been identified in all the countries where transfor­
mation has been successful. This includes, for instance, 
the identification of opportunities in rising markets (Sen­
egal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda), opportunities present­
ed by global outsourcing, such as automobiles in Tunisia, 
Morocco and Egypt, or the pivotal role of agriculture in 
some African economies, such as cocoa in Ghana, Sene­
gal and Cote d'Ivoire. Other positive examples are the 
garment sector as a first step into manufacturing in Ethi­
opia, which has also created jobs for women.
-  Remittances should play a central role in the CwA as the 
most sizeable, developmental and equitable form of pri­
vate cross-border flow. In view of the importance of re­
mittances, it is striking how little emphasis has been 
placed on this type of financial flow in the CwA initiative. 
Perhaps, the CwA initiative has given remittances such a 
low profile so as to avoid conflicting messages because 
another aspect of the rationale for the CwA is to avoid
excessive migration. Bundling and leveraging of remit­
tances with ODA funds, particularly to foster economic 
development in rural and marginalised areas, is strongly 
recommended. Low-income Africa's main source of for­
eign finance is remittances. With a sizeable diaspora pro­
viding skills, networks in Europe, the Middle East and 
North America, and remittances, all these assets should 
be conducive to solid socio-economic development.
REDEFINING GERMANY'S AFRICA POLICY
German Africa policy has undergone significant changes in 
the years since the G20 CwA decision. Never before in the 
history of Germany's policy towards Africa has there been a 
broader discourse or a larger number of public events with 
a focus on Africa. With the CwA, the DIF and the MPA, a 
gradual departure from the development aid strategies of 
previous decades has been initiated. On the one hand, Ger­
man policy has pursued an agenda within the framework of 
the CwA that has focused on implementation and, above 
all, been in cooperation with the W BG, IMF and the African 
states. On the other hand, the German government has 
strengthened its bilateral agenda by taking significant deci­
sions (buzzword: DIF). German decision-makers have fo­
cused more strongly than before on Germany-Africa busi­
ness relations and developed an agenda that is more inter­
ested in economic cooperation with Africa. The reasons for 
the large number of German initiatives can be traced back 
to geostrategic challenges (especially China's rise on the Af­
rican continent) and the challenges of migration from Afri­
ca to Europe (and thus also Germany).
By supporting the CwA agenda, Germany has made it clear 
that the emphasis on the business framework, the macro­
economic framework and the financial framework will re­
sult in the introduction of important reforms in CwA coun­
tries and that these will be supported by Germany. The 
main objective of the additional measures conducted by 
the DIF that complement the CwA has been, on the one 
hand, to improve the basic conditions for German investors 
and exporters (see Box 1). On the other hand, the activities 
described above (special vocational training initiative) also 
contribute to Germany's Africa policy, not only with Ger­
man interests in mind, but also actively contributing to 
shaping structural change in Africa.197
The extent to which the ambitions of the CwA and the DIF 
are suited to cope with the structural changes taking place 
in the CwA countries cannot yet be fully assessed in view
197 Henning Melber (ed.) (2019): Deutschland und Afrika. Anatomie eines 
komplexen Verhältnisses. Frankfurt/Main; Robert Kappel (2016): Ger­
man New Africa Policy: Time for a Change?, in: Geert Castryck, Silke 
Strickrodt and Katja Werthmann (eds.): Sources and Methods fo r Af­
rican History and Culture: Essays in Honour o f Adam Jones. Leipzig: 
629-650; Peter M o lt (2014): Ein Rückblick auf die (west)deutschen 
Beziehungen zu den Entwicklungsländern in Afrika südlich der Sa­
hara. KAS Mitteilungen 11/12: 47-69; Denis Tull (2014): Deutsche Af­
rikapolitik -  ein Beitrag zu einer überfälligen Debatte. Berlin: Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung. Cf. Stefan Oswald (2018): Zehn Jahre Afrikapolitik, in:
Zeitschrift fü r Außen- und Sicherheits po litik  11: 603-610.
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of the short period for which they have been in force. As 
we have already shown in the section on the architecture 
of the G20 CwA (see Chapter 4), the conceptual ideas tend 
to have a traditional agenda, clearly defined by framework 
measures. The question therefore arises as to the extent to 
which Germany is giving new impetus to the CwA agenda:
-  Germany's soft power is gaining profile. Together with 
the W BG, the AfDB and other international organisa­
tions, and the G20 countries themselves, it carefully 
developed a detailed concept for the CwA for the G20 
summit in Germany.
-  The German government envisaged a formative role for 
the Country Teams, an essential instrument for shaping 
the agenda of the CwA. Germany planned to work 
closely with other actors in influencing the tasks to be 
taken on. As was reported in the participating minis­
tries, this was seen as a criterion for the success or fail­
ure of the German participation in the CwA. Following 
more than two years of experience with the implemen­
tation of the CwA, it can now be said that Germany's 
commitment, with the exception of Tunisia, has in fact 
proven to be relatively modest. Only KfW , DEG and GIZ 
actually exert a certain amount of influence.
-  The support of German enterprises through an im­
proved set of instruments for hedging risks are designed 
to contribute to the promotion of German investment 
in the CwA countries. It can be assumed that, also in the 
future, German companies are not likely to invest in 
large numbers in North Africa and SSA. The reasons 
given are that the African markets are too small, the 
demand for German industrial companies is modest 
and the basic environment is regarded as suboptimal. 
To what extent the improved environment for German 
businesses to invest in African countries will lead to 
more investment remains to be seen, as AfricaGrow 
and AfricaConnect did not start operating until 2019.
-  With its various instruments, the German Federal Gov­
ernment has greatly improved the incentive system for 
German investment in Africa. The set of measures 
adopted constitutes subsidised support for German 
companies. However, there are no or hardly any condi­
tions or incentive systems to induce German companies 
to increase their cooperation with African enterprises 
(for example, by deepening linkages). The extent to 
which the advantage enjoyed by German companies 
investing in African countries over those operating in 
Asia or Latin America represents a distortion of compe­
tition would have to be examined in more detail.
-  The DIF could contribute to inclusive development if Af- 
ricaGrow and AfricaConnect were to be readjusted. So 
far, they lack coherent policies and instruments capable 
of improving complementarity between infrastructure 
development, foreign and domestic investment, and 
the development of local industry and agriculture, e. g., 
through targeted incentive systems.
-  I t would also be beneficial to refocus on a European 
agenda. As the EU's most important economic power, 
Germany could bring its soft power into play to tie 
other European countries and other G20 members 
into the CwA agenda. So far, efforts to achieve a co­
herent Africa policy at the European level have not 
been successful. The new French initiatives for eco­
nomic cooperation with African countries and the 
EU's plan for »International Partnerships« may con­
tribute to a shift away from the mainly bilateral and 
competitive activities of the individual European coun­
tries. Germany could spread the discourse to the rest 
of the EU and thus contribute to the EU jointly devel­
oping a cooperative partnership with African coun­
tries that differs markedly from the orthodox agenda 
of the CwA.
To conclude, we note that the high expectations that the 
German government placed in the CwA have (so far) bare­
ly been fulfilled. Numerous promises were made which 
could not be met. Above all, it shows that Germany has 
hard power with its bilateral measures (financing of pro­
grammes, deployment of experts), but its soft power is not 
well developed. Moreover, it been possible to convince ad­
ditional partners of the value of the Compact process, and 
nor has Germany managed to play an important and visi­
ble role in implementing the WBG agenda. As an overall 
G20 concept, the CwA has failed. The Compact is now be­
ing continued under the direction of the WBG in coopera­
tion with the African countries.
Thus, we are faced with two conflicting concepts. The CwA 
is an updated version of credit-financed growth strategies 
(debt-cum-growth). However, these are also at risk of failure 
in the new model, i. e., of making no sustainable contribu­
tion to solving labour market problems or reducing poverty. 
The bottom line is, therefore: The CwA in its basic form is at 
odds with inclusive and sustainable growth. In addition, 
there is a danger that the countries involved will fall back in­
to a debt trap. German Africa policy should therefore exam­
ine the extent to which cooperation with the powerful and 
experienced WBG needs to be reviewed. The same applies 
to the G20. With its focus on large-scale investment, the 
CwA undermines African strategies rather than supports 
them. Stronger German (and European) engagement in the 
WBG would be necessary to prevent adverse effects and to 
convince the Washington institutions to put inclusive growth 
and sustainable development at the heart of cooperation 
with Africa. This requires concerted European action. Given 
the power of the Washington institutions, this option is 
rather difficult, but not impossible. The second option — 
certainly no easier than the first — would be to pursue a 
separate agenda with other well-intentioned partners from 
Europe. This would certainly be more effective in a) giving 
priority to inclusive growth, b) deepening cooperation be­
tween European and African companies through incentive 
systems, and c) providing targeted support of medium-sized 
enterprises as a useful bridge between European and Afri­
can companies, for example through an integrative ap­
proach to vocational training.
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The Audacity of Hope
The CwA has the objective to increase the 
attractiveness of private investment in Af­
rica through substantial improvements to 
the macro, business and financing frame­
works. It aims to leverage private financ­
ing for infrastructure projects via blended 
finance to mobilise subsequent FDI flows.
The verdict on the CwA in its third year is 
that private cross-border equity flows 
have not materialised and neither have 
domestic resources been mobilised. The 
African countries involved in the Com­
pact are not to blame. Governance scores 
have improved since 2016. However, FDI 
and national savings have not yet re­
sponded accordingly. In fact, both fell for 
the majority of CwA partners.
The Compact brings together selected 
African countries, international organisa­
tions and bilateral partners from the G20 
to coordinate country-specific reform 
agendas, support respective policy mea­
sures and advertise investment opportu­
nities to private investors. Currently, it 
seems that the CwA is primarily owned 
by civil servants from the World Bank 
and the IMF. It is neither fully understood 
nor fully owned by the governments of 
CwA countries. The value proposition is 
not clear. Moreover, neither the private 
corporate sector nor institutional inves­
tors seem to have fully bought into the 
CwA. To revive the Compact initiative we 
would need to raise expectations and 
improve ownership, clarify the function 
of Compact Teams and provide better 
capacity support.
At present, structural change in most Af­
rican countries is slow, the modernisation 
of agriculture is sluggish, and informality 
and thus poverty are prevalent. One ma­
jor issue is that economic growth has 
been largely »jobless«. FDI alone will not 
be able to correct jobless growth. In its 
current form, the CwA fails to address 
the issues of how to achieve inclusive 
growth and how to eradicate poverty.
The CwA strategy assumes that a high 
level of infrastructure investment and FDI 
will automatically result in linkages. Poli­
cies that enhance the complementarities 
between FDI and domestic investment 
should be promoted. The CwA currently 
being implemented represents a depar­
ture from the objectives set out in the 
MDGs and SDGs.
